The bill
ROUTERS Act
HR. 866, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Rep. Latta, Robert E. [R-OH-5]
ID: L000566
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 866, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
27 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 434-436 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate.
April 28, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater. The ROUTERS Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this farce and see what's really going on.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to study the national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and combo devices made by countries that are deemed "covered" (read: China). The real objective, however, is to create a smokescreen for politicians to pretend they're doing something about cybersecurity while actually accomplishing nothing.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill orders the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a study and submit a report within a year. Wow, I bet that'll be a thrilling read. The only change to existing law is the creation of another bureaucratic hurdle for companies to jump through. Because what we really need is more red tape.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:
* Politicians: They get to grandstand about cybersecurity and pretend they're doing something. * Lobbyists: They'll make a killing "advising" companies on how to navigate the new regulatory landscape. * Companies: They'll have to waste resources complying with this pointless study. * Voters: They'll be treated to more empty promises and meaningless rhetoric.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact will be negligible, but the implications are delicious:
* This bill is a perfect example of "security theater," where politicians create the illusion of action without actually addressing the problem. * The study will likely conclude that there are risks (shocking!), and then nothing will change because no one has the guts to take real action. * Companies will continue to prioritize profits over security, and consumers will remain blissfully ignorant of the risks.
In short, this bill is a waste of time, money, and oxygen. It's a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease where politicians pretend to care about an issue but actually just want to look good while doing nothing. The diagnosis? Terminal stupidity, with a side of cowardice and greed.
Rep. Latta, Robert E. [R-OH-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000385
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 54 nodes and 30 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $77,400
Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(a) directs a study of national security risks and cybersecurity vulnerabilities of consumer routers, modems, and combined devices from covered countries, which could lead to regulatory restrictions affecting telecom equipment manufacturers and service providers.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Latta, Robert E. [R-OH-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The ROUTERS Act focuses on assessing cybersecurity risks in consumer networking equipment from foreign-linked suppliers, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on protecting electric infrastructure from cyber and physical attacks by foreign actors. While not directly about the power grid, both address supply‑chain vulnerabilities and the need to mitigate threats that could compromise critical infrastructure."
— 401 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions nation in the summer110 and winter.111 Cyber and physical attacks also threaten the grid. Specific areas for reform include the following: l Limit the impact of subsidized renewables on price formation. Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs. The increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support the reliable dispatchable generation that is needed to serve the grid at all times.112 l Reform the application of reserve margins. Reserve margins have become largely meaningless. Traditionally, the electric industry has used “reserve margins” to ensure that the grid has enough power plants to guarantee reliability. Generally, reserve margins represent the amount of generation available (power plants) to meet peak electric demand (the time of day and year when people are using the most electricity) plus a percentage of additional generation for backup.113 However, given the increasing number of intermittent resources (like solar, which may be available during the heat of the day but disappears as the sun sets), other dispatchable generation needs to be available to meet customers’ electricity requirements. Therefore, the definitions and calculations of reserve margins and peak load need to be updated to focus on the modern grid’s reliability challenges for all times of the day and year. l Recognize the interdependence of electric generation and natural gas. The interdependence of electric generation and natural gas pipelines continues to grow. Given natural gas’s important role in generating electricity, especially as backup when renewables are not available, lack of natural gas pipelines or attacks on existing pipelines could threaten our ability to generate electricity. l Expand resource diversity and reliability. Resource diversity is needed to support grid reliability. Pressure to use 100 percent renewables or non– carbon emitting resources threatens the electric grid’s reliability. A grid that has access to dispatchable resources such as coal, nuclear, and natural gas for generating power is inherently more reliable and resilient. l Protect against cyber and physical attacks. The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. The attacks with guns on substations in North Carolina in December 2022 that left customers without power demonstrate the grid’s vulnerability.114
AI Analysis:
"Both the ROUTERS Act and the Project 2025 DOE section emphasize protecting critical infrastructure from cyber and physical threats posed by foreign actors, but the bill focuses on consumer networking devices while the policy centers on electric grid reliability, generation, and natural gas infrastructure."
— 401 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions nation in the summer110 and winter.111 Cyber and physical attacks also threaten the grid. Specific areas for reform include the following: l Limit the impact of subsidized renewables on price formation. Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs. The increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support the reliable dispatchable generation that is needed to serve the grid at all times.112 l Reform the application of reserve margins. Reserve margins have become largely meaningless. Traditionally, the electric industry has used “reserve margins” to ensure that the grid has enough power plants to guarantee reliability. Generally, reserve margins represent the amount of generation available (power plants) to meet peak electric demand (the time of day and year when people are using the most electricity) plus a percentage of additional generation for backup.113 However, given the increasing number of intermittent resources (like solar, which may be available during the heat of the day but disappears as the sun sets), other dispatchable generation needs to be available to meet customers’ electricity requirements. Therefore, the definitions and calculations of reserve margins and peak load need to be updated to focus on the modern grid’s reliability challenges for all times of the day and year. l Recognize the interdependence of electric generation and natural gas. The interdependence of electric generation and natural gas pipelines continues to grow. Given natural gas’s important role in generating electricity, especially as backup when renewables are not available, lack of natural gas pipelines or attacks on existing pipelines could threaten our ability to generate electricity. l Expand resource diversity and reliability. Resource diversity is needed to support grid reliability. Pressure to use 100 percent renewables or non– carbon emitting resources threatens the electric grid’s reliability. A grid that has access to dispatchable resources such as coal, nuclear, and natural gas for generating power is inherently more reliable and resilient. l Protect against cyber and physical attacks. The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. The attacks with guns on substations in North Carolina in December 2022 that left customers without power demonstrate the grid’s vulnerability.114 — 402 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies l Reform RTOs to require reliability. FERC should direct RTOs to establish reliability pricing for eligible dispatchable generation resources or require intermittent resources to procure backup power for times when they are not available to operate. In addition, Congress should repeal subsidies for generation resources. l Update the definition and calculation of reserve margins to support reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE should revise the definition of reserve margins to ensure the grid’s reliability throughout the day and the year. This will mean recognizing that reserve margins may need to consider “net peak” and exclude non-dispatchable resources from inclusion in reserve margin calculations. l Expand and protect natural gas infrastructure in support of electric generation. FERC needs to ensure that its consideration of natural gas pipeline applications recognizes the role that natural gas plays in electric reliability. FERC also needs to make sure that RTO pricing mechanisms support generators that need to contract for natural gas service on a firm basis. l Support resource diversity and reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE play key roles in balancing consumer, industrial, and national defense interests to ensure an ongoing reliable, plentiful, and accessible national electricity supply. NERC reliability reviews and FERC’s reliability roles should be aware that overreliance on any one power generation fuel source entails concurrent cost and availability risk. FERC should reform market rules that unduly discriminate against dispatchable resources needed for reliability. l Strengthen security against cyber and physical threats. FERC and NERC need to enhance the security of the bulk power system by, for example, banning Chinese-made components, investing in transformers, and hardening substations and other critical infrastructure. DOE should play a leading role in identifying and addressing threats to the grid. FERC: RTOS/ISOS AND “ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS” Mission/Overview For more than 20 years, FERC has issued regulations and directed policies for the creation and operation of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) to manage the dispatch of generation and
AI Analysis:
"Both the ROUTERS Act and the Project 2025 DOJ section focus on national security threats posed by foreign actors, particularly China, and emphasize securing supply chains and technology against adversarial influence. However, the bill is a Commerce-led study on cybersecurity vulnerabilities, while the DOJ policy emphasizes law enforcement, prosecution, and border security, resulting in only moderate thematic overlap."
— 555 — Department of Justice 1. Rigorously prosecute as much interstate drug activity as possible, including simple possession of distributable quantities.46 Recent efforts to create the impression that drug possession crimes are not serious offenses has contributed to the explosion of criminal organization activities in the United States. 2. Aggressively deploy the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),47 which Congress expressly created to empower the Department of Justice to treat patterns of intrastate- level crimes, such as robbery, extortion, and murder, as federal criminal conduct for criminal organizations and networks. The next Administration can use existing tools while it works with Congress to develop new tools. l Secure the border,48 which is the key entry point for many criminal organizations and their supplies, products, and employees. Mexico— which is arguably functioning as a failed state run by drug cartels—is the main point of transit for illegal drugs produced in Central and South America, fentanyl precursors from the Chinese Communist Party–led People’s Republic of China,49 weapons, human smuggling and trafficking, and other contraband. Mexican drug cartels, including the dominant Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), are the main drivers of fentanyl production and distribution in the United States. The southwestern land border is sufficiently porous that Mexican drug cartels have operational control of large sections of the border, which facilitates easy movement of product and personnel. These cartels are also violent and not afraid to demonstrate force on both sides of the border. Their conduct represents a clear and present danger to the United States and its citizens. In addition to finalizing the southwestern land border wall, the next Administration should take a creative and aggressive approach to tackling these dangerous criminal organizations at the border. This could include use of active-duty military personnel and National Guardsmen to assist in arrest operations along the border—something that has not yet been done. A new and forceful approach to interdiction will have a ripple effect on the operations of these criminal organizations, which currently operate freely without concern for criminal prosecution, and will lay the necessary groundwork for initial prosecutions of these organizations and their leaders. It is critical that the federal government staunch the flow of drugs by preventing the far-too-easy access to the United States that now exists. — 556 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise There can be no serious dispute that the Biden Administration has opened the southwest border to whomever wants to enter and that some of those entrants are smuggling fentanyl into the country. More than 100,000 Americans died in a one-year period from opioid overdoses, and many of them died specifically from having used fentanyl.50 The federal government should treat this problem as aggressively as necessary. Enforcing the customs and immigration laws is a matter of life and death. PURSUING A NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA AIMED AT EXTERNAL STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS, NOT U.S. CITIZENS EXERCISING THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS The Department of Justice plays a vital role in protecting our national security, and it must not refrain from engaging in public initiatives that identify our adver- saries and educate the American people about their activities. The DOJ’s China Initiative under President Trump reflected the department’s priority of combating Chinese threats to our national security.51 Because China was accountable for approximately 80 percent of all prosecutions for economic espionage and approximately 60 percent of all thefts of trade secrets, then-At- torney General Jeff Sessions set key goals for the China Initiative that included development of an enforcement strategy concerning researchers in labs and universities who were being coopted into stealing critical U.S. technologies, iden- tification of opportunities to address supply-chain threats more effectively, and education of colleges and universities about potential threats from Chinese influ- ence efforts on campus. In February 2022, the Biden Administration terminated the department’s China Initiative largely out of a concern for poor “optics.”52 While the Biden Administra- tion correctly identified China as America’s “only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it,”53 it folded in the face of political cor- rectness and sent the message that liberal sensitivities outweighed bringing justice to threats from China. The next conservative Administration should therefore: l Restart the China Initiative. l Pursue other programs to educate the American people about the real and dangerous threats to our national security and economic security that are posed by actors across the globe, most notably China and Iran. l Ensure that it is agile enough to devote sufficient resources and attention to other emerging threats that involve federal interests
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.