Sponsored by
Rep. Scott, Austin [R-GA-8]
ID: S001189
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8322, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 248-250 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Became Public Law No: 119-84.
April 17, 2026
📍 Current Status
This bill has become law!
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of HR 8322 is to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 through April 30, 2026. Because, you know, the surveillance state just can't get enough of spying on its own citizens. The objective? To perpetuate the illusion of national security while feeding the insatiable hunger of the intelligence community for more power and less oversight.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 by extending the repeal date of title VII from "two years after" the enactment of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act to April 30, 2026. Wow, what a bold move! It's not like they're just kicking the can down the road, avoiding any real reform or accountability. The changes are largely cosmetic, with some minor tweaks to transition procedures and effective dates. Yawn.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the intelligence community, law enforcement, and the surveillance-industrial complex. Oh, and let's not forget the American people, who will continue to have their civil liberties slowly eroded by this legislation. But hey, who needs privacy when you have "national security"?
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact? More of the same: continued mass surveillance, erosion of civil liberties, and a further entrenchment of the surveillance state. The implications? A perpetuation of the cycle of fear, mistrust, and authoritarianism that has come to define modern America. But don't worry, the politicians will continue to peddle their lies about "keeping us safe" while lining their pockets with campaign contributions from the defense and intelligence lobbies.
In conclusion, HR 8322 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical exercise in maintaining the status quo, designed to appease the powerful interests that really run this country. The rest of us? Just collateral damage in the never-ending game of political theater. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold. Like diagnosing the terminal stupidity of our elected officials.
Rep. Scott, Austin [R-GA-8]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 40 nodes and 30 connections (43 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $53,750
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 1 extends the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which includes provisions related to surveillance and data collection, potentially benefiting telecommunications companies that provide services to government agencies, as seen in the extension of repeal date of title VII (Section 1(a))
The extension of authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act may lead to increased demand for cybersecurity services and solutions to support government surveillance activities, as implied by the amendments to Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
Large tech platforms may benefit from the extended authorities, as they may be contracted to provide services or solutions to support government surveillance activities, although this is not explicitly stated in the bill text, it can be inferred from the context of the extensions (Section 1(a))
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Scott, Austin [R-GA-8])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
To repeal certain provisions relating to notification to Senate offices regarding legal process on disclosure of Senate data, and for other purposes.
119/hr/6019
Removing Barriers to Work for Disabled Americans Act
119/hr/8884
Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3898) to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to make targeted reforms with respect to waters of the United States and other matters, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3383) to amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 with respect to the authority of closed-end companies to invest in private funds; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3638) to direct the Secretary of Energy to prepare periodic assessments and submit reports on the supply chain for the generation and transmission of electricity, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3628) to amend the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to add a standard related to State consideration of reliable generation, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3668) to promote interagency coordination for reviewing certain authorizations under section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (S. 1071) to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to disinter the remains of Fernando V. Cota from Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery, Texas, and for other purposes; and for other purposes.
119/hres/936