District of Columbia Code Returning Citizens Coordination Act
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Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large]
ID: N000147
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Congresswoman Norton and her cohorts. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The District of Columbia Code Returning Citizens Coordination Act (what a mouthful) claims to facilitate information sharing between the Bureau of Prisons and the Mayor of D.C. regarding individuals under federal jurisdiction. The stated goal is to aid in reentry programs for released prisoners. How touching.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to provide the Mayor with information on certain persons, including name, age, Federal Register Number, facility location, and scheduled release date. Oh, and there's a prohibition on disclosing this information outside of D.C. government, except for lawyers and reentry organizations. Because, you know, confidentiality is key when dealing with convicted felons.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the Bureau of Prisons, the Mayor of D.C., law enforcement agencies (who are conveniently excluded from receiving this information), and various reentry organizations. One wonders which special interest groups lobbied for this bill...
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's get real here. This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a token effort to appear concerned about prisoner reentry, while actually doing nothing to address the root causes of recidivism or provide meaningful support services. The information sharing provisions are likely to be used as a fig leaf for more bureaucratic busywork, rather than actual reform.
The real disease here is the chronic inability of our elected officials to tackle systemic problems with anything resembling courage or vision. Instead, they opt for shallow, feel-good legislation that allows them to claim credit without actually doing any heavy lifting.
Diagnosis: Legislative Laryngitis – a condition characterized by a complete lack of substance, accompanied by an abundance of empty rhetoric and self-congratulatory back-patting. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for the inevitable disappointment that follows.
In short, this bill is a joke. A pathetic attempt to appear concerned about prisoner reentry while doing nothing to actually address the issue. The only thing it will accomplish is providing more fodder for politicians to grandstand and pretend they're doing something meaningful. Wake me up when someone introduces a real reform bill.
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Introduction
— 527 — Department of the Interior Bay in Alaska; to expand recreation across BLM’s vast, diverse, and unique land- scapes; or to manage timber and rangelands to prevent wildfires, would all journey to Grand Junction. Convention opportunities on Colorado’s western slope would abound for BLM’s disparate constituencies to congregate and meet with BLM leadership. The Western States Sheriffs’ Association, for example, whose annual gathering attracts hundreds of law enforcement officers from 17 western and plains states might have moved its event to Grand Junction. Law Enforcement Officers. In 2002, at the direction of the Secretary of the Interior in the days following the 9/11 attack, the Inspector General (IG) for DOI made a series of department-wide recommendations regarding law enforcement. Then-Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton ordered adoption of those recom- mendations, which drew strong bipartisan support from Congress. Over the years, most were implemented. One, however, remained undone: placing all BLM law enforcement officers (LEOs), that is, its 212 Law Enforcement Rangers and 76 Special Agents, in an exclusively law enforcement chain of command. This was not just the IG’s recommendation in 2002, but that of every IG who fol- lowed. It is also the strong recommendation of the department’s top LEO. Moreover, it has been the urgent recommendation of law enforcement professionals across the country, especially in the West, for decades, including the Western States Sher- iffs Association. Unfortunately, over time, BLM leadership stonewalled, adhering to a haphazard system in which LEOs reported to non-LEO superiors, including not only state directors, but also district and field managers with expertise in other fields—range management or petroleum engineering, for example—with only 24 hours of law enforcement study. Obviously, those managers lack a comprehensive understanding of law enforcement issues—constitutional, legal, and tactical. In addition, they do not uniformly apply or enforce rules of conduct or ethical stan- dards for LEOs and special agents, leading to weakened esprit de corps and morale. Worse yet, because of their duties as managers of the multiple-use lands under their jurisdiction, they are exposed to conflicts of interests and may intentionally or unintentionally prevent LEOs from investigating violations or applying the law. In the final days of the Trump Administration, Secretary David L. Bernhardt ordered, and Deputy Director William Perry Pendley implemented, the IG’s recom- mendation. Of course, leadership heads exploded; they were furious with their loss of authority, not to mention subordinates and budgets. Unfortunately, in the first days of the Biden Administration, BLM Deputy Director Mike Nedd suspended Pendley’s order. Nonetheless, LEOs, the BLM, and westerners want LEOs—who make life-and- death decisions—to be as well-trained and well-equipped as possible. They should report to a professional, expert, and knowledgeable chain of command. After all, they protect visitors to BLM lands and the natural and cultural resources of those lands, as well as the employees who manage those lands. — 528 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise BLM’s LEOs must keep in touch, work closely, and coordinate with fellow fed- eral, state, and local law enforcement officers. In the Trump Administration, they joined state and local law enforcement in arresting dangerous suspects in Cortez, Colorado; responded to a request from a rural sheriff in Arizona to rescue a family stuck in freezing temperatures; and, teamed up in an all-hands-on-deck effort to locate a missing American Indian teenager in rural Montana. More important, western LEOs need the assurance that the BLM LEOs with whom they work are professionals who report through a professional chain of command. Wild Horses and Burros. In 1971, Congress ordered the BLM to manage wild horses and burros to ensure their iconic presence never disappeared from the western landscape. For decades, Congress watched as these herds overwhelmed the land’s ability to sustain them, crowded out indigenous plant and other animal species, threatened the survival of species listed under the Endangered Species Act, invaded private and permitted public land, disturbed private property rights, and turned the sod into concrete. BLM experts said in 2019 that some affected land will never recover from this unmitigated damage. There are 95,000 wild horses and burros roaming nearly 32 million acres in the West—triple what scientists and land management experts say the range can sup- port. These animals face starvation and death from lack of forage and water. The population has more than doubled in just the past 10 years and continues to grow at a rate of 10 to 15 percent annually. This number includes the more than 47,000 animals the BLM has already gathered from public lands, at a cost to the American taxpayer of nearly $50 million annually to care for them in off-range corrals. This is not a new issue—it is not just a western issue—it is an American issue. What is happening to these once-proud beasts of burden is neither compassionate nor humane, and what these animals are doing to federal lands and fragile ecosys- tems is unacceptable. In 2019, the American Association of Equine Practitioners and the American Veterinary Medication Association—two of the largest organi- zations of professional veterinarians in the world—issued a joint policy calling for further reducing overpopulation to protect the health and well-being of wild horses and burros on public lands. The National Wild Horse and Burro Advisory Board, a panel of nine experts and professionals convened to advise the BLM, endorsed the joint policy. Furthermore, animal welfare organizations such as the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Humane Society of the United States recognize that the prosperity of wild horses and burros on public lands is threatened if herds continue to grow unabated. The BLM’s multi-pronged approach in its 2020 Report to Congress46 included expanded adoptions and sales of horses gathered from overpopulated herds; increased gathers and increased capacity for off-range holding facilities and pas- tures; more effective use of fertility control efforts; and improved research, in concert with the academic and veterinary communities, to identify more effective
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.