Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
ID: B001307
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 25 - 19.
April 21, 2026
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026 is a laughable attempt to address the "national security risks" posed by China's military-civil fusion strategy. Let me dissect this farce for you.
The bill creates new regulations and modifies existing ones, because what's a legislative session without more red tape? The Secretary of State, Defense, or Energy can now submit proposed rules to the Export Administration Review Board, which will undoubtedly lead to a thrilling game of bureaucratic ping-pong. The board has 30 days to vote on these proposals, unless they need more time to "consult" (read: stall), in which case they can extend the deadline by another 30 days.
The affected industries and sectors are, predictably, those related to export controls, defense, and technology. Because who doesn't love a good game of "let's restrict exports to China"? The compliance requirements are, as always, a joy to behold. Exporters will need to perform due diligence to prevent the PRC's military from accessing US technology, because that's not already a Herculean task.
The enforcement mechanisms and penalties are, of course, the usual toothless wonders. The bill requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress within 150 days, which will undoubtedly be a riveting read. As for penalties, I'm sure the Export Administration Review Board will be swift and merciless in their punishment of non-compliant entities (just kidding, they'll probably just issue a strongly worded letter).
The economic and operational impacts of this bill will be negligible, except for the usual suspects: defense contractors, tech companies, and exporters who will have to navigate the new regulatory landscape. But hey, who needs a functioning economy when you can have more bureaucracy?
In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of legislative placebo effect. It's a symbolic gesture designed to make lawmakers look tough on China, while doing nothing to actually address the underlying issues. The real disease here is the chronic inability of Congress to pass meaningful legislation that doesn't serve special interests or perpetuate bureaucratic inertia. But hey, at least they tried. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this legislative trainwreck unfold.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 24 nodes and 24 connections
Total contributions: $58,100
Top Donors - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.
- −Semiconductors & Hardware confidence 0.80
Section 3(a)(4) requires review of PRC's strategic technology sectors including semiconductor, and Section 3(b)(1)(A)-(E) allows proposing changes to export control policy such as additions to Military End-User List or new rules, which could impose restrictions on semiconductor exports to PRC entities, harming the industry.
- −AI & Cloud Infrastructure confidence 0.75
Section 3(a)(4) includes artificial intelligence as a strategic technology sector tied to PRC military, and Section 3(b) allows proposing export control policy changes (e.g., Military End-User List additions, new rules) that could restrict AI-related exports, harming AI & cloud infrastructure firms.
- −Biotech & Research confidence 0.70
Section 3(a)(4) includes biotechnology as a strategic technology sector linked to PRC military, and Section 3(b) permits proposing export control policy changes (e.g., restrictions, new rules) that could limit biotech exports or collaborations, harming the biotech industry.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill strongly aligns with the Project 2025 policy by addressing national security risks posed by the PRC's exploitation of US technology and talent, and introducing new regulations to enhance interagency coordination and oversight in export control regulations. The bill's focus on reviewing the PRC's military-civil fusion strategy and updating US export control policies reflects key priorities outlined in the Project 2025 policy."
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on restricting exports to China and preventing the transfer of US technology to the Chinese military aligns moderately with Project 2025's objective of strengthening the US manufacturing and defense industrial base, but it does not directly address the broader trade policy issues highlighted in the project. The bill's goals are related to, but do not fully capture, the scope of Project 2025's trade and economic security concerns."
— 765 — 26 TRADE THE CASE FOR FAIR TRADE Peter Navarro For decades the world has struggled with a shifting maze of punitive tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, dollar-locked currencies, and the like. Many of these import-inhibiting and export-encouraging devices have long been employed by major exporting countries trying to amass ever larger [trade] surpluses. Warren Buffett, CEO, Berkshire Hathaway1 The Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term industrial strategy to ensure its global dominance…. Beijing’s ultimate goal is for domestic companies to replace foreign companies as designers and manufacturers of key technology and products first at home, then abroad. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission2 The United States of America is the world’s dominant superpower and remains the world’s arsenal of democracy. To maintain that global positioning—and thereby best protect the homeland and our own democratic institutions—it is critical that the United States strengthen its manufacturing and defense industrial base at the same time that it increases the reliability and resilience of its globally dispersed — 766 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise supply chains. That will necessarily require the onshoring of a significant portion of production currently offshored by American multinational corporations. Trade policy can and must play an essential role in an American manufacturing and defense industrial base renaissance. However, several major challenges in the international trading environment are pushing America in the opposite direction. The first challenge is rooted in MFN: the “most favored nation” rule of the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the MFN rule, WTO members must apply the lowest tariffs that they apply to the products of any one country to the products of every other country.3 However, WTO members can charge higher tariffs if they apply these nonreciprocal tariffs to all countries. The practical result has been the systematic exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers through higher tariffs institutionalized by MFN. In turn, this unfair and nonreciprocal trade has resulted in chronic U.S. trade deficits with much of the rest of the world. This systemic trade imbalance serves as a brake and bridle on both GDP growth and real wages in the American economy while encumbering the U.S. with significant foreign debt. The second challenge is part of the broader existential threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its quest for global dominance. That chal- lenge is rooted in the CCP’s continued economic aggression, which begins with mercantilist and protectionist trade policy tools such as tariffs, nontariff barriers, dumping, counterfeiting and piracy, and currency manipulation. However, Com- munist China’s economic aggression also extends to an intricate set of industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that have dramatically skewed the international trading arena. Both the unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade institutionalized by the WTO and Communist China’s economic aggression are weakening America’s man- ufacturing and defense industrial base even as the fragility of globally dispersed supply chains has been brought into sharp relief by the COVID-19 pandemic with its associated lockdowns and other disruptions and by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian revanchism, in particular, has demonstrated once again how bad actors on the world stage can use trade policy (for example, export restraints on natural gas) as a weapon of war. LAYING THE TRADE DEFICIT PREDICATE The great football coach Bill Parcells once said, “You are what your record says you are.” America’s record on trade—specifically American’s chronic and ever-ex- panding trade deficit—says that America is the globe’s biggest trade loser and a victim of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade. During the first year of the Biden Administration, the overall U.S. trade defi- cit, including goods and services, soared by 29 percent, from $654 billion in 2020 to $845 billion in 2021.4 Over the same time period, imports of consumer goods,
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and Project 2025 policy share some thematic alignment in addressing national security risks posed by China, but the bill's focus on export controls and regulatory modifications does not directly implement or strongly support the broader policy objectives outlined in Project 2025. The moderate alignment is due to the shared goal of mitigating Chinese threats, but the approaches differ significantly."
— 789 — Trade The following policy options were on the drawing board or in discussion as preparations for a potential Trump second term were being made. These options span the spectrum from purely trade-related like increasing tariffs to cutting off Communist China’s access to American financial markets, research institutions, and consumers. The next American President should strongly consider adopting all of them as a package: l Strategically expand tariffs to all Chinese products and increase tariff rates to levels that will block out “Made in China” products, and execute this strategy in a manner and at a pace that will not expose the U.S. to lack of access to essential products like key pharmaceuticals. l Provide significant financial and tax incentives to American companies that are seeking to onshore production from Communist China to U.S. soil. l Stop Communist China’s abuse of the so-called de minimis exemption, which allows it to evade the tariffs for products valued at less than $800. l Prohibit Communist Chinese state-owned enterprises from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts (for example, contracts for subway and other transportation systems). l Prohibit the use of Communist Chinese–made drones in American airspace. l Ban all Chinese social media apps such as TikTok and WeChat, which pose significant national security risks and expose American consumers to data and identity theft. l Prohibit all Communist Chinese investment in high-technology industries. l Prohibit U.S. pension funds from investing in Communist Chinese stocks. l Delist any Communist Chinese stocks that do not meet Public Company Accounting Oversight Board standards or, alternatively, close off the Chinese “A shares” stock market to U.S. investment and deregister U.S.- sanctioned Communist Chinese companies. l Prohibit the use of Hong Kong clearinghouses as transit points for American capital investing in the Chinese mainland. l Prohibit the inclusion of Chinese sovereign bonds in U.S. investors’ portfolios. — 790 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Systematically reduce and eventually eliminate any U.S. dependence on Communist Chinese supply chains that may be used to threaten national security such as medicines, silicon chips, rare earth minerals, computer motherboards, flatscreen displays, and military components. l Sanction any companies, including American companies like Apple, that facilitate Communist China’s use of its Great Firewall surveillance and censorship capabilities. l Order the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice to contract with U.S.-owned and U.S.-operated artificial intelligence companies that are capable of detecting, identifying, and disrupting both the domestic groups’ and CCP influencers’ social media operations and funding streams using public information as a rapidly available offensive measure. l Reinvigorate and expand the DHS crackdown on the CCP’s use of e-sellers (including third-party sellers) and the shippers and operators of major warehouses such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba to flood U.S. markets with counterfeit and pirated goods. l Compel the closure of all Confucius Institutes in the U.S., which serve as propaganda arms of the CCP. l Significantly reduce or eliminate the issuance of visas to Chinese students or researchers to prevent espionage and information harvesting. l Hold the CCP accountable for the COVID-19 virus, which almost certainly originated as a genetically engineered virus from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and do so through the establishment of a presidential commission or select congressional committee that would investigate the origins of the virus; its various costs, both economically and in human life; and the possible means of collecting damages from the CCP, which are likely to rise to the trillions of dollars. If the new U.S. President wishes to defend this country against the serious exis- tential threat posed by Communist China, that President will adopt all of these proposals through the requisite presidential executive orders or memoranda. Effective Trade Policy in the Real World. To conclude this analysis, it is useful to offer brief reflections on a number of key obstacles to implementing the policy initiatives recommended in this chapter. These obstacles include:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Related Bills
Other Bills by Rep. Baird, James R.
Similar Topics
To amend the Arms Export Control Act to modify certain provisions relating to AUKUS defense trade cooperation, and for other purposes.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations Licensing Reform Act
Export Dispute Resolution Act