The bill
POINT Act
HR. 7750, 119th Congress.
POINT Act
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/7750
Last Updated: March 18, 2026
Sponsored by
Rep. Latimer, George [D-NY-16]
ID: L000606
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. Latimer, George [D-NY-16]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$66,500 raised
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
70% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Justice" section, p. 596-598 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H2453)
March 4, 2026
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
🏛️
Committee Review
🗳️
Floor Action
✅
Passed House
🏛️
Senate Review
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Joy. Another congressional bill that's about as effective as a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. Let me dissect this mess for you.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The POINT Act (Protecting Our Integrity and Nation from Tyranny Act) claims to prevent election interference by the executive branch. Yeah, right. It's just another exercise in legislative theater, designed to make voters feel good while doing nothing substantial.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**
* The bill prohibits "covered individuals" (read: high-ranking government officials) from engaging in election interference or using government resources for such purposes. * It defines "election interference" as any conduct that undermines public confidence in elections, including spreading unsubstantiated claims of fraud or attempting to influence vote results. * The President is restricted from deploying the Armed Forces or exercising federal law enforcement authority in a state where it might disrupt an election, except in cases related to secession or armed rebellion.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**
* High-ranking government officials (the "covered individuals") who'll pretend to be outraged by these new restrictions. * State and local election officials who'll have to deal with the bureaucratic fallout from this bill. * Voters who'll be misled into thinking their elections are now safer, when in reality, this bill is just a drop in the ocean.
**Potential Impact & Implications:**
* This bill will do nothing to address the root causes of election interference, such as money laundering, gerrymandering, or voter suppression. * It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, designed to make politicians look good while doing nothing substantial. * The restrictions on the President's authority might lead to some interesting constitutional debates, but ultimately, it's just a sideshow.
In conclusion, this bill is a joke. A pathetic attempt to address a complex problem with simplistic solutions. It's like trying to cure cancer with a few aspirin and a pat on the back. The real disease – corruption, greed, and stupidity – remains untreated. Mark my words: this bill will be nothing more than a footnote in the annals of legislative history, a reminder of the politicians' boundless capacity for self-delusion and voter manipulation.
Related Topics
Elections & Voting Rights
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Latimer, George [D-NY-16]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$66,500
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000
No PAC contributions found
1
SOMERS DEMOCRATIC CLUB
$500
No committee contributions found
1
CUTLER, RANDI
$6,600
2
GUTHART, DAWN
$6,600
3
HABER, ROBERT
$6,600
4
ABRAMSON, ALAN
$3,300
5
BRODIE, JACOB
$3,300
6
BUCHWEITZ, TAMAR
$3,300
7
CUOMO COLE, MARIA
$3,300
8
DACHS, HARVEY
$3,300
9
DE CICCO, JOHN
$3,300
10
ETTENGER, MARK
$3,300
11
FINKELSTEIN, HOWARD
$3,300
12
FOUGERE, DANIEL
$3,300
13
FOUGERE, STEPHANIE
$3,300
14
FRANCO, CORINNE
$3,300
15
GRINGLAS, MARCY B
$3,300
16
HIRSCHTICK, JON
$3,300
17
KAPLAN, ROBERT N
$3,300
Donor Network - Rep. Latimer, George [D-NY-16]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 31 nodes and 21 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $66,500
Top Donors - Rep. Latimer, George [D-NY-16]
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
1 Org17 Individuals
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Department of Justice
Moderate
Vector: 64%Pages: 596-598AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The POINT Act focuses on preventing executive branch interference in elections, while the Project 2025 DOJ policy emphasizes limiting judicial and administrative overreach in absentee ballot curing and restoring proper jurisdiction over voter suppression claims. Both share concerns about election integrity and improper influence, though the POINT Act targets executive power and the Project 2025 text critiques DOJ and judicial actions in election administration."
Key themes:election integrityvoter suppressionballot curingexecutive overreachfederal election oversight
— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation.
Federal Election Commission
Weak
Vector: 69%Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The POINT Act focuses on restricting executive branch interference in elections, while the Project 2025 FEC section concerns reforming the Federal Election Commission's litigation authority, commissioner terms, and regulatory guidance. Both share a broad concern for election integrity and preventing abuse of power, but they address different mechanisms and institutions, resulting only a weak thematic overlap."
Key themes:election integritypreventing abuse of powerfair elections
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Federal Communications Commission
Weak
Vector: 65%Pages: 895-897AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The POINT Act focuses on preventing executive branch interference in elections, while the Project 2025 policy centers on FEC and DOJ enforcement of campaign finance law and protecting political speech from overzealous prosecution. Though both relate to election integrity, their mechanisms and primary concerns differ significantly."
Key themes:election integrityexecutive branch authorityDepartment of JusticeFederal Election Commissioncampaign finance enforcement
— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.