SHADOW Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/7632
Last Updated: September 9, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

ID: S001224

Follow the money

The bill

SHADOW Act

HR. 7632, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$105,700 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 229-231 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 46 - 0.

March 25, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SHADOW Act (because, of course, it needs a catchy acronym) claims to address the "persistent and growing threat" of hybrid warfare activities against US interests. How quaint. Its primary objective is to create a new bureaucratic position, the Coordinator for Hybrid Warfare Accountability, because what every government needs is more administrative bloat.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to:

1. Assess and engage diplomatically with foreign governments to counter hybrid warfare activities (read: more pointless meetings and empty rhetoric). 2. Designate a Coordinator to oversee interagency efforts on hybrid warfare (because one person can surely fix this complex problem). 3. Submit reports on Chinese entities supporting Russia's defense industrial base, recommending sanctions or other measures (a classic example of "do something" legislation).

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

1. The Department of State, which will have to deal with the new Coordinator and associated bureaucratic red tape. 2. NATO allies, who will be subjected to more US lectures on cooperation and information sharing. 3. Chinese entities, which might face sanctions or other measures (but let's be real, they'll just find ways to circumvent them). 4. The American people, who will foot the bill for this legislative posturing.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of "security theater," designed to create the illusion of action while accomplishing little. Its potential impact is negligible, but it may:

1. Create a new layer of bureaucratic inefficiency. 2. Provide a temporary distraction from more pressing issues (like the fact that US foreign policy is still driven by special interests and campaign donations). 3. Further strain relations with China and Russia, because what's a little more diplomatic tension among "friends"? 4. Waste taxpayer money on reports, meetings, and other bureaucratic busywork.

In conclusion, the SHADOW Act is a textbook example of legislative placebo effect: it looks like something is being done, but in reality, it's just a shallow attempt to appease the masses while perpetuating the status quo. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold. Next patient, please!

Related Topics

National Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$105,700
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$105,400

No PAC contributions found

1
TUCKER HILL HOA
1 transaction
$300

No committee contributions found

1
CHALIN, THOMAS
2 transactions
$11,600
2
MULLIGI, GINO
1 transaction
$9,000
3
FRITCHER, SAMMY
1 transaction
$6,600
4
LOBB, PAT
1 transaction
$6,600
5
MYERS, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
6
HUFFINES, RAY
1 transaction
$6,600
7
MOSES, FRED
1 transaction
$6,600
8
LI, QINGSONG
1 transaction
$6,000
9
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
1 transaction
$5,800
10
HILTON, W.D.
1 transaction
$5,000
11
KORCA, YLBER
1 transaction
$5,000
12
SMAJLI, MARIO
1 transaction
$5,000
13
KRASNIQI, BLERINA
1 transaction
$4,500
14
QUILLIN, GEORGE
1 transaction
$4,000
15
ADAMS, CAROL A
1 transaction
$3,300
16
DEASON, DARWIN
1 transaction
$3,300
17
MCCLELLAND, MARK
1 transaction
$3,300
18
KELLOGG, DAVID H
1 transaction
$3,300
19
HILTON, MARY JEAN
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Keating, William R. [D-MA-9]

ID: K000375

Top Contributors

20

1
EPPERLY, MATTHEW THOMAS
CHARTWELL STRATEGY GROUP • MANAGING DIRECTOR
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
2
WORLEY, RICHARD
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualEDGARTOWN, MA
$3,300
Feb 19, 2024
3
MCCANN, WILLIAM J.
STRATEGIC MARKETING INNOVATIONS • CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER
IndividualARLINGTON, VA
$3,300
May 10, 2023
4
FISH, JOHN F.
SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION • CEO
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Jun 28, 2024
5
MCCARTNEY, CHRISTINE B.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualOSTERVILLE, MA
$3,300
Jun 6, 2024
6
MCCLENNEN, JAMES C.
WEQUASSETT RESORT AND GOLF CLUB • PARTNER
IndividualHARWICH, MA
$3,300
Aug 12, 2024
7
ABRAHAM, ANDREW
KECHES • LAWYER
IndividualMILTON, MA
$3,300
Sep 26, 2023
8
FLAHERTY, SEAN C.
KECHES LAW GROUP • ATTORNEY
IndividualBRIDGEWATER, MA
$3,300
Sep 26, 2023
9
GREEN, LAWRENCE ALAN
RENTALS UNLIMITED • CEO
IndividualNANTUCKET, MA
$3,300
Jul 24, 2023
10
LEITER, DAVID J.
PLURUS STRATEGIES LLC • CONSULTANT
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Sep 28, 2023

Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32]

ID: S000344

Top Contributors

26

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Oct 30, 2023
2
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,000
Oct 5, 2023
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$700
Oct 21, 2024
7
AHMED, TAIMOOR
MARKHOR LOGISTICS • CEO
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
8
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
9
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
10
GARHWAL, SANJEEV
WWMG • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEATTLE, WA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

ID: B001307

Top Contributors

21

1
TORCHBEARER PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OrganizationCARMEL, IN
$1,000
Apr 10, 2024
2
NICOSON, JON
NICOSON FARMING INC • FARMER
IndividualCORY, IN
$6,600
Aug 25, 2023
3
BAIRD, BEAU
SELF • RANCHER
IndividualGREENCASTLE, IN
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
4
GOODRICH, CHARLES D
GAYLOR ELECTRIC, INC. • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualNOBLESVILLE, IN
$3,300
Jun 30, 2024
5
CARRIER, JAMISON
RELENTLESS DEALER SERVICES • FOUNDER
IndividualGREENWOOD, IN
$3,300
Mar 11, 2024
6
WALTON, ROBERT S
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBENTONVILLE, AR
$3,300
Mar 31, 2024
7
NICOSON, BARBRA
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCORY, IN
$3,300
Jul 8, 2024
8
NICOSON, JON
NICOSON FARMING INC • FARMER
IndividualCORY, IN
$3,300
Jul 8, 2024
9
NESSEL, ARIEL
ENTREPRENEUR • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualROSS, CA
$2,500
Apr 14, 2023
10
LANGLEY, THOMAS
LANGLEY CONSULTING • CONSULTANT
IndividualATHENS, AL
$2,000
Sep 29, 2023

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

21

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

22

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
IndividualROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELF • ACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATION • EXECUTIVE
IndividualTULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELF • MD
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELF • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 33 nodes and 31 connections

Total contributions: $31

Top Donors - Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Org19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 2 harmed.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 4 requires a report identifying Chinese entities materially supporting Russia's defense industrial base and recommending sanctions, export controls, or other measures. This could lead to sanctions on Chinese defense suppliers, potentially benefiting U.S. defense contractors by reducing foreign competition or creating opportunities for alternative suppliers.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(3) encourages information sharing with NATO allies on hybrid warfare activities, including Chinese and Russian cyber campaigns. Section 3(b)(1) includes assessing and disseminating information on hybrid warfare activities for diplomatic engagement and interagency strategy. Section 3(d)(1) requires reports on key assessments and findings on hybrid warfare activities. These provisions likely increase demand for cybersecurity threat intelligence, attribution, and defensive services, benef

  • −Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(b)(4) includes supporting resilience and de-risking efforts with allies and partners in sectors vulnerable to foreign coercion, including critical infrastructure and telecommunications. This implies potential regulatory scrutiny or requirements for telecommunications companies to enhance security against hybrid threats, which could impose compliance costs.

  • Section 3(b)(4) includes supporting resilience and de-risking efforts with allies and partners in sectors vulnerable to foreign coercion, including critical infrastructure and energy. This suggests potential regulatory focus on energy infrastructure security, possibly leading to new requirements or costs for energy infrastructure firms.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of State

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 229-231AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The SHADOW Act aligns closely with Project 2025's call for the State Department to counter hybrid threats from China and Russia, establish enforceable cyber norms with allies, and support offensive deterrence strategies in cyberspace, particularly through accountability mechanisms and transatlantic coordination."

Key themes:countering hybrid warfareChina-Russia threat coordinationenforceable cyber normstransatlantic cooperationaccountability for adversarial support

— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy. — 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.

Department of State

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 229-231AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The SHADOW Act aligns closely with Project 2025's call for the State Department to counter hybrid threats from China and Russia, establish enforceable norms in cyberspace, and work with allies to deter aggression below the threshold of armed conflict through coordinated action and accountability measures."

Key themes:countering hybrid warfareChina and Russia threatsally cooperationenforceable normsdeterrence and accountability

— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.

Department of State

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 208-210AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The SHADOW Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on countering the Chinese threat and enhancing State Department coordination to advance presidential foreign policy objectives, particularly through centralized efforts to address hybrid warfare and sanctions on entities supporting adversaries."

Key themes:countering ChinaState Department coordinationhybrid warfaresanctions enforcementinteragency alignment

— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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