The bill
SHADOW Act
HR. 7632, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
ID: S001224
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7632, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 229-231 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 46 - 0.
March 25, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SHADOW Act (because, of course, it needs a catchy acronym) claims to address the "persistent and growing threat" of hybrid warfare activities against US interests. How quaint. Its primary objective is to create a new bureaucratic position, the Coordinator for Hybrid Warfare Accountability, because what every government needs is more administrative bloat.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to:
1. Assess and engage diplomatically with foreign governments to counter hybrid warfare activities (read: more pointless meetings and empty rhetoric). 2. Designate a Coordinator to oversee interagency efforts on hybrid warfare (because one person can surely fix this complex problem). 3. Submit reports on Chinese entities supporting Russia's defense industrial base, recommending sanctions or other measures (a classic example of "do something" legislation).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. The Department of State, which will have to deal with the new Coordinator and associated bureaucratic red tape. 2. NATO allies, who will be subjected to more US lectures on cooperation and information sharing. 3. Chinese entities, which might face sanctions or other measures (but let's be real, they'll just find ways to circumvent them). 4. The American people, who will foot the bill for this legislative posturing.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of "security theater," designed to create the illusion of action while accomplishing little. Its potential impact is negligible, but it may:
1. Create a new layer of bureaucratic inefficiency. 2. Provide a temporary distraction from more pressing issues (like the fact that US foreign policy is still driven by special interests and campaign donations). 3. Further strain relations with China and Russia, because what's a little more diplomatic tension among "friends"? 4. Waste taxpayer money on reports, meetings, and other bureaucratic busywork.
In conclusion, the SHADOW Act is a textbook example of legislative placebo effect: it looks like something is being done, but in reality, it's just a shallow attempt to appease the masses while perpetuating the status quo. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold. Next patient, please!
Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000375
Top Contributors
20
ID: S000344
Top Contributors
26
ID: B001307
Top Contributors
21
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
21
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 33 nodes and 31 connections
Total contributions: $31
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 2 harmed.
Section 4 requires a report identifying Chinese entities materially supporting Russia's defense industrial base and recommending sanctions, export controls, or other measures. This could lead to sanctions on Chinese defense suppliers, potentially benefiting U.S. defense contractors by reducing foreign competition or creating opportunities for alternative suppliers.
Section 2(3) encourages information sharing with NATO allies on hybrid warfare activities, including Chinese and Russian cyber campaigns. Section 3(b)(1) includes assessing and disseminating information on hybrid warfare activities for diplomatic engagement and interagency strategy. Section 3(d)(1) requires reports on key assessments and findings on hybrid warfare activities. These provisions likely increase demand for cybersecurity threat intelligence, attribution, and defensive services, benef
Section 3(b)(4) includes supporting resilience and de-risking efforts with allies and partners in sectors vulnerable to foreign coercion, including critical infrastructure and telecommunications. This implies potential regulatory scrutiny or requirements for telecommunications companies to enhance security against hybrid threats, which could impose compliance costs.
Section 3(b)(4) includes supporting resilience and de-risking efforts with allies and partners in sectors vulnerable to foreign coercion, including critical infrastructure and energy. This suggests potential regulatory focus on energy infrastructure security, possibly leading to new requirements or costs for energy infrastructure firms.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The SHADOW Act aligns closely with Project 2025's call for the State Department to counter hybrid threats from China and Russia, establish enforceable cyber norms with allies, and support offensive deterrence strategies in cyberspace, particularly through accountability mechanisms and transatlantic coordination."
— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy. — 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.
AI Analysis:
"The SHADOW Act aligns closely with Project 2025's call for the State Department to counter hybrid threats from China and Russia, establish enforceable norms in cyberspace, and work with allies to deter aggression below the threshold of armed conflict through coordinated action and accountability measures."
— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.
AI Analysis:
"The SHADOW Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on countering the Chinese threat and enhancing State Department coordination to advance presidential foreign policy objectives, particularly through centralized efforts to address hybrid warfare and sanctions on entities supporting adversaries."
— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.