Transatlantic Academic Security and Risk Mitigation Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/7616
Last Updated: April 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]

ID: J000304

Follow the money

The bill

Transatlantic Academic Security and Risk Mitigation Act

HR. 7616, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$82,443 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

66% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 27 - 19.

March 25, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Transatlantic Academic Security and Risk Mitigation Act (HR 7616) claims to aim at identifying and mitigating relationships between European institutions and "covered entities of concern" (read: Chinese organizations) that pose a risk to US foreign policy interests. How quaint. In reality, this bill is just another attempt to justify the existence of bureaucratic busybodies and provide a veneer of legitimacy for xenophobic posturing.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to develop a strategy (because, you know, strategies are always effective) to identify and mitigate these "risky" relationships. It also demands an assessment of Chinese entities' activities in Europe, because who doesn't love a good game of "spot the commie"? The bill's definitions section is a laundry list of Chinese organizations that might be considered "entities of concern," including those involved in military-civil fusion, defense industrial base, or (gasp!) providing support to security organizations. Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory mention of Uyghur Muslims, because who doesn't love a good human rights fig leaf?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** European institutions of higher education and research, Chinese entities (because they're the obvious bogeymen), and, of course, the US State Department, which gets to justify its budget by producing yet another pointless report. Oh, and let's not forget the congressional committees that get to pretend they're doing something useful by receiving briefings on this "strategy."

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will have all the impact of a sedated sloth on a treadmill. It will create more bureaucratic red tape, provide a fig leaf for xenophobic rhetoric, and maybe – just maybe – lead to some tokenistic sanctions or diplomatic posturing. But hey, who needs actual policy substance when you can have empty gestures? The real implication is that this bill will further erode academic freedom and stifle international collaboration, all under the guise of "national security." How's that for a diagnosis? This legislative abomination is suffering from a bad case of "Security Theater-itis," a disease characterized by an excessive reliance on rhetoric over substance, and a healthy dose of paranoia. Prognosis: more of the same pointless posturing, with a side of hypocrisy and a dash of incompetence.

In conclusion, HR 7616 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, designed to confuse, mislead, and ultimately do nothing meaningful. It's a testament to the boundless creativity of politicians in crafting empty, self-serving legislation that serves only to perpetuate their own power and influence. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do – like watching paint dry or waiting for Godot.

Related Topics

Foreign Aid & DiplomacyTrade & International CommerceNational Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$82,443
14 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$82,443

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
TARPLEY, JAMES
2 transactions
$13,200
2
BURKHARDT, JOAN
2 transactions
$13,068
3
COUNTRYMAN, LOUEEN
3 transactions
$9,900
4
ARCHER, LYNNE
2 transactions
$6,870
5
DAMBROSIO, KATHLEEN
2 transactions
$6,600
6
HIMEBAUGH, PAUL
1 transaction
$6,270
7
BURZYNSKI, STANISLAW
1 transaction
$3,435
8
PERRIN, JOE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
KOVSCHAK, ANGELA
1 transaction
$3,300
10
BALLER, JIM
1 transaction
$3,300
11
HAYNES, JOHN T
1 transaction
$3,300
12
FLETCHER, J'MELLE
1 transaction
$3,300
13
GRAVES, WILLIAM E
1 transaction
$3,300
14
COHEN, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6]

ID: F000484

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

10

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITEDOWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC.BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELFPRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTECEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

ID: S001224

Top Contributors

10

1
TUCKER HILL HOA
OrganizationALLEN, TX
$300
Jun 15, 2023
2
MULLIGI, GINO
NAPOLIAC'SMANAGER
IndividualWYLIE, TX
$9,000
May 23, 2023
3
FRITCHER, SAMMY
AIRBORNE ASPECT INCCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
Aug 19, 2024
4
LOBB, PAT
SELFCAR DEALER
IndividualFRISCO, TX
$6,600
Aug 31, 2024
5
MYERS, ROBERT
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualMCKINNEY, TX
$6,600
May 19, 2023
6
HUFFINES, RAY
HUFFINES AUTO DEALERSHIPSAUTO DEALER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 26, 2023
7
MOSES, FRED
TELCOM ELECTRIC SUPPLY
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
Mar 9, 2023
8
LI, QINGSONG
SONGHAO HOLDINGS LLCOWNER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,000
May 3, 2023
9
CHALIN, THOMAS
NONERETIRED
IndividualFAIRVIEW, TX
$5,800
Jan 30, 2024
10
CHALIN, THOMAS
NONERETIRED
IndividualFAIRVIEW, TX
$5,800
Aug 12, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 36 nodes and 26 connections (46 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $112,543

Top Donors - Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]

Showing top 14 donors by contribution amount

14 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate65.6%
Pages: 736-738

— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.

Introduction

Moderate65.6%
Pages: 736-738

— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.

Introduction

Moderate60.6%
Pages: 155-157

— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.

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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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