Small Business Lending Fraud Prevention Act

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/hr/7401
Last Updated: July 14, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

ID: M001204

Follow the money

The bill

Small Business Lending Fraud Prevention Act

HR. 7401, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.

The sponsor

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$99,770 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

73% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 792-794 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.

July 12, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The "Small Business Lending Fraud Prevention Act" - because, you know, the title is always the most important part. Let's dissect this farce and uncover the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the stated goal: to prevent conflicts of interest among Small Business Administration (SBA) employees involved in loan origination, review, or approval. How noble. In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, attempting to address the symptom rather than the disease. The real purpose? To create the illusion of accountability while maintaining the status quo.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires SBA employees to certify they don't have prohibited conflicts of interest before participating in loan decisions. Wow, what a revolutionary concept - asking people to promise they're not corrupt. This provision is about as effective as a patient self-diagnosing their own illness on WebMD. The regulations will be issued 180 days after enactment, because who needs timely or effective implementation?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The SBA employees, of course, are the primary targets of this bill. But let's not forget the real stakeholders: the lobbyists and special interest groups who will continue to manipulate the system, now with a veneer of legitimacy. Small business owners might be affected, but only if they're naive enough to believe this bill will actually change anything.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact will be negligible, as this bill is merely a placebo. It might provide a temporary PR boost for the sponsors, but it won't address the systemic corruption and cronyism that plagues the SBA. In fact, it may even create new opportunities for abuse, as employees will simply find ways to circumvent the certification process. The real implication? This bill is a symptom of a larger disease: the inability of Congress to effectively address corruption and the prioritization of appearances over actual reform.

In conclusion, HR 7401 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a shallow attempt to treat the symptoms of corruption while ignoring the underlying disease. The sponsors of this bill should be ashamed, but they won't be - they'll just pat themselves on the back for "doing something" and continue to collect their paychecks. The voters who elect these charlatans should be embarrassed, but they'll just keep reelecting them, like a patient returning to a quack doctor who promises miracle cures.

Related Topics

Small Business & Entrepreneurship
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$99,770
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$3,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$96,270

No PAC contributions found

1
PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORP
1 transaction
$2,500
2
COTLER, YUDACUFSKI, HUEBNER
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
DOWD, JOHN J
2 transactions
$13,200
2
PEYKOFF, ANDY
1 transaction
$6,600
3
ROWAN, MARC J
1 transaction
$6,600
4
ROWAN, CAROLYN
1 transaction
$6,600
5
RICH, BRIAN R MR. JR
1 transaction
$6,600
6
VOLPE, ELLEN M
1 transaction
$5,800
7
VOLPE, CHARLES J
1 transaction
$5,800
8
B ASHER, ROBERT
1 transaction
$5,000
9
ROSE, VIRGINIA S
1 transaction
$5,000
10
ASHER, ROBERT B MR.
1 transaction
$4,900
11
KNIGHT, PETER H
1 transaction
$3,500
12
GOLDEAN, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,435
13
MCCARTHY JR, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,435
14
ALLISON, LAWRENCE S JR.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
MERICLE, KIM E
1 transaction
$3,300
16
SCHLOUCH, BARRY L
1 transaction
$3,300
17
PUGH, BRENDA M
1 transaction
$3,300
18
COATES, JOHN O
1 transaction
$3,300
19
CLEMENTS, BRIAN W
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Goodlander, Maggie [D-NH-2]

ID: G000604

Top Contributors

10

1
MCLAUGHLIN, JANE
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLYME, NH
$4,500
Aug 24, 2024
2
FLORY, ROBERT H. JR
FLORY INVESTMENTS, INC.PRESIDENT
IndividualDAMARISCOTTA, ME
$4,100
Sep 30, 2024
3
FLORY, ROBERT H. JR
FLORY INVESTMENTS, INC.PRESIDENT
IndividualDAMARISCOTTA, ME
$4,100
Sep 30, 2024
4
KRAUSZ, STEVEN
US VENTURE PARTNERSVENTURE CAPITAL
IndividualPORTOLA VALLEY, CA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
5
HIRSHBERG, GARY
STONYFIELD FARM INC.SENIOR ADVISOR
IndividualCONCORD, NH
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
6
DRAKE, LAWRENCE C JR
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPORTSMOUTH, NH
$3,300
Oct 19, 2024
7
CUTLER, DOULGAS
CUTLER MANAGEMENT CORPMANAGEMENT
IndividualDANIA, FL
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
8
JAMES, AMABEL
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
9
NUNNELLY, MARK
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualDOVER, MA
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
10
ROBY, DAVID M.
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLYME, NH
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 39 nodes and 25 connections (35 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $112,470

Top Donors - Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • The conflict of interest certification required by Section 2(a) could potentially limit investment opportunities for private equity and hedge funds in small businesses relying on SBA loans.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

High72.9%
Pages: 792-794

— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

Introduction

High72.9%
Pages: 792-794

— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 760 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 7953, Small Business Act, Public Law 85-536, 85th Congress, July 18, 1958, § 2, https://uscode.ecfr.io/ statutes/pl/85/536.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), amended by H.R. 4877, One Stop Shop for Small Business Compliance Act of 2021, Public Law 117-188, 117th Congress, October 20, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ188/PLAW-117publ188.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 2. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: Mission,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 3. Michael Faulkender, Robert Jackman, and Stephen I. Miran, “The Job-Preservation Effects of Paycheck Protection Program Loans,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, Working Paper No. 2020-01, December 2020, p. 9, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Job-Preservation-Effects- Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loans.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Kate Rogers, Scott Zamost, Karina Hernandez, and Jennifer Schlesinger, “As Pandemic Aid Was Rushed to Main Street, Criminals Seized on Covid Relief Programs,” CNBC, April 15, 2021, https://www.cnbc. com/2021/04/15/as-pandemic-aid-was-rushed-to-main-street-criminals-seized-on-ppp-eidl-.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. Kevin Brewer, “Bills Extend Statute of Limitation for Prosecuting PPP, EIDL Fraud,” Journal of Accountancy, August 10, 2022, https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2022/aug/bills-extend-statute-limitation- prosecuting-ppp-eidl-fraud.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. Sacha Pfeiffer, “Virtually All PPP Loans Have Been Forgiven with Limited Scrutiny,” NPR, October 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/12/1128207464/ppp-loans-loan-forgiveness-small-business#:~:text=As%20 COVID-19%20shutdowns%20threatened,early%20days%20of%20the%20pandemic (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: SBA History,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 8. President Richard Nixon, Executive Order 11518, “Providing for the Increased Representation of the Interests of Small Business Concerns Before Departments and Agencies of the United States Government,” March 20, 1970, in Federal Register, Vol. 35, No. 56 (March 21, 1970), pp. 4939–4940, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/ service/ll/fedreg/fr035/fr035056/fr035056.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 9. S. 3331, Small Business Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-386, 93rd Congress, August 23, 1974, https://www. congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg742.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 10. S. 299, Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law No. 96-354, 96th Congress, September 19, 1980, https://www. congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg1164.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 11. Maeve P. Carey, “The Regulatory Flex Act: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11900, August 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11900 (accessed February 18, 2023). 12. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “The Regulatory Flexibility Act,” https://advocacy.sba. gov/resources/the-regulatory-flexibility-act/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 13. H.R. 644, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-125, 114th Congress, February 24, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg122.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 14. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “Advocacy Releases Trade Report,” December 21, 2018, https://advocacy.sba.gov/2018/12/21/advocacy-releases-trade-report/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 15. Associated Press, “Reagan Offers $994-Billion ‘Hard-Choices’ 1987 Budget,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1986, http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-02-05-mn-4369-story.html (accessed February 18, 2023). 16. Testimony of Hon. Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, Small Business Administration, in hearing, The President’s FY 2006 Budget Request for the Small Business Administration, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 17, 2005, p. 8, https://books.google.com/ books?id=UwD-2ICa8k8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 18, 2023). See also Report No. 109-49, Summary of Legislative and Oversight Activities During the 108th Congress, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 2005, p. 21, https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt49/CRPT-109srpt49.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023).

Introduction

Moderate66.1%
Pages: 786-788

— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills