The bill
SECURE Minerals Act of 2026
HR. 7126, 119th Congress — read as touching Renewable Energy.
Sponsored by
Rep. Wittman, Robert J. [R-VA-1]
ID: W000804
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7126, 119th Congress — read as touching Renewable Energy.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 702-704 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Subcommittee Hearings Held
February 23, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
(sigh) Oh joy, another congressional bill that's about as subtle as a sledgehammer to the face. Let me dissect this mess for you.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SECURE Minerals Act of 2026 is a desperate attempt to address the United States' embarrassing reliance on China for critical minerals and materials. The bill aims to establish a Strategic Resilience Reserve, which sounds like a fancy name for "We're trying to reduce our dependence on China without actually doing anything meaningful." The main objective is to create a domestic supply chain for critical minerals, but let's be real, this is just a Band-Aid on a bullet wound.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a new entity, the Strategic Resilience Reserve, which will supposedly oversee the development of a domestic critical minerals supply chain. It also establishes a Board of Governors (because we all know how well those work out) and grants them authority to collect data, assess market risks, and set production standards. Oh, and it allows for financing and acquisition of critical minerals or materials, because who doesn't love a good government subsidy? The bill also includes provisions for corporate powers, records, and accounts, because transparency is overrated.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: mining companies, manufacturers, the defense industry, and of course, China. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the politicians who will benefit from this legislation, either through campaign donations or future lobbying jobs.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "too little, too late." It's a half-hearted attempt to address a problem that's been festering for decades. The impact will be minimal, as it doesn't actually address the root causes of our dependence on China. Instead, it creates another bureaucratic entity that will likely become a dumping ground for pork barrel projects and crony capitalism.
In short, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease – the inability of politicians to make tough decisions and take meaningful action. It's a placebo designed to placate voters while allowing the real problems to fester. I give it two years before we're back to square one, with China still controlling the global supply chain for critical minerals.
Diagnosis: Legislative Theater-itis, a chronic condition characterized by grandstanding, empty promises, and a complete lack of substance. Treatment: None, as the patient is terminal.
Rep. Wittman, Robert J. [R-VA-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001194
Top Contributors
10
ID: H001101
Top Contributors
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ID: S001229
Top Contributors
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ID: P000614
Top Contributors
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ID: K000399
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 65 nodes and 39 connections (53 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $194,937
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 24 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 202(b)(1)(B)(II)(dd) explicitly includes renewable energy production as a purpose for which critical minerals are necessary, indicating support for renewable energy industries.
Section 202(b)(1)(B)(I) states critical minerals are necessary for national defense and national security requirements, directly benefiting defense contractors.
Section 202(b)(1)(B)(II) includes 'refining capacity' as part of energy infrastructure that critical minerals support, which directly benefits oil & gas refining operations.
Section 202(b)(1)(B)(II)(cc) includes electrical power generation, storage, transmission, and distribution as critical for which minerals are necessary, benefiting electric utilities.
Section 202(b)(1)(B)(II)(aa) and (bb) include pipelines and refining capacity as critical infrastructure, supporting energy infrastructure industries.
Findings (2) explicitly link critical minerals to batteries for next-generation automotive systems, and Section 202(b)(1)(B)(III) includes transportation, directly benefiting EV industry.
+ 19 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Wittman, Robert J. [R-VA-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly supports Project 2025's objectives of reducing reliance on China, securing critical mineral supply chains for defense and emerging technologies, and promoting domestic production and reshoring."
— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS
AI Analysis:
"The SECURE Minerals Act of 2026 aligns strongly with Project 2025's Department of Defense objectives by focusing on securing domestic supply chains for critical materials, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries (particularly China), and strengthening the defense industrial base through onshoring and friendshoring initiatives. Both emphasize resilient, domestically sourced supply chains for national security and economic stability."
— 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities. — 97 — Department of Defense 3. Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engage in multiyear procurements and block buys. This will improve private-sector rates of return, thereby incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the government. It will also reduce government overhead by reducing the number of procurement competitions. 4. Prioritize the U.S. and allies under the “domestic end product” and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America, Buy America Act.5 Currently, defense companies are required to manufacture defense items for the U.S. government that are 100 percent domestically produced and at least 50 percent composed of domestically produced components. However, there are loopholes that allow companies to manufacture these items overseas. This can create supply chain and other issues, especially in wartime. Manufacturing components and end products domestically and with allies spurs factory development, increases American jobs, and builds resilience in America’s defense industrial base. 5. Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or “friendshoring” of manufacturing (kinetic capabilities, castings and forgings, critical materials, microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle batteries); evaluate them according to the strategic landscape; and expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate. 6. Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors, which encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters competition. Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses so they also have commercial/private-sector customers and are not solely dependent on defense orders, which can be highly specialized, expensive, and irregular. 7. Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them of DOD’s needs and how they could work with DOD to meet national security priorities. l Optimize the DOD acquisition community. 1. Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making for prototyping and program-of-record starts and terminations. Most bureaucrats would rather follow a checklist and fail than go outside the procedures and win because failure means negative
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on securing domestic supplies of critical minerals, which supports defense readiness and reduces reliance on foreign (especially Chinese) sources—a concern also highlighted in Project 2025’s emphasis on strengthening U.S. defense capabilities. However, the bill does not directly address the specific nuclear weapons, missile defense, or arms control priorities outlined in the Project 2025 DOD section."
— 125 — Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself. 3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail. MISSILE DEFENSE Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims. l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. l North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. l Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs. — 126 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority. Needed Reforms l Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities. 1. Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems. 2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42 l Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43 1. Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44 The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20. 2. Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast. l Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S. should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot missiles. l Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.