The bill
Developing Overseas Mineral Investments and New Allied Networks for Critical Energies Act
HR. 7037, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]
ID: K000397
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7037, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 702-704 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
June 8, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The DOMINANCE Act (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) claims to promote US and allied energy and mineral security by reducing dependence on strategic competitors (read: China) for critical minerals and related technologies. How noble. In reality, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to prop up the interests of US energy and mining corporations while pretending to care about national security.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes international cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains (because we all know how well international cooperation works), establishes an Office of Energy Security Compacts (because who doesn't love a new bureaucracy?), and creates a Critical Mineral Mining Fellowship Program (because nothing says "national security" like a fellowship program). It also amends the Mutual and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, because why not? The changes to existing law are largely cosmetic, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: US energy and mining corporations, their lobbyists, and the politicians they've bought. Oh, and let's not forget the "partner countries" that will be graciously allowed to participate in this grand scheme. The real stakeholders, however, are the American taxpayers who will foot the bill for this boondoggle and the environment, which will inevitably suffer as a result of increased mining activities.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the hallmarks of a classic case of legislative myopia. By focusing on short-term gains for US corporations, Congress is ignoring the long-term consequences of increased mineral extraction, including environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and further destabilization of global markets. The potential impact on national security? Negligible. The real beneficiaries will be the corporate interests that drafted this bill in the first place. As for the American people, they'll be left with the tab and a healthier dose of cynicism towards their elected representatives.
In conclusion, the DOMINANCE Act is a textbook example of how to create a bill that sounds good on paper but accomplishes nothing meaningful. It's a masterclass in political theater, designed to distract from the real issues while lining the pockets of corporate interests. Bravo, Congress. You've done it again. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: B001287
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001199
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ID: H001058
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ID: O000176
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ID: S001229
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ID: W000804
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ID: S001211
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ID: L000599
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ID: P000613
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ID: T000468
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 79 nodes and 45 connections (72 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $142,947
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Title II authorizes Energy Security Compacts (Sec. 201) to enhance energy and economic security through diversification of critical mineral and energy supply chains, including infrastructure development for energy access and critical minerals mining/processing (Sec. 203(c)(2)(D)), benefiting energy infrastructure companies.
The bill emphasizes securing critical minerals for defense requirements (Findings (3), (4), (7); Purpose (1), (3), (6)) and includes the Department of Defense in the Energy Security Compacts Council (Sec. 204(b)(7)), indicating support for defense contractors reliant on critical minerals.
Energy Security Compacts aim to increase reliable access to energy and electricity (Sec. 203(a)) and improve infrastructure for energy access (Sec. 203(c)(2)(A), (D)), which would benefit electric utilities through grid modernization and energy security initiatives.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly advances Project 2025's goals of strategic decoupling from China, securing critical mineral supply chains, and supporting emerging technologies like rare earths and batteries through international partnerships and new diplomatic structures."
— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS
AI Analysis:
"HR 7037 directly advances Project 2025's goal of establishing U.S. energy dominance through international partnerships, reducing reliance on strategic competitors, and creating new institutional mechanisms (e.g., Assistant Secretary for Energy Security and Diplomacy) to align diplomatic, development, and trade tools for energy security."
— 369 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions private sector for government-favored resources. The DOE Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED); Office of State and Community Energy Programs; ARPA-E; Office of Grid Deployment (OGD); and DOE Loan Program should be eliminated or reformed. If they continue to exist, FECM, NE, OE, and EERE should focus on fundamental science and technology issues, particularly in relation to cyber and physical threats to energy security, rather than subsidizing and commercializing energy resources. l Eliminate political and climate-change interference in DOE approvals of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. In addition, Congress should reform the Natural Gas Act8 to expand required approvals from merely nations with free trade agreements to all of our allies, such as NATO countries. l Focus the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) on ensuring that government buildings and operations have reliable and cost- effective energy. FEMP should stop using taxpayer dollars to force the purchase of more expensive and less reliable energy resources in the name of combating climate change. l Ensure that information provided by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), a data and statistical organization, is data-neutral. l Focus FERC on its statutory obligation to ensure access to reliable energy at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. FERC is a five-member commission created under the DOE Organization Act that regulates the wholesale sales and transmission of electricity, promotes electric reliability through standards, permits natural gas pipelines and LNG export facilities, sets natural gas pipeline shipping rates, and sets oil pipeline shipping rates. It is an economic regulator and should not make itself a climate regulator. l Streamline the nuclear regulatory requirements and licensing process. Such changes would help to lower costs and accelerate the development and deployment of civilian nuclear, such as advanced nuclear reactors (including small modular nuclear reactors). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is commission tasked with the licensing of civilian nuclear reactors and power plants and regulating other uses of nuclear materials, such as nuclear medicine. Although it is not a DOE agency, its jurisdiction over nuclear reactor, fuel, safety, and trade issues often relates to or impinges on DOE’s jurisdiction. — 370 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Focus on energy and science issues, not politicized social programs. The next Administration should stop using energy policy to advance politicized social agendas. Programs that sound innocuous, such as “energy justice,”9 Justice40,10 and DEI,11 can be transformed to promote politicized agendas. DOE should focus on providing all Americans with access to abundant, affordable, reliable, and secure energy, and DOE should manage its employees so that everyone is treated fairly based on his or her talent, skills, and hard work. New Policies: International Energy Security To help the President and policymakers understand and apply U.S. energy inter- ests in international affairs more effectively, various DOE programs offices need to be reformed. l Promote American energy interests. The next Administration should make U.S. energy dominance a key component of its foreign policy while ensuring that domestic and international goals are aligned. American energy dominance will allow the United States to secure energy for its citizens, markets for its energy exports, and access to new energy natural resources and will provide tools for U.S. policymakers to assist our allies and deter our adversaries. DESAS should analyze U.S. international energy security interests and develop a National Energy Security Strategy (NESS). This strategy would take account of the energy landscape across the globe to inform the President in his foreign policy and defense roles, but it should not be a tool for U.S. industrial policy, although it might highlight how current domestic industrial and climate policies threaten U.S. energy and national security. l Strengthen the role of the new Department of Energy Security and Advanced Science. There are frequent turf battles on energy issues between the Department of State and DOE. Although the State Department clearly has the policymaking authority under the DOE Organization Act, it tends to ignore the expertise and perspectives that DOE provides. The existing Assistant Secretary for International Affairs should provide the principal support for the DOE Secretary and Deputy Secretary on National Security Council (NSC) activities and should interface with colleagues at the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Commerce, as well as the Intelligence Community (IC). New Policies: Advanced Science To ensure that America continues to lead the world in fundamental science, the National Labs should be refocused, and national science policy should be reviewed and coordinated.
AI Analysis:
"HR 7037 aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on enhancing domestic energy security, reducing dependence on strategic competitors like China for critical minerals, and strengthening interagency coordination to secure energy supply chains—core themes in the Department of Energy section of Project 2025."
— 410 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. Sean Michael Kerner, “Colonial Pipeline Hack Explained: Everything You Need to Know,” TechTarget, April, 26, 2022, https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Colonial-Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to- know (accessed February 13, 2023). 2. Jacob Knutson, “N.C. Power Company: Substation Repairs Complete After Alleged Attack,” Axios, December 7, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/12/07/duke-energy-moore-county-substation-attack (accessed February 13, 2023). 3. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 4. H.R. 5376, Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117-169, August 16, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ169/PLAW-117publ169.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 5. S. 826, Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91, 95th Congress, August 4, 1977, https://www. congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-91/STATUTE-91-Pg565.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 6. DOE also promotes domestic energy security by providing research and coordination between government and the private sector on physical and cyber-related threats to energy security. This work should continue and be enhanced under the next Administration. 7. Elimination of OE, NE, FE, and EERE might also be considered; however, there are benefits from having political appointees run separate offices. Specifically, separate program offices can focus on threats that are unique to their energy areas, and having political appointees run separate offices helps to ensure focused, unobstructed pursuit of policy objectives. 8. H.R. 6586, Natural Gas Act, Public Law No. 75-688, 75th Congress, June 21, 1938, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg821a.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Energy, “Promoting Energy Justice,” https://www.energy.gov/promoting-energy-justice (accessed February 13, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Economic Impact and Diversity, “Justice40 Initiative,” https://www. energy.gov/diversity/justice40-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 11. Press release, “DOE Releases First-Ever Plan to Advance Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 1, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-first-ever-plan- advance-diversity-equity-inclusion-and-accessibility (accessed February 14, 2023). 12. Including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, etc. 13. Table, “Environmental Management: Lifecycle Cost by Project Baseline Summary (PBS) ($M),” in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pd (accessed February 13, 2023). 14. KPMG, “Independent Auditor’s Report, United States Department of Energy Nuclear Waste Fund Annual Financial Report as of and for the Years Ended September 30, 2022 and 2021,” November 8, 2022, p. 8, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Office of Cyber Assessments and Data Analytics, Audit Report: The Department of Energy Nuclear Waste Fund’s Fiscal Year 2022 Financial Statement Audit, DOE- OIG-23-05, November 2022, p. 10, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/DOE-OIG-23-05.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 15. See Patty-Jane Geller, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 481–506, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 16. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, pp. 9, 21, 23, and 43, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-03/doe-fy2023-budget-in-brief-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 17. H.R. 4346, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law No. 117-167, 117th Congress, August 9, 2022, https://www. congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 18. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ceser/ceser-mission (accessed February 27, 2023). — 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.