The bill
Financial Services and General Government and National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026
HR. 7006, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Cole, Tom [R-OK-4]
ID: C001053
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7006, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
27 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate.
January 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?
First off, the total funding amount for this appropriations bill is a whopping $287 billion. Because what's a few hundred billion dollars among friends? The bulk of it goes to the Department of the Treasury ($287 million), with smaller chunks allocated to the Executive Office of the President and Funds Appropriated to the President (because God knows they need more money to waste).
Now, let's look at some key programs and agencies receiving funds. We have:
* $21 million for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), because who doesn't love a good game of "spot the Chinese spy"? This amount is actually an increase from previous years, likely due to the growing paranoia about foreign investment. * $237 million for the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), which sounds like a real mouthful. I'm sure they'll use this money wisely to combat all those rogue nations and terrorist facilitators... or maybe just to fund their next office party. * $59 million for enhanced cybersecurity, because who needs actual security when you can just throw more money at the problem?
Notable increases from previous years include:
* A 10% increase in funding for the Department of State and Related Programs (Division B), likely due to the growing need for diplomatic efforts to clean up after our President's latest Twitter tantrums. * A 5% increase in funding for the Judiciary, because who doesn't love a good judicial branch bailout?
Now, let's talk about riders and policy provisions attached to funding. We have:
* Section 6, which provides $174,000 to the widow of deceased Representative Douglas L. LaMalfa (R-CA). Because what's an appropriations bill without a little bit of pork barrel politics? * The explanatory statement in Section 4, which essentially gives Congress permission to ignore any actual budget constraints and just make stuff up as they go along.
Fiscal impact and deficit implications? Ha! Don't be ridiculous. This bill is a masterclass in fiscal irresponsibility. We're talking about adding hundreds of billions of dollars to the national debt, all while pretending that it's somehow "paid for" through magical accounting tricks and offsets.
In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a perfect example of the legislative equivalent of a patient with a terminal case of stupidity. It's a mess of conflicting priorities, pork barrel politics, and fiscal irresponsibility, all wrapped up in a neat little package of bureaucratic jargon. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create another masterpiece of legislative theater that will undoubtedly make our nation's financial woes even worse.
Rep. Cole, Tom [R-OK-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 53 nodes and 27 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $414,600
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 13 helped, 5 harmed.
Title IV, International Security Assistance, includes $6,158,397,000 for the Foreign Military Financing Program (Sec. 7047) to procure defense articles and services to enhance the capacity of foreign security forces. This is a clear benefit (market expansion) for defense contractors.
Sec. 7010(c) prohibits using funds to promote the sale or export of tobacco or tobacco products, including electronic nicotine delivery systems, or to seek reduction/removal by foreign countries of restrictions on marketing of tobacco or tobacco products. This is a regulatory restriction that harms the alcohol industry's ability to market and expand internationally.
Sec. 7010(c) prohibits using funds to promote the sale or export of tobacco or tobacco products (including electronic nicotine delivery systems), or to seek the reduction or removal by any foreign country of restrictions on the marketing of tobacco or tobacco products (including electronic nicotine delivery systems), except for restrictions which are not applied equally to all tobacco or tobacco products (including electronic nicotine delivery systems) of the same type. This is a clear regulator
Division B, Title III, Section 7058(a)(1) provides $575,000,000 for family planning/reproductive health programs, which benefits hospitals and health systems that deliver these services.
Division B, Title VII, Section 7060(e)(1) provides not less than $720,000,000 for food security and agricultural development programs, which includes support for crop producers through international agricultural research and Feed the Future Innovation Labs.
Title VI, Export and Investment Assistance, includes $983,250,000 for the United States International Development Finance Corporation's Corporate Capital Account (Sec. 7056) to carry out authorized activities, which includes energy infrastructure projects abroad. This represents market expansion for energy infrastructure firms.
+ 12 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Cole, Tom [R-OK-4])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
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119/hr/2827
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A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed foreign military sale to the Government of Israel of certain defense articles and services.
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