No SmartPay for Anti-2A Companies Act
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Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
ID: B001302
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
January 3, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đ Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đ How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece from the esteemed members of Congress. Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this trainwreck.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the title says it all - "No SmartPay for Anti-2A Companies Act". How clever. The main purpose is to grandstand about gun rights while pretending to care about fiscal responsibility. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to strong-arm payment processing agencies into not discriminating against gun retailers. Because, you know, the Second Amendment is more important than actual financial prudence.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits the Administrator of General Services from awarding contracts for commercial payment systems that use merchant category codes (MCCs) for gun retailers. MCCs are used to categorize businesses and help prevent money laundering, among other things. But hey, who needs effective financial regulation when you can pander to the NRA?
The bill also conveniently exempts any contracts awarded before its enactment, because why bother with actual change when you can just pretend to care? This is like a doctor prescribing a placebo to a patient and claiming it's a cure-all.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: gun retailers, payment processing agencies, and the General Services Administration (GSA). But let's be real, this bill is actually about politicians trying to score points with their base while pretending to care about fiscal responsibility. It's like a game of "I'm more conservative than you" - except instead of actual conservatism, it's just a bunch of posturing.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Oh boy, where do I even start? This bill will likely lead to:
* Increased costs for the GSA and taxpayers due to reduced competition in payment processing services * Potential security risks from exempting certain contracts from MCC requirements * More grandstanding and less actual governance from our esteemed representatives
But hey, at least we'll have more politicians tweeting about how they're "standing up for gun rights" while doing absolutely nothing to address the real issues facing this country.
Diagnosis: This bill is a classic case of "Legislative Theater-itis", where politicians pretend to care about an issue while actually just trying to score points with their base. Symptoms include grandstanding, pandering, and a complete disregard for actual policy effectiveness. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies and posturing.
Related Topics
đ° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]
ID: O000175
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]
ID: C001118
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Boebert, Lauren [R-CO-4]
ID: B000825
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Van Drew, Jefferson [R-NJ-2]
ID: V000133
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 42 nodes and 42 connections
Total contributions: $162,068
Top Donors - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 837 â Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHORâS NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the DoddâFrank Act.32 Since the Bureauâs inception, its status as an âinde- pendentâ agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investorâs Business Daily accused the CFPB of âdiverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Partyâ and plan- ning âto create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutionsâ that would use âramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigationsâ to âbankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.â34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as âa victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.â39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of DoddâFrank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and â 838 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite âconsumer educationâ and âfinancial literacyâ programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what âconsumer educationâ or âfinancial literacy programsâ to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPBâs leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because â[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.â46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPBâs âperpetual insulation from Congressâs appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau âno longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountableâ to Congress and, ultimately, to the peopleâ48 and that â[b]y abandoning its âmost complete and effectualâ check on âthe overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the governmentââindeed, by enabling them in the Bureauâs caseâCongress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.â49 The Court further remarked that the CFPBâs âcapacious portfolio of authority acts âas a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.ââ50
Introduction
â 869 â 30 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Adam Candeub MISSION/OVERVIEW Americaâs antitrust laws are over a century old. In 1890, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sherman Act,1 the first federal prohibition on trusts and restraints of trade. The Clayton Act,2 adopted in 1914, builds upon the Sherman Act, outlawing certain practices, such as price fixing, while bringing other business combinations, such as mergers and acquisitions, under regulatory scrutiny. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),3 also adopted in 1914, gives the federal government legal tools to combat anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive practices in the marketplace, empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The FTCA prohibits âunfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.â Sections 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act empower the FTC to block unlawful tying contracts, unlawful corporate mergers and acquisitions, and inter- locking directorates. Under an amendment to the FTCA, the RobinsonâPatman Act,4 the FTC has authority to prohibit practices involving discriminatory pricing and product promotion. While the FTC has enforcement or administrative respon- sibilities under more than 70 laws, the FTCA and the Clayton Act are the focus of its regulatory energy. FTC actions, therefore, turn on the antitrust principles and market principles it adopts. Modern approaches to antitrust stress that the objective of antitrust law is to assure a competitive economyâwhich in economic terms maximizes both allocative efficiency (optimal distribution of goods and services, taking into account consumerâs preferences, so that prices tend toward marginal cost) and productive
Introduction
â 869 â 30 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Adam Candeub MISSION/OVERVIEW Americaâs antitrust laws are over a century old. In 1890, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sherman Act,1 the first federal prohibition on trusts and restraints of trade. The Clayton Act,2 adopted in 1914, builds upon the Sherman Act, outlawing certain practices, such as price fixing, while bringing other business combinations, such as mergers and acquisitions, under regulatory scrutiny. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),3 also adopted in 1914, gives the federal government legal tools to combat anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive practices in the marketplace, empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The FTCA prohibits âunfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.â Sections 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act empower the FTC to block unlawful tying contracts, unlawful corporate mergers and acquisitions, and inter- locking directorates. Under an amendment to the FTCA, the RobinsonâPatman Act,4 the FTC has authority to prohibit practices involving discriminatory pricing and product promotion. While the FTC has enforcement or administrative respon- sibilities under more than 70 laws, the FTCA and the Clayton Act are the focus of its regulatory energy. FTC actions, therefore, turn on the antitrust principles and market principles it adopts. Modern approaches to antitrust stress that the objective of antitrust law is to assure a competitive economyâwhich in economic terms maximizes both allocative efficiency (optimal distribution of goods and services, taking into account consumerâs preferences, so that prices tend toward marginal cost) and productive â 870 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise efficiency (using the least amount of resources for optimal output)âand thereby maximizes consumer welfare.5 Recently, however, many in the conservative movement have taken a broader view of antitrust. They point out that the authors of our antitrust laws did not intend this purely economic understanding of competitive marketsâand the normative assumptions that undergird itâto guide their legislation. First, these principles were only imperfectly worked out at the time the antitrust laws were passed. Second, contemporaneous statements concerning the Sherman and Clay- ton Acts demonstrate Congressâs concern about the political and economic power of the oil and railroad trusts of the first Gilded Age, and their influence on dem- ocratic institutions and civil society. Antitrust law can combat dominant firmsâ baleful effects on democratic institutions such as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior with government. Republican Senator John Sherman explained to Congress in support of his eponymous legislation: If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.6 Similarly, identifying the institutional threats that market concentration can pose, the former Republican President and future Supreme Court Justice William Howard Taft wrote at the time, The federal antitrust law is one of the most important statutes ever passed in this country. It was a step taken by Congress to meet what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable evil in combinations between many who had capital employed in a branch of trade, industry, or transportation, to obtain control of it, regulate prices, and make unlimited profit. Taft saw in this economic threat broader implications for American society since âthe building of great and powerful corporations which had, many of them, intervened in politics and through use of corrupt machines and bosses threatened us with a plutocracy.â7 Others in the conservative movement have maintained for numerous decades that an economic justification is the only coherent approach to the antitrust laws. Many view the first 90 years of U.S. antitrust policy as unprincipled in its approach, often resulting in policies that, by trying to protect smaller competitors, ended up
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.