Freedom to Petition the Government Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/69
Last Updated: February 12, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

ID: B001302

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

January 3, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

âś…

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually-challenged geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Freedom to Petition the Government Act" (HR 69) claims to promote transparency and ease the burden on nonprofit organizations by exempting their meetings with federal officials from being considered "doing business" in the District of Columbia. How noble. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to grease the wheels for special interest groups to peddle their influence without scrutiny.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 29-105.05(a) of the District of Columbia Official Code by adding a new paragraph (11), which essentially says that nonprofit organizations meeting with federal officials at government-owned or leased locations won't be considered "doing business" in D.C. This change allows these organizations to avoid registering with the District, thereby dodging transparency requirements.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects benefit from this bill: special interest groups, lobbyists, and their congressional enablers. Nonprofit organizations will now have an easier time schmoozing with federal officials without being held accountable for their activities. Meanwhile, the public remains in the dark about who's influencing policy decisions.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a larger disease – the corrupting influence of money and power in politics. By allowing special interest groups to operate with greater secrecy, Congress is essentially saying, "We don't care about transparency or accountability." The real impact will be felt by the average citizen, who'll continue to be left out of the policy-making process while corporate interests and their lobbyists reap the benefits.

In conclusion, HR 69 is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak. It's a bill that claims to promote freedom but actually perpetuates corruption. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create another piece of legislation that serves only to further erode trust in government. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.

Related Topics

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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$116,250
26 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$116,250

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
GRAINGER, DAMON
2 transactions
$6,870
2
MCBRIDE, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$6,870
3
BENNETT, HEATHER
1 transaction
$6,600
4
COX, HOWARD
1 transaction
$6,600
5
SCOTT, MARILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
SEYMORE, GARY W
1 transaction
$6,600
7
TAYLOR, MARGARETTA J
2 transactions
$6,600
8
BENSON, LEE
2 transactions
$6,600
9
MATTEO, CHRIS
1 transaction
$5,000
10
CASSELS, W.T. JR.
1 transaction
$3,500
11
CASSELS, W TOBIN III
1 transaction
$3,500
12
ARIAIL, BRANDI C
1 transaction
$3,500
13
FLOYD, KAREN KANES
1 transaction
$3,500
14
SIMPSON, DARWIN H
1 transaction
$3,500
15
JOHNSON, NEIL
1 transaction
$3,435
16
KUMAR, DHAVAL
1 transaction
$3,435
17
LEE, LUCIAN
1 transaction
$3,435
18
RAHM, CHRISTINA
1 transaction
$3,435
19
THOMAS, CLAYTON
1 transaction
$3,435
20
EZELL, SHAWN
1 transaction
$3,435
21
MCCLEVE, LONNIE
1 transaction
$3,300
22
FAUST, ANNE R
1 transaction
$3,300
23
BROPHY, DANIEL
1 transaction
$3,300
24
LONDEN, PRISCILLA
1 transaction
$3,300
25
ALLEN, GWYNDA S
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

ID: O000175

Top Contributors

10

1
WINTERSTEEN, JAMES
RETIRED • RETIRED
Individual MILL VALLEY, CA
$13,200
Jun 27, 2024
2
FISHER, KENNETH L.
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
Individual PLANO, TX
$6,600
May 23, 2024
3
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
Individual PLANO, TX
$6,600
May 23, 2024
4
RAMSEY, DAVE
RAMSEY • CEO
Individual COLLEGE GROVE, TN
$6,600
Jul 27, 2024
5
MOSING, GREG
RETIRED • RETIRED
Individual BROUSSARD, LA
$6,600
Jul 24, 2024
6
SHOCKLEY, QIANG
QIANG SHOCKLEY • TECHNICIAN
Individual IRVINE, CA
$6,600
Jun 8, 2023
7
BEAMAN, LEE MR.
BEAMAN VENTURES • INVESTOR
Individual NASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Apr 13, 2023
8
GUO, MING
INTEL INC • MANAGER
Individual CUPERTINO, CA
$6,600
Jun 2, 2023
9
KENNINGER, STEVEN
QMO LLC • INVESTOR
Individual AUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Sep 25, 2023
10
JAQUISH, GAIL
JURIX, INC. • PSYCHOLOGIST
Individual AUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Sep 26, 2023

Rep. Crane, Elijah [R-AZ-2]

ID: C001132

Top Contributors

10

1
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
Organization MARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Mar 31, 2024
2
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
Organization MARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Sep 16, 2024
3
HALE, STEVEN L. MR.
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL • WEALTH MANAGEMENT ADVISOR
Individual PEACHTREE CITY, GA
$9,900
Mar 31, 2024
4
JOHNSON, BENJAMIN MR.
Individual GRIFFIN, GA
$9,900
Mar 29, 2024
5
METCALF, MICHAEL MR.
SOUND MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC • OWNER
Individual WOODSTOCK, GA
$9,900
Mar 29, 2024
6
MILES, PHILLIP MR.
Individual ALPHARETTA, GA
$9,900
Mar 29, 2024
7
SANDWICH, JAMES T.
Individual BROOKS, GA
$9,900
Feb 13, 2024
8
SANDWICH, JAMES T. DR.
FAYETTE AREA DERMATOLOGY • PHYSICIAN
Individual BROOKS, GA
$9,900
Feb 13, 2024
9
HALE, STEVEN L. MR.
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL • WEALTH MANAGEMENT ADVISOR
Individual PEACHTREE CITY, GA
$9,900
Mar 31, 2024
10
JOHNSON, BENJAMIN MR.
LIBERTY TECHNOLOGY • CEO
Individual GRIFFIN, GA
$9,900
Mar 29, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 34 nodes and 36 connections

Total contributions: $159,150

Top Donors - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

26 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 53.0%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Introduction

Low 53.0%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Low 51.0%
Pages: 75-77

— 42 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 3. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3. 4. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 5. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 6. H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/ PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.