Modernizing Retrospective Regulatory Review
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Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
ID: B001302
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 24 - 18.
May 21, 2025
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
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Became Law
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Diagnosis:** "Modernizing Retrospective Regulatory Review" is a classic case of bureaucratic doublespeak, designed to create the illusion of progress while maintaining the status quo.
**Symptoms:**
1. **New regulations being created or modified**: Ah, yes! The bill creates new reporting requirements, guidance on using technology for retrospective reviews, and agency plans. Because what we really need is more paperwork and administrative busywork. 2. **Affected industries and sectors**: Anyone who's been paying attention knows that this bill will primarily benefit the lobbying firms and special interest groups that have a stranglehold on our regulatory system. The rest of us? Just collateral damage. 3. **Compliance requirements and timelines**: Oh, joy! Agencies must submit reports, plans, and guidance within arbitrary timeframes. Because nothing says "efficiency" like adding more bureaucratic hurdles to the already Byzantine regulatory process. 4. **Enforcement mechanisms and penalties**: *Crickets* That's right; there are no meaningful enforcement mechanisms or penalties for non-compliance. Just a gentle pat on the back and a whispered promise to "try harder next time." 5. **Economic and operational impacts**: Let's be real, folks. This bill will have zero tangible impact on the economy or operations of affected industries. It's all just window dressing to make it seem like our elected officials are doing something – anything! – to address the regulatory quagmire.
**Underlying disease:** The real illness here is the chronic inability of our lawmakers to tackle meaningful reform. Instead, they opt for cosmetic changes that maintain the existing power structures and special interest groups' grip on the system.
**Treatment:** A healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach, and a willingness to call out this legislative charade for what it is: a pathetic attempt to appear proactive while doing nothing substantive.
In conclusion, HR 67 is a textbook example of regulatory theater, designed to create the illusion of progress while perpetuating the same old bureaucratic inefficiencies. Wake me up when someone in Congress decides to tackle real reform.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Crane, Elijah [R-AZ-2]
ID: C001132
Top Contributors
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Donor Network - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
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Total contributions: $132,750
Top Donors - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16.
Introduction
— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).
Introduction
— 425 — Environmental Protection Agency are statutorily required, and remove any regulatory differences between attainment and maintenance that are not explicitly required by law. l Streamline the process for state and local governments to demonstrate that their federally funded highway projects will not interfere with NAAQS attainment. l Adopt policies to prevent abuse of EPA’s CAA “error correction” authority.20 EPA historically has used this to coerce states into adopting its favored policies on pain of imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). l Limit EPA’s reliance on CAA § 30121 general rulemaking authority to ensure that it is not abused to issue regulations for which EPA lacks substantive authority elsewhere in the statute. l If possible, return the standard-setting role to Congress. Climate Change l Remove the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) for any source category that is not currently being regulated. The overall reporting program imposes significant burdens on small businesses and companies that are not being regulated. This is either a pointless burden or a sword-of- Damocles threat of future regulation, neither of which is appropriate. l Establish a system, with an appropriate deadline, to update the 2009 endangerment finding. l Establish a significant emissions rate (SER) for greenhouse gasses (GHGs). Regulating Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Under the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act22 l Repeal Biden Administration implementing regulations for the AIM Act that are unnecessarily stringent and costly. l Refrain from granting petitions from opportunistic manufacturers to add new restrictions that further skew the market toward costlier refrigerants and equipment.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.