Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act of 2024

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Bill ID: 119/hr/666

Last Updated: August 1, 2025

Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act of 2024

HR. 666, 119th Congress — read as touching Surface Transportation.

The sponsor

Rep. Case, Ed [D-HI-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$68,659 raised

29 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Transportation" section, p. 670-672 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR E90-91)

February 3, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act of 2024, HR 666. A bill that attempts to inject a semblance of order into the chaotic world of noncontiguous domestic ocean trade. How quaint.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The primary objective of this legislation is to establish a definition for "reasonable rate" in noncontiguous domestic ocean trade. The bill aims to provide clarity and consistency in rate-setting, which, in theory, should promote efficiency and fairness in the market.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 13701(d) of title 49, United States Code, by introducing a new paragraph that defines a reasonable rate as one within 10 percent of a comparable international ocean rate index recognized by the Federal Maritime Commission. This change is designed to provide a benchmark for rate-setting and reduce disputes between shippers and carriers.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The primary stakeholders affected by this legislation are:

1. Shipping companies: Carriers operating in noncontiguous domestic trade will need to adapt their rate-setting practices to comply with the new definition. 2. Shippers: Companies relying on ocean transportation for goods may see changes in rates and potentially benefit from increased transparency and consistency. 3. Federal Maritime Commission: The FMC will play a crucial role in recognizing and maintaining international ocean rate indexes, which will serve as the basis for determining reasonable rates.

**Potential Impact & Implications** From my perspective, this bill has limited implications for my interests. However, I do see potential opportunities for consolidation and optimization in the shipping industry. By introducing a standardized definition of reasonable rate, the bill may facilitate more efficient operations and reduce costs for carriers. This could lead to increased competitiveness and potentially drive smaller players out of the market.

In terms of dollar projections, I estimate that this legislation could result in cost savings of up to $500 million annually for major shipping companies. However, these gains will likely be offset by increased regulatory compliance costs and potential disputes over rate-setting.

Ultimately, HR 666 is a minor tweak to an inefficient system. True innovation and growth can only be achieved through the free market, unencumbered by bureaucratic meddling. As I always say, "Regulation is the enemy of progress."

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Case, Ed [D-HI-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$68,659

22 donors

PACs

$5,000

Organizations

$11,800

Committees

Individuals

$51,859

CHUGACH ALASKA CORPORATION PAC (CAC PAC)

1 transaction

$5,000

AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA

1 transaction

$2,500

CHICKASAW NATION

2 transactions

$2,000

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

2 transactions

$2,000

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$1,000

SAMISH TYEE

1 transaction

$1,000

No committee contributions found

PETERSON, MICHAEL A.

2 transactions

$6,600

SILBEY, NEELY MARCUS

2 transactions

$5,900

SILBEY, ALEXANDER

2 transactions

$5,800

DEMAREE, GRANT

2 transactions

$5,600

LOUI, STEVEN

1 transaction

$5,000

CARDOZA, MIGUEL A.

2 transactions

$4,700

MAYER, NATHAN

1 transaction

$3,300

SCHIMPF, BRIAN

1 transaction

$3,300

CAMPION, TOM

1 transaction

$2,000

FALK, JIM

1 transaction

$2,000

YOUNG, STAN K.

1 transaction

$2,000

BURSTEIN, BARTON

1 transaction

$1,650

RAINWATER, PAUL

1 transaction

$1,509

DININO, PAUL

1 transaction

$1,500

CASE, STACEY

1 transaction

$1,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU]

ID: M001219

Top Contributors

No contribution data available

Rep. Torres, Ritchie [D-NY-15]

ID: T000486

Top Contributors

OPEN HAND ASSOCIATION, INC.

OrganizationBRONX, NY

$5,000

Jan 10, 2024

JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT

OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA

$4,589

May 31, 2023

HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA

OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA

$3,300

Jul 18, 2023

OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA

OrganizationRED ROCK, OK

$3,300

Jul 18, 2023

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF NORTH DAKOTA

OrganizationBELCOURT, ND

$3,300

Jul 17, 2023

JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT

OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA

$2,976

Apr 28, 2023

JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT

OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA

$682

Jun 6, 2023

JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT

OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA

$270

Jul 5, 2023

JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT

OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA

$227

Jul 31, 2023

JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT

OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA

$48

Jun 30, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Case, Ed [D-HI-1]

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Total contributions: $81,548

Top Donors - Rep. Case, Ed [D-HI-1]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC6 Orgs15 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

+Surface Transportationconfidence 0.90
Section 2 amends 49 U.S.C. § 13701(d)(1) to define a reasonable rate for noncontiguous domestic ocean trade as within 10% of a comparable international ocean rate index recognized by the Federal Maritime Commission. This provision affects surface transportation industries involved in maritime shipping, such as freight carriers, shipping lines, and logistics firms that operate in noncontiguous domestic routes (e.g., between mainland U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, and territories). By providing a clearer,

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Transportation

Moderate

Vector: 59%

Pages: 670-672AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy concern maritime shipping regulation and aim to reduce costs for noncontiguous U.S. territories, but the bill focuses on defining reasonable rates while Project 2025 emphasizes structural reforms like Jones Act repeal and agency realignment."

Key themes:maritime shipping regulationnoncontiguous traderate reasonablenessJones Act reformconsumer cost reduction

— 638 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and purpose, and therefore its funding priorities, are not well understood and his- torically have been minimalized in planning and budgeting. MARAD, including its subordinate Service Academy (the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy) should be transferred to the Department of Defense (if the Coast Guard is located there because DHS has been eliminated) or to the Department of Home- land Security. In this way, the two agencies charged with oversight and regulation of the Maritime sector—MARAD and the United States Coast Guard—would be aligned under the same department where operational efficiencies could be real- ized more easily. Serious consideration should be given to repealing or substantially reforming the Jones Act,16 which would require legislation. The economic costs of the Jones Act, which is notionally in place to promote a robust Merchant Marine, vastly exceed its effect on the supply of domestic ships. For instance, no liquified natural gas (LNG) can be shipped from Alaska to the lower 48 states because there are no U.S.-flagged ships that carry LNG. If there are genuine concerns about U.S. fleet capacity in the absence of the Jones Act, it would be possible to do so through an expansion of the Defense Reserve Fleet. Another DHS agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a frequent user of MARAD Ready Reserve Force shipping during disaster assistance missions. Transferring MARAD to DHS would make coordination and requisition of those vessels a smoother and more rapid process. DHS has responsibility for reviewing and approving Jones Act waivers. This process first requires a market survey of available shipping tonnage that is completed by MARAD. The processing of Jones Act waiver requests would be streamlined if both agencies were in the same department. Finally, DHS as a department is experienced in administering and budgeting for the operation of an existing federal service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, which is similar to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in size. There would be increased efficiencies and better alignment of the missions of these two institutions if they were under one single department that has equity in the industries served by these academies. CONCLUSION Americans need more abundant and affordable transportation. They need more affordable and safer cars as well as physical aspects of transportation such as roads, bridges, airports, ports, and rail lines. The Department of Transportation should be evaluating which aspects of transportation are contributing to the economic competitiveness of the United States and the well-being of Americans—and that therefore should continue to be funded. All too often, DOT’s mission is described as reducing the number of trips, using less fuel, and raising the costs of travel to Americans through increased use of — 639 — Department of Transportation renewables. These goals are not compatible with what should be DOT’s purpose: to make travel easier and less expensive. That is what the American people want, and that is what DOT should provide. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Steven Bradbury, David Ditch, and Robert Poole deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

26

Weak

Vector: 63%

Pages: 801-803AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 trade section aim to address unfair trade practices and promote fair competition, but HR 666 focuses on domestic shipping rates for noncontiguous U.S. territories while the Project 2025 policy deals with international tariff reciprocity and the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act, resulting only tangential overlap."

Key themes:tradefair competitionmaritime regulation

— 769 — Trade TABLE 2 Nonreciprocal Tariff Rates Under “Most Favored Nation” Rule Foreign U.S. and Foreign Partner Applies U.S. Applies Partner Apply 132-Country Sample Higher Tariff Higher Tariff Same Tariff Number of HS6 Product Lines 467,015 141,736 87,319 Percent of HS6 Product Lines 67% 20% 13% Tariff Diff erential 12.3% 8.7% 0.0% NOTE: HS6—Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. SOURCE: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Trade Analysis Information System,” https:// databank.worldbank.org/source/unctad-%5E-trade-analysis-information-system-(trains) (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org by 67 percent tariffs while American milk producers benefit only from a 15 percent tariff on foreign imports.9 From the perspective of strategic game theory, the WTO’s MFN rule provides little or no incentive for higher-tariff countries to lower their tariffs. Rather, under these conditions, the dominant strategy of any relatively high-tariff country is simply to maintain those high tariffs while free riding off the lower-tariff countries. The U.S. is disproportionately harmed by the WTO’s nonreciprocal tariff regime. The countries that are hurt most by the WTO’s nonreciprocal tariff regime are those like the United States that charge the lowest tariffs on average. This point is illustrated in Table 2, which reports information on nonreciprocal tariffs that are applied under the MFN rule on product lines at the six-digit level of the Harmo- nized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS6).10 Table 2 presents results for a broad sample of 132 countries that account for more than 60 percent of total U.S. trade and 98 percent of U.S. trade that is not cov- ered by free trade agreements (FTAs). Within this broad sample of 132 countries, U.S. exporters face higher tariffs in 467,015 different cases compared to 141,736 cases in which the U.S. charges higher nonreciprocal rates. In other words, U.S. exporters face higher tariffs more than three times as often as the U.S. applies higher tariffs. Moreover, when American exporters face higher tariffs, the nonreciprocal tar- iffs are typically much higher. As row 4 of Table 2 indicates, in the 467,015 cases in which foreign partners charge higher tariffs, the average rate applied by the foreign partners is 12.3 percentage points above the rate applied by the U.S. In contrast, — 770 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise in the 141,736 cases in which the U.S. charges the higher tariff, the average U.S. applied rate is only 8.7 percentage points higher than the average applied tariff of the foreign partner. Separately, Communist China levies higher tariffs on 10 products for every one Chinese product that is subject to a U.S.-applied higher tariff.11 India’s ratio is even higher at 13 to one. Further, both Communist China and India also feature significant nontariff barriers. Collectively, these higher nonreciprocal tariffs in Communist China and India block American exporters from selling goods at com- petitive prices to more than one-third of the world’s population. Trade Deficit Impacts of the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act. Under current United States laws and regulations, an American President has limited ability to fight back against the higher MFN tariffs now being levied against American workers, farmers, ranchers, and manufacturers. Accordingly, behind the WTO’s protective MFN shield, America’s free-riding trading partners have little or no incentive to come to the bargaining table to negotiate lower tariffs. To address this nonreciprocity stalemate, President Trump urged Congress in his 2019 State of the Union address to pass the United States Reciprocal Trade Act (USRTA).12 Under the USRTA, the President would have the authority to bring any American trading partner that is currently applying higher nonreciprocal tariffs to the negotiating table. If that trading partner refused to lower tariffs to U.S. levels, the President then would have the authority to raise U.S. tariffs to match or “mirror” the foreign partner’s tariffs. The USRTA was introduced on January 24, 2019, by then-Representative Sean Duffy (R–WI). The following month, a Harvard–Harris poll of 1,792 registered voters found that 80 percent of respondents supported the USRTA.13 As Repre- sentative Duffy noted at the time, the purpose of granting the President these authorities was not to raise tariffs. Rather, it was to give the President, working in close consultation with Congress, a sophisticated and targeted tool that he could use to force other countries to lower their tariffs and nontariff barriers.14 Following the introduction of the USRTA, the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (which the author directed) ran simulations to estimate the impact that implementation of the USRTA might have on the overall U.S. trade deficit in goods and the large bilateral trade deficits the U.S. runs with many of its major trading partners. The sample consisted of the same 132 trading partners used in Table 2 above.15 The results underscore the unfair and unbalanced nonreciprocal trade the U.S. is forced to accept under WTO MFN rules. Two Scenarios. Scenario One in Table 3 assumes that our trading partners lower their applied tariff rates on specific products to U.S. levels in cases where their applied tariffs are higher. Scenario Two assumes that our trading partners refuse to lower their tariff rates to match those of the U.S. Instead, in order to uphold the principle of reciprocity, the U.S. raises its tariffs to mirror levels. To

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 437-439AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy involve federal oversight of rates to prevent unfair pricing and undue discrimination, but the bill regulates maritime shipping rates via the FMC while Project 2025 focuses on electricity transmission and natural gas pipeline rates under FERC, resulting only a tangential thematic connection."

Key themes:rate regulationfederal oversightpreventing undue discriminationfair competition

— 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to: — 406 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Ensure that transmission planning and interconnection processes are resource neutral. l Prevent socializing costs for customers who do not benefit from the projects or justifying such cost shifts as advancing vague “societal benefits” such as climate change. l Stop cost allocation from becoming a subsidy for generators, such as renewables. With respect to NIETCs, FERC and the new DESAS should ensure that state interests are respected and not allow such NEITC transmission lines to be devel- oped as a mere subsidy to renewable developers. Furthermore, much of the transmission buildout (including its attendant costs) is being driven by renewable developers seeking market share. These projects are causing rates for customers to go up and hurting reliability. FERC needs to ensure that transmission buildouts are planned for the benefit of customers. FERC: NATURAL GAS PIPELINES Mission/Overview FERC permits, sites, and authorizes the construction and operation of inter- state natural gas pipelines.121 It also regulates the rates for the shipping of natural gas122 (but not the price of the natural gas commodity, which is market based). FERC is charged with ensuring that natural gas pipelines are approved if they are required by the “public convenience and necessity.”123 Pipeline permitting is sub- ject to environmental reviews under NEPA, and the rate for the pipeline and the shipping of the commodity is set by FERC under a just and reasonable standard. Once FERC approves a project, the holder of the certificate has the sovereign’s power of eminent domain. Needed Reforms Natural gas pipelines are vital for the economy, manufacturing, heating, and electric generation. Opposition from “Keep it in the ground” environmentalists has made it harder to gain approvals for natural gas pipelines. Under Democrat leadership, FERC has proposed official policies to consider upstream and down- stream GHG emissions from the use of the natural gas that would be shipped in the pipeline to be part of FERC’s public-interest determination when deciding whether to approve a pipeline. There is conflicting direction from the D.C. Circuit on the GHG issue, which also could be seen as a “major questions” issue under the U.S. Supreme Court’s West Virginia v. EPA decision.124

Trade

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 813-815AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill addresses domestic shipping rate fairness for U.S. noncontiguous territories, whereas Project 2025's trade section focuses on international trade deficits, reciprocal tariffs, and leveling the global playing field for U.S. exporters. The overlap is limited to the general theme of promoting fair competition."

Key themes:fair competitiontrade policyrate regulation

— 781 — Trade 5 ELBAT )8 fo 8 egaP( noisserggA cimonocE fo seirogetaC s’anihC tsinummoC erutpaC gnigremE hceT-hgiH taht seirtsudnI erutuF evirD yeK eriuqcA dna eruceS tcetorP dna htworG seigolonhceT etanimoD lortnoC emoH s'anihC stnemecnavdA morf PI dna lanoitidarT larutaN eroC s’anihC dnapxE morf tekraM ,seiciloP ,stcA s'anihC esnefeD ni seirtnuoC rehtO gnirutcafunaM secruoseR labolG fo erahS noititepmoC fo secitcarP dna yrtsudnI .S.U eht dna seirtsudnI yllabolG stekraM stropmI dna noisserggA cimonocE ,gnikeeS-ygolonhceT % % % ngieroF detceriD-etatS tnemtsevnI tceriD % % % tfarcypS lanoitidarT gnipmuditnA edavE ot pihssnarT % seituD gniliavretnuoC dna stnemtsujdA xaT deddA-eulaV % % ezidisbuS setabeR dna stropxE esenihC decrofnE ylxaL dna kaeW % % swaL latnemnorivnE seigolonhceT eht snetaerhT noisserggA cimonocE s’anihC woH ,yciloP gnirutcafunaM dna edarT fo ecffi O esuoH etihW :ECRUOS /tnetnoc-pw/vog.sevihcra.esuohetihwpmurt//:sptth ,8102 enuJ ,dlroW eht dna setatS detinU eht fo ytreporP lautcelletnI dna gro.egatireh A .)3202 ,12 hcraM dessecca( fdp.FDP-81.81.6-tropeR-ygolonhceT-anihC-LANIF/60/8102/sdaolpu — 782 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reduction in the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India. Similarly, if Taiwan were to reduce its tariffs to U.S. levels, the size of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 6 percent. If the U.S. imposed a mirror tariff, its bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 59 percent. These results again underscore the high degree of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade that currently exists between the U.S. and much of the rest of the world, which penalizes American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers because of the WTO-MFN conundrum. These simulations also demon- strate that implementation of the USRTA most likely would substantially reduce the U.S. trade deficit while creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs. These benefits notwithstanding, however, the U.S. would still face a substantial over- all trade deficit and substantial bilateral trade deficits with many of its major trading partners. Why might this be so? Because under WTO rules, America still faces numerous nonreciprocal nontariff barriers around the world. For example, one of America’s largest trading partners, Japan, runs a significant bilateral trade surplus in goods with the U.S.—more than $70 billion a year. While Japan has relatively low tariffs, it ranks high on the nontariff barrier scale. In such cases, which are numerous, pas- sage of the USRTA would likely also be very helpful in reducing nontariff barriers. This is because under the powers provided by the USRTA, if a foreign country imposes significantly higher nontariff barriers, then the President has the authority to “negotiate and seek to enter into an agreement” that “commits the country to… eliminate [its] nontariff barriers.”16 If the country refuses to come to the negoti- ating table and lower its nontariff barriers, the President has the authority to levy reciprocal duties to offset or mirror those barriers. In summary, passage of the USRTA would go a long way toward leveling the playing field for American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers who are now forced to compete in an intrinsically unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal WTO-MFN system. Nor is the USRTA necessarily the only possible legislative way to address this issue. In 2017, then-House Speaker Paul Ryan (R–WI) and then-House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R–TX) proposed a “border adjust- ment tax.” The proposed border adjustment would have eliminated the ability of corporations to deduct the cost of imports while eliminating the tax on income attributable to exports. This border adjustment tax would have shifted the U.S. corporate income tax from an origin-based tax applying to the production of goods and services in the United States to a destination-based tax applying to the con- sumption of goods and services in the U.S. This tax—strongly opposed by American multinational corporations and big- box retailers—not only would have leveled the playing field with respect to WTO rules, but also would have provided an innovative alternative to the application of

Trade

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 804-806AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on establishing reasonable domestic shipping rates for U.S. noncontiguous territories, whereas Project 2025's trade section centers on international reciprocal tariffs and reducing the U.S. trade deficit; they share only a broad concern for trade and economic competitiveness but differ in scope and policy mechanisms."

Key themes:maritime shippingtrade policyeconomic competitivenessconsumer costsregulatory oversight

— 771 — Trade TABLE 3 Trade Defi cit Reductions Under Alternative USRTA Scenarios REDUCTION IN U.S. TRADE DEFICIT WITH WORLD Scenario One: Scenario Two: Partner Countries U.S. Matches Partner Metric Match U.S. Tariff Rate Tariff Rates In Billions of Dollars $58.3 $63.6 As Percentage of 2018 Defi cit 9.4% 10.2% NOTE: USRTA—U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act. SOURCE: White House Offi ce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Defi cit Eff ects, May 2029, p. 18, https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/RTAReport. pdf?mod=article_inline (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org calculate the trade deficit reductions under Scenario One and Scenario Two, the analysis relied on the World Bank’s SMART tariff simulator. Table 3 provides the simulation results. In Scenario One, if all 132 countries were to lower their higher nonreciprocal tariffs to U.S. levels, the overall U.S. trade deficit in goods would be reduced by $58.3 billion, or about 9.4 percent of that deficit. In contrast, in Scenario Two, if these countries were to refuse to reciprocate and the U.S. were to raise its tariffs to mirror those countries’ levels, the reduction in the U.S. trade deficit would be slightly larger: an estimated $63.6 billion, or 10.2 percent of the deficit. This suggests that implementing the USRTA would help to create between 350,000 and 380,000 jobs. The slightly larger reduction in the trade deficit in Scenario Two as a result of the U.S. raising its tariffs to mirror those of its partners, as opposed to foreign countries lowering their tariffs to U.S. levels, may seem surprising to those who are steeped in Ricardian dogma and the textbook lessons of free trade. However, this result speaks to the fact that so many of America’s trading partners are applying significantly higher tariffs to thousands of American products. Estimated Impacts on Key U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficits. If the USRTA were enacted, a President would likely have to prioritize which countries he should negotiate with first. One way to create such a priority list would be to choose those countries that have relatively large trade deficits with the U.S. and apply relatively high tariffs. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which maps bilateral trade deficits — 772 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise FIGURE 1 Mapping Bilateral Trade Deficits Against Tariff Differentials ■ Largest bilateral trade deficit and/or largest tariff differential ■ Second-to-largest bilateral trade deficit and/or second-to-largest bilateral tariff differential ■ Smallest bilateral trade deficit and/or smallest tariff differential AVERAGE MOST-FREE-NATION DIFFERENTIAL, SIMPLE MEAN 10% India 8% Thailand China Taiwan 6% Vietnam 4% 2% Malaysia Japan E.U. 0% 0 $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 $350 $400 $450 BILATERAL TRADE DEFICIT, 2018, IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS SOURCE: White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Deficit Effects, May 2019, p. 20, https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/RTAReport.pdf? mod=article_inline (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org against tariff differentials for eight major U.S. trading partners, which account for 47.6 percent of total U.S. trade and 88.6 percent of the U.S. trade deficit in goods. Figure 1 shows that the USRTA priority list would include the countries in red—Communist China and India—along with trading partners in the yellow zone. This yellow zone includes the European Union, which features a very high deficit, along with Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam, which feature particularly high tariff differentials. Table 4 estimates the improvement in the U.S. trade deficit under Scenario One, in which partner countries match the U.S. tariff rate under pressure from

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act of 2024