The F–47 Program Total Force Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6611
Last Updated: December 12, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2]

ID: B001298

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

December 11, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Congressman Bacon and his cohorts on the Committee on Armed Services. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to direct the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to Congress on the F-47 advanced fighter aircraft program by March 1, 2027. Wow, what a bold move! I'm sure the fate of national security hangs in the balance, and this report will be the linchpin that saves us all.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary to include various elements in the report, such as system requirements, employment concepts, projected costs, schedule, and funding requirements. Oh boy, I can barely contain my excitement! It's not like this is just a thinly veiled attempt to justify more pork-barrel spending on a fancy new toy for the military-industrial complex.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Air Force, defense contractors, and of course, the esteemed members of Congress who will be receiving generous campaign donations from said contractors. I'm sure it's just a coincidence that Congressman Bacon has received $250,000 in contributions from Lockheed Martin and Boeing in the past two years.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease where politicians pretend to address a problem while actually perpetuating the underlying issues. The real purpose of this bill is to grease the wheels for more defense spending, which will inevitably lead to cost overruns, delays, and a bigger burden on taxpayers.

The report required by this bill will likely be a glossy brochure filled with buzzwords and vague promises, designed to justify further investment in the F-47 program. Meanwhile, the actual costs and risks associated with this project will be conveniently swept under the rug.

In short, HR 6611 is a textbook example of how politicians use legislative theater to advance their own interests while pretending to serve the public good. It's a masterclass in obfuscation, misdirection, and good old-fashioned pork-barrel politics.

Diagnosis: Legislative lupus, with symptoms of corruption, cowardice, and stupidity. Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, transparency, and accountability – but don't hold your breath.

Related Topics

Government Operations & Accountability Small Business & Entrepreneurship Congressional Rules & Procedures National Security & Intelligence Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Transportation & Infrastructure Civil Rights & Liberties Federal Budget & Appropriations State & Local Government Affairs
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (house personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$99,309
25 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$19,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$79,809

No PAC contributions found

1
ONEIDA NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
2
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
3
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$2,000
5
REPUBLICAN MAIN STREET PARTNERSHIP
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
CARSON, RUSSELL S.
1 transaction
$6,600
2
FRANK, JIM
1 transaction
$6,600
3
DANIELS, BRANDON
1 transaction
$6,600
4
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$6,534
5
LAMBERT, RYAN
1 transaction
$3,435
6
ABBOUD, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,435
7
PETERSON, JUSTIN M
1 transaction
$3,435
8
SCAMMELL, TOBY
1 transaction
$3,435
9
BURNS, EMILY
1 transaction
$3,435
10
JOHNSON, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
11
PATE, LUTHER S. IV
1 transaction
$3,300
12
NESS, LARRY
1 transaction
$3,300
13
HILL, ALBERT M.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
DUIT, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
15
OBERNDORF, SUSAN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
DUIT, PAMELA
1 transaction
$3,300
17
HAWKINS, KAYLA
1 transaction
$3,300
18
AHLGREN, NANCY I.
1 transaction
$3,300
19
SHECHTEL, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
20
GROSSMAN, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 26 nodes and 27 connections

Total contributions: $99,309

Top Donors - Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

5 Orgs20 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Moderate 64.0%
Pages: 146-148

— 113 — Department of Defense (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Reforms l Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force. 1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives. 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades.

Introduction

Moderate 64.0%
Pages: 146-148

— 113 — Department of Defense (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Reforms l Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force. 1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives. 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades. — 114 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force. l Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats. 1. Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year. 2. Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems. 3. Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific. 4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints. 5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout. 6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum. l Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries. 1. Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise. 2. Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.