No Bonuses for Utility Executives Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6590
Last Updated: December 12, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]

ID: R000622

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H5805)

December 11, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

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Passed House

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Senate Review

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Passed Congress

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Presidential Action

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. The "No Bonuses for Utility Executives Act" - a title that screams "we're doing something about those greedy executives!" while actually accomplishing nothing.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to limit bonuses for executives of certain electric utilities, because, you know, those evil CEOs are just rolling in cash. The real purpose, however, is to create a smokescreen of pseudo-regulatory action, allowing politicians to claim they're "doing something" about income inequality and corporate greed.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces a convoluted system for determining whether a utility can pay bonuses to its executives. Essentially, it ties bonus payments to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and customer rate increases. Because nothing says "effective regulation" like relying on a metric that's been criticized for underestimating inflation.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill targets state-regulated electric utilities not wholly owned by U.S. persons. Translation: it's aimed at foreign-owned utilities, because xenophobia is always a great legislative motivator. The real stakeholders, however, are the politicians who get to grandstand about "sticking it to those greedy CEOs" while actually serving the interests of their campaign donors.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will have zero impact on income inequality or corporate greed. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real beneficiaries will be the politicians who sponsored this bill, like Mr. Riley and Mr. Van Drew, who'll get to tout their "tough-on-corporate-greed" credentials while raking in donations from... you guessed it... utility companies and related PACs.

Now, let's play a game of "follow the money." A quick glance at campaign finance records reveals that Mr. Riley has received significant contributions from the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). Coincidence? I think not. These organizations will likely benefit from the bill's loopholes and exemptions, ensuring their member companies can continue to pay out lavish bonuses while pretending to be subject to "tough regulations."

In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative sleight of hand. It's a Potemkin village of regulation, designed to distract from the real issues and serve the interests of politicians and their corporate donors. Bravo, Congress. You've managed to create a bill that's both ineffective and corrupt. That takes skill.

Related Topics

Government Operations & Accountability Small Business & Entrepreneurship Congressional Rules & Procedures National Security & Intelligence Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Transportation & Infrastructure Civil Rights & Liberties Federal Budget & Appropriations State & Local Government Affairs
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$71,929
26 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$9,450
Committees
$0
Individuals
$62,479

No PAC contributions found

1
SWANSON INDUSTRIES
1 transaction
$5,000
2
HOPE SPRINGS FARM
2 transactions
$3,350
3
FLOWERS BY ORZEL
2 transactions
$600
4
THE PLANTSMEN NURSERY
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
HARRISON, ADAM JAY
1 transaction
$6,600
2
JAY, ADAM
1 transaction
$6,600
3
WOWCZUK, ANGELA
1 transaction
$6,600
4
SCHARBAUER, DOUGLAS
1 transaction
$6,600
5
CALANDRA, KARL
1 transaction
$5,000
6
ALSOP, JAMES
1 transaction
$5,000
7
PEREZ, ISAAC
1 transaction
$5,000
8
MAYNARD, ZACHERY
1 transaction
$5,000
9
AARON, BRIAN
3 transactions
$3,382
10
ADAMS, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$3,300
11
ADAMS, RICHARD M.
1 transaction
$3,300
12
ASTORG, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
13
HARWOOD, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$521
14
BOYLE, MARY
1 transaction
$500
15
REEVES, GREG
1 transaction
$260
16
JUNGE, KURT
1 transaction
$250
17
BURKHOLDER, KEVIN
1 transaction
$250
18
SULLIVAN, REARDON
1 transaction
$250
19
SCHARF, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$250
20
BAKER, MARTIN
1 transaction
$208
21
HANSON, JUSTIN
1 transaction
$208
22
MANOHAR, KRISHNA
1 transaction
$100

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Van Drew, Jefferson [R-NJ-2]

ID: V000133

Top Contributors

10

1
WINRED
PAC ARLINGTON, VA
$6,781
Jan 26, 2024
2
WINRED
PAC ARLINGTON, VA
$868
Feb 16, 2024
3
ACE LISTENGER ENTERPRISES LLC
Organization LOUISVILLE, KY
$500
Sep 30, 2024
4
SPTWO LLC
Organization NORTH WILDWOOD, NJ
$500
Sep 30, 2024
5
TEC AEROSPACE, LLC
Organization CLAYTON, NJ
$500
Jun 30, 2024
6
FV REDEMPTION LLC
Organization CAPE MAY COURT HOUSE, NJ
$500
Jun 27, 2024
7
CHARLES MARANDINO LLC
Organization MILMAY, NJ
$105
May 15, 2024
8
FORMAN, RICHARD P
RETIRED • RETIRED
Individual CHERRY HILL, NJ
$6,600
Nov 29, 2023
9
HOLLANDER, SCOTT
PULSE VASCULAR • PHYSICIAN
Individual MULLICA HILL, NJ
$6,600
Feb 16, 2024
10
LAUDEMAN, KEITH MR
COLD SPRING FISH • FISH DEALER
Individual CAPE MAY, NJ
$6,600
May 8, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 30 nodes and 33 connections

Total contributions: $80,078

Top Donors - Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

4 Orgs22 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 53.0%
Pages: 437-439

— 404 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC. Even then, however, accountability is indirect through the tariffs (rules) that the RTOs adopt and FERC approves. In addition, unlike utilities, generators in an RTO have no obligation to serve customers. New Policies FERC must make reliability of the grid and service to end use top priorities. To do so, it should: l Reexamine the premise of RTOs. RTOs no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people. Marginal price auctions for energy are not ensuring the reliability of the grid and are not passing the full economic benefits of subsidized renewables on to customers. FERC needs to reexamine the RTOs under its jurisdiction to make sure that they procure reliable and affordable electricity for the benefit of the American people. l Ensure that RTOs return to market fundamentals so that they serve customers, not special interests and political causes. FERC should require RTOs to ensure that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued to provide electricity when needed for the benefit of customers. Potential reforms could include: 1. Requiring renewable generators to provide intra-day backup by dispatchable on-demand generation so that bids by intermittent resources into RTOs equate fairly with far more valuable on-demand dispatchable resources; 2. Creating dual energy markets for dispatchable and nondispatchable resources; or 3. Eliminating capacity markets where intermittent resources participate and instead establishing “reliability” markets where dispatchable on-demand resources participate. Alternatives to marginal price auctions also should be considered. l Direct the RTOs to ensure that the economic benefits of renewables (like tax credits and no fuel costs) are passed on to customers.

Introduction

Low 53.0%
Pages: 437-439

— 404 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC. Even then, however, accountability is indirect through the tariffs (rules) that the RTOs adopt and FERC approves. In addition, unlike utilities, generators in an RTO have no obligation to serve customers. New Policies FERC must make reliability of the grid and service to end use top priorities. To do so, it should: l Reexamine the premise of RTOs. RTOs no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people. Marginal price auctions for energy are not ensuring the reliability of the grid and are not passing the full economic benefits of subsidized renewables on to customers. FERC needs to reexamine the RTOs under its jurisdiction to make sure that they procure reliable and affordable electricity for the benefit of the American people. l Ensure that RTOs return to market fundamentals so that they serve customers, not special interests and political causes. FERC should require RTOs to ensure that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued to provide electricity when needed for the benefit of customers. Potential reforms could include: 1. Requiring renewable generators to provide intra-day backup by dispatchable on-demand generation so that bids by intermittent resources into RTOs equate fairly with far more valuable on-demand dispatchable resources; 2. Creating dual energy markets for dispatchable and nondispatchable resources; or 3. Eliminating capacity markets where intermittent resources participate and instead establishing “reliability” markets where dispatchable on-demand resources participate. Alternatives to marginal price auctions also should be considered. l Direct the RTOs to ensure that the economic benefits of renewables (like tax credits and no fuel costs) are passed on to customers. — 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to:

Introduction

Low 48.2%
Pages: 419-421

— 387 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (EIA) Mission/Overview The U.S. Energy Information Administration “collects, analyzes, and dis- seminates independent and impartial energy information to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding of energy and its inter- action with the economy and the environment.”70 Needed Reforms EIA is not an inherently problematic agency and historically has provided inde- pendent and impartial analysis. Requests for EIA analyses can be made by the Administration or from Members of Congress or congressional committees. EIA needs to be committed to providing unbiased forecasting and data so that poli- cymakers, industry, and the public can have a clear understanding of our energy resources and energy economy. Strong leadership will be needed to ensure that data and reporting are not misused to promote a politicized “energy transition.” New Policies l Clarify levelized cost of electricity. “Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) refers to the estimated revenue required to build and operate a generator over a specified cost recovery period.”71 It is used in the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to compare the cost of technologies to determine which technologies are expected to be constructed in the future. Although it is useful in comparing the costs of resources over time, LCOE can also mask the massive amounts of capital needed to deploy new generation. Moreover, in the case of intermittent resources such as wind and solar, LCOE does not include the cost for backup or firming power from dispatchable resources. EIA should ensure that its reporting provides an accurate assessment of generation costs. The cost of backup power for when wind and solar resources are not available should be included when comparing the technologies and reported as a separate component in the modeling documents. l Revise reserve margins. EIA, in conjunction with FERC, NERC, regional transmission organizations (RTOs), and the electric industry, should change how electric grid reserve margins are defined and calculated. In the past, reserve margins have looked at the amount of nameplate capacity on the grid to serve peak load plus a reserve. With the increasing number of intermittent, nondispatchable resources like wind and solar, peak load and reserve margins need to be reevaluated. Reserve margins need to be timed to load changes throughout the day and consider the availability of dispatchable on-demand resources to meet load when renewables may not be available. — 388 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Update reports on the impacts of federal financial interventions and subsidies. EIA’s most recent report on federal financial interventions and subsidies was issued in April 2018.72 This is an important analysis because it clearly shows the level of the federal government’s intervention in each area of the energy system for a given fiscal year. In the past, EIA performed the analysis pursuant to a request from Congress or the Administration. This report should become a project that is performed annually or every other year as part of EIA’s base program. l Ensure the objectivity of the International Energy Outlook (IEO). In the past, EIA published the IEO every year. It is now published every two years. IEO forecasts are important because the International Energy Agency’s forecasts in its annual World Energy Outlook are becoming unrealistic and politically oriented to push Europe’s climate goals. EIA forecasts should be based on current laws and regulations and should not be used to promote favored policies. l Assess the case for privatization. There are some who think that EIA should be privatized. The cost savings to taxpayers should be considered. On the other hand, EIA has generally demonstrated neutral data presentation that is helpful to policymakers and the private sector. Budget Congress appropriated $126.8 million for EIA in FY 2021, and the FY 2023 budget request is for approximately $144.5 million.73 OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (IA) Mission/Overview “The Office of International Affairs has primary responsibility for addressing international energy issues that have a direct impact on research, development, utilization, supply, and conservation of energy affecting the United States.”74 It “focuses on enhancing global energy security through countering malign influence, diversifying supplies, and increasing energy access” and “is committed to increas- ing U.S. energy exports and trade to enhance growth.” 75 Needed Reforms l Expand IA’s role and focus its activities on U.S. international energy security interests. International energy activities should be consolidated under IA (and the Department of State’s Bureau of Energy Resources should be eliminated) to ensure a proper understanding of domestic energy

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.