Bank-Fintech Partnership Enhancement Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6552
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

ID: B001282

Follow the money

The bill

Bank-Fintech Partnership Enhancement Act

HR. 6552, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.

The sponsor

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$92,054 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 456.

February 24, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another exercise in legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Bank-Fintech Partnership Enhancement Act (HR 6552) claims to promote partnerships between fintech companies and banking organizations, allegedly to support new bank formation, community bank health, and innovation. How quaint.

In reality, the bill's primary objective is to grease the wheels for more lucrative relationships between big banks and fintech firms, while pretending to care about community banks and consumer protection. It's a classic case of "regulatory capture," where lawmakers serve the interests of their corporate donors rather than the public.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and FDIC to conduct studies on fintech-bank partnerships and report back to Congress. Oh, what a thrilling prospect – more bureaucratic busywork!

In essence, these studies will provide cover for future deregulation efforts, allowing banks to further entrench their relationships with fintech companies, which will inevitably lead to more consolidation, reduced competition, and increased systemic risk.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects benefit from this bill:

1. Big banks: They'll get to deepen their ties with fintech firms, expanding their reach and profits. 2. Fintech companies: They'll gain access to more customers, data, and resources through partnerships with established banks. 3. Lobbyists and special interest groups: They'll reap the rewards of influencing policy that benefits their corporate clients.

Meanwhile, community banks, credit unions, and consumers will be left in the dust, as they often are when Congress prioritizes the interests of powerful corporations over those of ordinary people.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill's passage would likely lead to:

1. Increased consolidation in the banking sector, reducing competition and choice for consumers. 2. Greater systemic risk, as banks become more intertwined with fintech companies, which often operate outside traditional regulatory frameworks. 3. More opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, allowing banks to exploit loopholes and avoid oversight. 4. A further erosion of community bank health, as they struggle to compete with the behemoths in the industry.

In conclusion, HR 6552 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice – a bill designed to serve the interests of powerful corporations at the expense of the public interest. It's a cynical exercise in regulatory capture, dressed up as a noble effort to promote innovation and community bank health. Don't be fooled.

Related Topics

Banking & Financial ServicesFederal Budget & AppropriationsSmall Business & Entrepreneurship
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$92,054
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$90,754

No PAC contributions found

1
TED J. BALESTRERI ENTERPRISES
1 transaction
$1,000
2
QUEENSLAKE
1 transaction
$300

No committee contributions found

1
BOUCHER, DAWN D
2 transactions
$6,800
2
VESTER, NANCY
1 transaction
$6,600
3
KOLLAR, CLINT WILLIAM
1 transaction
$6,600
4
FIELD, CHESTER JACK
1 transaction
$6,600
5
FISHER, KENNETH
1 transaction
$6,600
6
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
7
BROWN, CHRIS
1 transaction
$5,600
8
DARWISH, SAM
1 transaction
$5,000
9
CORRELL, JESS T.
1 transaction
$5,000
10
JOHNSON, TRAVIS
1 transaction
$5,000
11
BARKER, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,409
12
KAUDER, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$3,409
13
LEVINE, ALLAN
1 transaction
$3,409
14
LINDSAY, OLIVIA
1 transaction
$3,409
15
SCHWIMMER, STEVEN
1 transaction
$3,409
16
WOLFF, JARED
1 transaction
$3,409
17
ATKINS, RANDALL
1 transaction
$3,300
18
BARON, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
19
BAUGUESS, SCOTT
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]

ID: G000583

Top Contributors

10

1
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$22,941
Apr 12, 2024
2
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$10,621
May 10, 2024
3
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
May 15, 2024
4
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 15, 2024
5
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 30, 2024
6
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$5,751
Apr 1, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SEKAS LAW GROUP LLC
OrganizationENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NJ
$1,500
Apr 12, 2024
9
SANDOR F. GENET & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
OrganizationNORTH MIAMI BEACH, FL
$250
Apr 12, 2024
10
FIRESTONE MILKEN, SARAH
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Jul 2, 2024

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

ID: S000250

Top Contributors

10

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
May 16, 2024
2
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
Sep 12, 2023
3
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 17, 2024
4
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
May 24, 2023
5
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
6
HOWARD, RONALD VANCE
BANKERS LIFE • MANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
7
HOWARD, KAREN
ELEMENTS MASSAGE • MANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
8
SINGH, PRITPAL
BETA SOFT SYSTEMS • MANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
9
KAUR, MANJIT
SINGH SEMICONDUCTORS & SYSTEMS • MANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
10
BEHRINGER, TODD
THE BEHRINGER GROUP, LLC • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualWOODWAY, TX
$3,400
Sep 1, 2023

Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

ID: D000626

Top Contributors

10

1
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
PAXOS • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Apr 22, 2024
2
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
NA • HOMEMAKER
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Apr 22, 2024
3
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 22, 2024
4
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 22, 2024
5
GROW, RICHARD
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCINCINNATI, OH
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
6
ROBINSON, ROBERT S
SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualFAIRFIELD TOWNSHIP, OH
$6,600
May 5, 2023
7
BEAMAN, LEE
BEAMAN VENTURES • INVESTOR
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Apr 13, 2023
8
PHELAN, BRENT J
PHELAN INSURANCE • INSURANCE
IndividualWEST CHESTER, OH
$6,600
Apr 19, 2023
9
RICKETTS, J. PETER
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Jun 30, 2023
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CEO / OWNER
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Moskowitz, Jared [D-FL-23]

ID: M001217

Top Contributors

10

1
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 28, 2023
2
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 20, 2024
3
ANDREWS LAW FIRM
OrganizationTALLAHASSEE, FL
$1,000
Mar 5, 2024
4
ANDREWS LAW FIRM
OrganizationTALLAHASSEE, FL
$1,000
Mar 5, 2024
5
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$1,000
Jun 17, 2024
6
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$1,000
Sep 25, 2023
7
ZAFFIRINI, CARLOS
AHCV • CEO
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Feb 2, 2024
8
ZAFFIRINI, CARLOS
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Feb 12, 2024
9
BOGDAN, MICHAEL
TESTING MATTERS INC • SELF
IndividualDEERFIELD BEACH, FL
$3,300
Dec 26, 2023
10
BOGDAN, MICHAEL
TESTING MATTERS INC • SELF
IndividualDEERFIELD BEACH, FL
$3,300
Dec 26, 2023

Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]

ID: M001236

Top Contributors

10

1
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
SOUTHLAND • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Apr 26, 2024
2
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Jun 26, 2024
3
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
CPFRM • EXECUTIVE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
4
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
5
KELLER, OSCAR A III
SELF EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Apr 23, 2024
6
KELLER, OSCAR A III
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Jun 23, 2024
7
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
SUMMIT HOSPITALITY • PRESIDENT
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
8
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
9
BELL, III, JAMES
BELLLEGAL GROUP • ATTORNEY
IndividualGEORGETOWN, SC
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
10
BEAM, DREW
BROAD RIVER HOLDINGS • REAL ESTATE
IndividualSHELBY, NC
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

10

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 63 nodes and 37 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $192,253

Top Donors - Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • +Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a) requires a study on partnerships between banking organizations and financial technology companies, which includes fintechs, to support new banking organization formation and community bank health, indicating a potential benefit to the fintech industry.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a) and (b) direct federal banking agencies to study how bank-fintech partnerships can support new banking organization formation and community bank health, which could benefit commercial banks by fostering innovation and growth.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 27 contributions
    • SCHARF, CHARLIE$3,300
    • DIMON, JAMES$3,300
    • LEOPOLD, ROBIN$3,300
    • OESTERLE, MARK$2,500
    • MAGUIRE, MICHAEL$2,500
  • from 9 contributions
    • BAUGUESS, SCOTT$3,300
    • CALVERT CAMPBELL, KARA$3,300
    • CHOI, EMILIE$3,300
    • HAAS, AJ$3,300
    • ARMSTRONG, BRIAN$3,300

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 6552's focus on studying bank-fintech partnerships to support new bank formation and community bank health aligns with Project 2025's goal of improving entrepreneurs' access to capital and reducing regulatory barriers through market-driven financial innovation."

Key themes:fintech partnershipsaccess to capitalregulatory reformcommunity bank healthinnovation and competition

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 64%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 6552 focuses on studying bank‑fintech and credit union‑fintech partnerships to foster innovation and consumer protection, while the Project 2025 section seeks to abolish the CFPB and curb its authority. The bills share only broad themes of consumer protection and financial innovation but do not align on the specific goal of dismantling or limiting the CFPB."

Key themes:consumer protectionfinancial innovationregulatory oversightcompetition

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 63%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section address financial regulatory agencies, but the bill focuses on studying bank‑fintech partnerships to support innovation and community bank health, whereas the Project 2025 excerpt centers on CFPB structure, civil penalty fund operations, and related reforms. The thematic overlap is limited to the broader domain of financial regulation."

Key themes:financial regulationregulatory agenciesconsumer protectioninnovationcommunity bank health

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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