American FIRST Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6550
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

ID: L000583

Follow the money

The bill

American FIRST Act of 2025

HR. 6550, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$66,000 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

62% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 773-775 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 454.

February 24, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The American FIRST Act of 2025 is a laughable attempt to increase transparency in interactions between Federal banking supervisory agencies and global financial regulatory or supervisory forums. The bill's sponsors claim it will promote accountability and ensure that the United States maintains its sovereignty in financial regulation. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Federal Reserve Act to require annual reporting on interactions between the Board of Governors and global financial regulatory or supervisory forums. This includes a laundry list of details, from membership lists to funding sources, organizational charts, and meeting summaries. Oh, joy.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Federal Reserve, banking supervisory agencies, global financial regulatory or supervisory forums, and – of course – the politicians who sponsored this bill. One can only assume that these stakeholders will be thrilled to provide more paperwork and bureaucratic busywork.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's not pretend that this bill will have any meaningful impact on the opaque world of international finance. It's a Potemkin village, designed to create the illusion of transparency while allowing the real players to continue their backroom deals and regulatory capture.

In reality, this bill is likely a response to lobbying efforts by financial institutions seeking to curry favor with regulators and lawmakers. The added reporting requirements will only serve to increase compliance costs for banks, which will then be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fees and interest rates.

Meanwhile, the politicians who sponsored this bill will tout it as a victory for transparency and accountability, all while collecting campaign contributions from the very same financial institutions they're supposedly regulating. It's a classic case of regulatory theater, where everyone involved is playing their part in a farce designed to distract from the real issues.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), characterized by a complete disconnect between stated goals and actual outcomes. The prognosis is poor, as LLSS often leads to further bureaucratic bloat, regulatory capture, and a continued erosion of trust in the financial system.

Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong prescription of critical thinking and a thorough examination of the bill's true motivations. Unfortunately, this treatment is unlikely to be effective, given the entrenched interests and cognitive biases at play.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsBanking & Financial Services
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$66,000
13 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
STEPHENSON, DONNA MRS.
2 transactions
$6,600
2
STEPHENSON, JAMES MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
STEPHENS, WARREN
2 transactions
$6,600
4
TEAGUE, GREGORY D. MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
5
DICKERSON, JASON
2 transactions
$6,600
6
LIEBERMAN, RONALD MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
7
YOUNG, E. HOWARD MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
8
BOLCH, CARL MR. JR.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
MORRIS, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
LAKO, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
11
WALLACE, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300
12
YOUNG, REBECCA H. MRS.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
NICHOLAS, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

ID: B001282

Top Contributors

10

1
TED J. BALESTRERI ENTERPRISES
OrganizationMONTEREY, CA
$1,000
Dec 6, 2023
2
QUEENSLAKE
OrganizationGEORGETOWN, KY
$300
Feb 12, 2024
3
VESTER, NANCY
NONERETIRED
IndividualCENTERVILLE, MA
$6,600
Sep 15, 2024
4
KOLLAR, CLINT WILLIAM
SIXTH STREET PARTNERSINVESTOR
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$6,600
Mar 22, 2023
5
FIELD, CHESTER JACK
NONERETIRED
IndividualSUMMERTON, SC
$6,600
Jun 4, 2024
6
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTSEXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 21, 2024
7
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLCMEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 21, 2024
8
BROWN, CHRIS
MINDSETPARTNER
IndividualCHEVY CHASE, MD
$5,600
Mar 7, 2023
9
DARWISH, SAM
SINGULARITY INVESTMENTS LLCCEO
IndividualMCKINNEY, TX
$5,000
Oct 28, 2024
10
CORRELL, JESS T.
FIRST SOUTHERN BANKBANKER
IndividualSTANFORD, KY
$5,000
May 7, 2024

Rep. Flood, Mike [R-NE-1]

ID: F000474

Top Contributors

10

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
2
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1,919
Jun 24, 2024
3
SUGAR CREEK REALTY
OrganizationSAINT LOUIS, MO
$1,500
Oct 1, 2024
4
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$959
May 28, 2024
5
LAMA COMMUNITY TRUST
OrganizationSAN CRISTOBAL, NM
$833
Jun 26, 2024
6
RADCLIFFE GILBERTSON & BRADY
OrganizationLINCOLN, NE
$500
Oct 20, 2024
7
CASSLING, MICHAEL
CASSLINGCEO
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$13,200
Mar 13, 2023
8
BRADFORD VI, DANA
C3 BRANDSCEO
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Mar 28, 2023
9
HAWKINS JR, FRED
HAWKINS CONSTRUCTIONCONSTRUCTION
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
May 11, 2024
10
DUGGER, CATHERINE
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Oct 21, 2024

Rep. Rose, John W. [R-TN-6]

ID: R000612

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
2
EVANS, JOHN B.
NGU RISK MANAGEMENTPRESIDENT
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$13,200
Feb 24, 2023
3
HUDSON, PHILLIP JR.
CUMBERLAND SUPPLY CO. INC.SHAREHOLDER
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$13,200
May 20, 2023
4
VADEN, JAMES L.
SELF-EMPLOYEDORTHODONTIST
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$13,200
May 8, 2023
5
BARNES, SAM T. DR.
SELF-EMPLOYEDPHYSICIAN
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$10,000
Feb 12, 2024
6
EVANS, JOHN B.
SELF-EMPLOYEDSALES
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$10,000
Feb 27, 2024
7
BARNES, SAM T. DR.
SELF-EMPLOYEDPHYSICIAN
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$6,600
Dec 8, 2023
8
LIPMAN, ROBERT S.
LIPMAN BROTHERSEXECUTIVE
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Nov 9, 2023
9
SMITH, BRAD
RUSSELL STREET VENTURESCEO
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Oct 26, 2023
10
SMITH, LAUREN
LH SMITH CONSULTINGPRESIDENT
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Oct 26, 2023

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

ID: S000250

Top Contributors

10

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
May 16, 2024
2
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
Sep 12, 2023
3
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 17, 2024
4
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
May 24, 2023
5
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
6
HOWARD, RONALD VANCE
BANKERS LIFEMANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
7
HOWARD, KAREN
ELEMENTS MASSAGEMANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
8
SINGH, PRITPAL
BETA SOFT SYSTEMSMANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
9
KAUR, MANJIT
SINGH SEMICONDUCTORS & SYSTEMSMANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
10
BEHRINGER, TODD
THE BEHRINGER GROUP, LLCCONSTRUCTION
IndividualWOODWAY, TX
$3,400
Sep 1, 2023

Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

ID: D000626

Top Contributors

10

1
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
PAXOSCEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Apr 22, 2024
2
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
NAHOMEMAKER
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Apr 22, 2024
3
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTSEXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 22, 2024
4
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLCMEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 22, 2024
5
GROW, RICHARD
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualCINCINNATI, OH
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
6
ROBINSON, ROBERT S
SELF EMPLOYEDENTREPRENEUR
IndividualFAIRFIELD TOWNSHIP, OH
$6,600
May 5, 2023
7
BEAMAN, LEE
BEAMAN VENTURESINVESTOR
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Apr 13, 2023
8
PHELAN, BRENT J
PHELAN INSURANCEINSURANCE
IndividualWEST CHESTER, OH
$6,600
Apr 19, 2023
9
RICKETTS, J. PETER
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Jun 30, 2023
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINECEO / OWNER
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]

ID: M001236

Top Contributors

10

1
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
SOUTHLANDENTREPRENEUR
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Apr 26, 2024
2
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Jun 26, 2024
3
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
CPFRMEXECUTIVE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
4
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
5
KELLER, OSCAR A III
SELF EMPLOYEDREAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Apr 23, 2024
6
KELLER, OSCAR A III
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Jun 23, 2024
7
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
SUMMIT HOSPITALITYPRESIDENT
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
8
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
9
BELL, III, JAMES
BELLLEGAL GROUPATTORNEY
IndividualGEORGETOWN, SC
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
10
BEAM, DREW
BROAD RIVER HOLDINGSREAL ESTATE
IndividualSHELBY, NC
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 43 nodes and 35 connections (30 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $143,419

Top Donors - Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount

13 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90

    The bill requires annual reporting on interactions between Federal banking supervisory agencies (including the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC) and global financial regulatory forums, imposing new reporting obligations and transparency requirements on these agencies, which oversee commercial banks. This increases regulatory scrutiny and compliance burden on the banking industry.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate62.0%
Pages: 773-775

— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).

Introduction

Moderate61.8%
Pages: 869-871

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

Full Policy Text

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