Merger Process Review Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6546

Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Merger Process Review Act

HR. 6546, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$98,700 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 453.

February 24, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Analysis of HR 6546: Merger Process Review Act**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect the implications of this bill on my empire's interests.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Merger Process Review Act aims to enhance transparency and efficiency in the review process for insured depository institution mergers. The bill requires each Federal prudential regulator's Inspector General to conduct a 3-year review of their merger application handling, focusing on timeliness, efficiency, and impact on safety, soundness, competition, and financial stability.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces several key provisions:

1. **Inspector General Review**: Mandates regular reviews of merger application handling by Federal prudential regulators. 2. **Quantifiable Metrics**: Requires evaluation of mean and median application processing times, sources of delay, and impact on safety and soundness. 3. **Recommendations for Improvement**: Inspector Generals must provide specific recommendations to enhance the merger review process.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** This bill affects:

1. **Federal Prudential Regulators**: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and National Credit Union Administration Board. 2. **Insured Depository Institutions**: Banks, thrifts, credit unions, and other financial institutions involved in mergers and acquisitions.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From my perspective as a visionary entrepreneur, this bill has both positive and negative implications:

1. **Increased Transparency**: Regular reviews may lead to more efficient merger processes, benefiting my empire's interests. 2. **Regulatory Burden**: Additional reporting requirements could increase regulatory costs for my institutions, potentially hindering growth. 3. **Potential for Deregulation**: Recommendations from Inspector Generals might lead to streamlined regulations, allowing my empire to expand its market share.

To maximize the benefits of this bill, I will:

1. **Lobby for Regulatory Relief**: Advocate for reduced reporting requirements and streamlined regulations to minimize costs. 2. **Influence Inspector General Reviews**: Leverage my network to ensure that reviews focus on efficiency and timeliness, rather than safety and soundness concerns. 3. **Expand Market Share**: Utilize the potential deregulation opportunities to further consolidate my empire's position in the market.

By understanding the implications of this bill, I can navigate the regulatory landscape to protect and expand my interests.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through various stages before becoming an actual law.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The Merger Process Review Act (HR 6546) aims to improve the efficiency and transparency of the merger review process for insured depository institutions. The main objective is to require the Inspector General of each Federal prudential regulator to conduct a review every three years of their handling of merger applications.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill requires the Inspector General to evaluate the merger review procedures, including timeliness and efficiency, and identify sources of delay. They must also consider the benefits and risks of different approaches and provide recommendations for improvement. The report will be submitted to Congress and published online. Additionally, the Federal depository institution regulatory agency must respond to the report with a plan to implement the recommendations.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The affected parties include:

* Insured depository institutions (banks and credit unions) * Federal prudential regulators (Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, and NCUA) * Inspector General offices * Congress

**Potential Impact & Implications** If passed, this bill could lead to a more efficient and transparent merger review process, which may benefit consumers and promote financial stability. However, it's essential to note that the actual impact will depend on how effectively the recommendations are implemented by the regulatory agencies.

As we covered in 8th grade civics class, the legislative process involves checks and balances to ensure that power is distributed evenly among the branches of government. In this case, Congress has introduced a bill to oversee the actions of Federal regulators, which is an example of congressional oversight. Remember when we learned about the importance of separation of powers? This bill demonstrates how that concept works in practice.

Now, I hope you understand the basics of this bill and its objectives. It's not exactly rocket science, folks...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

Folks, gather 'round! I've got the scoop on HR 6546, the Merger Process Review Act. Now, at first glance, this bill seems like a snooze-fest – just another bureaucratic exercise in regulatory oversight. But trust me, there's more to it than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose of this bill is to require the Inspector General (IG) of each Federal prudential regulator to review their handling of insured depository institution merger applications every three years. Sounds innocuous enough, right? But think about it – what's really being reviewed here? The efficiency and timeliness of these mergers? Or something more?

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a new requirement for the IGs to review merger procedures, including metrics like application processing times. It also mandates that the regulators respond to these reviews with written plans to implement recommendations. Now, this might seem like a minor tweak, but I'd argue it's a Trojan horse. What if these reviews are just a pretext for consolidating power in the hands of the Federal Reserve and other regulatory agencies?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The obvious stakeholders here are the banks and credit unions involved in mergers. But what about the consumers? The small businesses? The community organizations that rely on these financial institutions? Are they being represented in this process, or is it just a game of musical chairs among the big players?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Here's where things get interesting. If this bill passes, we might see a wave of consolidation in the banking industry, with smaller institutions getting swallowed up by the giants. And what about the impact on financial stability? Competition? The availability of financial products and services? It's all being reviewed, supposedly – but who gets to decide what's "safe" and "sound"?

Now, I know some folks might say I'm reading too much into this bill. But let me tell you, there are always hidden agendas lurking beneath the surface. Mark my words: this is just another step towards a more centralized, more controlled financial system – one that serves the interests of the powerful at the expense of the people.

So, what do you think, folks? Am I onto something here, or am I just seeing shadows on the wall?

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Deep breath) Folks, gather 'round! We've got a real doozy of a bill on our hands here. The Merger Process Review Act, HR 6546 - sounds innocuous enough, right? But trust me, this is just another example of the elites in Washington trying to strangle American freedom with red tape.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose of this bill is to require the Inspector General of each Federal prudential regulator (think: big banks and financial institutions) to review their handling of merger applications every three years. Sounds like a reasonable idea, right? But let's dig deeper...

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This bill would create a new layer of bureaucracy, requiring these regulators to evaluate their own performance on merger reviews. They'll have to assess timeliness, efficiency, and even the impact on "safety and soundness" (whatever that means). And get this - they'll have to publish their findings online for all to see! Can you smell the transparency?

But here's the kicker: these regulators will also have to consider "different merger review approaches and procedures." Code for: more regulations, more oversight, more government control. You know what that means? Less freedom for American businesses to operate!

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Who's affected by this bill? Well, it's not just the big banks and financial institutions - although they're certainly in the crosshairs. No, no! This bill also impacts small businesses, entrepreneurs, and everyday Americans who rely on these institutions for their financial needs. You see, when government overregulates, everyone suffers.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Now, I know what you're thinking: "But isn't this just a minor tweak to existing law?" Ah, no! This bill has far-reaching implications. It sets a precedent for even more government interference in the free market. Mark my words, folks - if we let this slide, next thing you know, they'll be telling us how to run our own businesses!

(Conspiratorial whisper) You see, this is all part of the deep state's plan to strangle American freedom with regulations and bureaucracy. Wake up, sheeple! This bill might seem harmless on the surface, but trust me - it's a slippery slope.

(Smirk) Now, I know some of you are thinking, "But what about accountability? Don't we want our regulators to be transparent?" (Scoffs) Transparency is just code for more government control. We don't need more bureaucrats telling us how to live our lives!

(Outrage mode) This bill is a threat to American freedom, plain and simple! We must stand strong against this overreach and protect our right to operate in the free market without Big Brother breathing down our necks!

(Smirk) And that's the truth, folks. Stay vigilant, stay informed - and remember

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Merger Process Review Act (HR 6546) claims to promote transparency and efficiency in the review process for insured depository institution mergers. But don't be fooled – this bill is a Trojan horse, designed to appease big banks and financial institutions while pretending to serve the public interest.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires each Federal prudential regulator's Inspector General to conduct a review every three years of their merger review procedures. This includes evaluating metrics like application processing times, identifying sources of delay, and considering alternative approaches. Sounds reasonable, right? Wrong. These reviews will be nothing more than window dressing, allowing regulators to pat themselves on the back while maintaining the status quo.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: big banks, financial institutions, and their lobbyists. They'll use this bill as a fig leaf to justify further consolidation and concentration in the industry, all under the guise of "efficiency" and "competitiveness." Meanwhile, smaller banks and credit unions will be left to fight for scraps.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of regulatory capture. By giving regulators more flexibility in their review processes, it will actually make it easier for big banks to merge and acquire smaller institutions, further reducing competition and increasing systemic risk. The Inspector General reviews will be nothing more than a rubber stamp, providing a veneer of accountability while allowing the real power players to continue their games.

In short, HR 6546 is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of money in politics and the revolving door between regulators and industry insiders. It's a bill designed to serve the interests of the powerful at the expense of the public. But hey, who needs actual oversight when you can just pretend to care?

Diagnosis: Terminal case of regulatory capture, with symptoms including excessive deference to big banks, lack of meaningful oversight, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy.

Treatment: None available, as the patient (Congress) is too far gone. Prognosis: Poor.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The Merger Process Review Act (HR 6546) aims to improve the efficiency and transparency of the merger review process for insured depository institutions, such as banks and credit unions. The bill requires each Federal prudential regulator's Inspector General to conduct a review every three years of their agency's handling of merger applications.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill introduces several key provisions:

1. **Inspector General Review**: Requires the Inspector General of each Federal depository institution regulatory agency (e.g., Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC) to review their agency's merger review procedures every three years. 2. **Evaluation Metrics**: The review must include an evaluation of quantifiable metrics, such as mean and median application processing times, and identify sources of delay in the review process. 3. **Report and Recommendations**: Each Inspector General must issue a report to Congress containing findings and recommendations for improving the merger review process. 4. **Agency Response**: The relevant Federal depository institution regulatory agency must respond to each report with a plan to implement the recommendations.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The bill affects:

1. **Federal Prudential Regulators**: Agencies responsible for reviewing merger applications, such as the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, and National Credit Union Administration. 2. **Insured Depository Institutions**: Banks and credit unions that submit merger applications to these regulators. 3. **Congress**: Receives reports from Inspector Generals and agency responses.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The bill may lead to:

1. **Improved Efficiency**: Streamlined merger review processes, reducing delays and costs for institutions seeking to merge or acquire other entities. 2. **Increased Transparency**: Regular reviews and reports provide greater insight into the merger review process, promoting accountability and informed decision-making. 3. **Enhanced Regulatory Oversight**: Regulators may refine their procedures to better balance safety and soundness with competition and innovation in the financial sector.

However, potential challenges include:

1. **Additional Burden on Regulators**: The bill's requirements may add to the workload of already resource-constrained regulatory agencies. 2. **Potential for Inconsistent Implementation**: Variability in Inspector General reviews and agency responses could lead to inconsistent application of merger review procedures across different regulators.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down this gnarly bill, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The Merger Process Review Act (HR 6546) is all about makin' sure the feds are reviewin' bank mergers in a chill way. The main goal is to require the Inspector General of each Federal prudential regulator to review their merger review process every three years. This means they'll be checkin' if the regulators are doin' their job efficiently and effectively, bro.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill's got some key provisions that'll make a difference:

* The Inspector General will review the merger review process, including how long it takes to process applications and identify any delays. * They'll also evaluate the impact of mergers on safety and soundness, financial stability, competition, and access to financial services. * The report will include recommendations for improvement, which the regulators will have to respond to with a plan to implement those recs.

This bill's all about addin' some transparency and accountability to the merger review process, dude. It's not changin' any existing laws, but rather makin' sure the feds are doin' their job right.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The parties affected by this bill include:

* Federal prudential regulators (like the Fed, OCC, FDIC, and NCUA) * Insured depository institutions (banks and credit unions) * Consumers who use financial services

These stakeholders will be impacted by the increased transparency and accountability in the merger review process. It's all about makin' sure the system is workin' for everyone, bro.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The potential impact of this bill is pretty significant:

* Increased efficiency: By identifyin' delays and inefficiencies, regulators can streamline their processes and make mergers happen faster. * Improved transparency: The regular reviews will give us a better idea of how the merger review process works and where it's goin' wrong. * Better decision-makin': With more data and analysis, regulators can make more informed decisions about mergers.

However, there are some potential implications to consider:

* Increased regulatory burden: The additional reviews might put more pressure on regulators, which could lead to delays or inefficiencies elsewhere in the system. * Unintended consequences: Changes to the merger review process could have unintended effects on the financial industry as a whole.

Overall, this bill's all about makin' sure the feds are doin' their job right and keepin' the financial system chill, bro.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**HR 6546: Merger Process Review Act**

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The Merger Process Review Act aims to increase transparency and efficiency in the review process of insured depository institution merger applications by Federal prudential regulators. The bill requires each regulator's Inspector General to conduct a review every three years, evaluating the timeliness and effectiveness of the merger review procedures.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill introduces several key provisions:

1. **Inspector General Review**: Requires the Inspector General of each Federal depository institution regulatory agency (Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, and NCUA) to conduct a review every three years of their merger review procedures. 2. **Evaluation Metrics**: The review must include an evaluation of quantifiable metrics, such as mean and median application processing times, and identify sources of delay in the review process. 3. **Report and Response**: Each Inspector General must issue a report to Congress containing findings and recommendations, which will be made publicly available. The relevant regulatory agency must respond with a plan to implement the recommendations.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The bill affects:

1. **Federal Prudential Regulators**: The Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, and NCUA will be required to conduct regular reviews of their merger review procedures. 2. **Insured Depository Institutions**: Banks and credit unions that submit merger applications will benefit from a more efficient and transparent review process. 3. **Industry Associations**: Trade associations representing banks and credit unions may welcome the increased transparency and potential for streamlined regulations.

**Potential Impact & Implications** The bill's impact is likely to be significant:

1. **Increased Transparency**: Regular reviews and public reports will provide greater insight into the merger review process, allowing stakeholders to better understand the regulatory environment. 2. **Improved Efficiency**: The evaluation of metrics and identification of sources of delay may lead to streamlined procedures, reducing the time and cost associated with merger applications. 3. **Potential for Regulatory Capture**: The bill's emphasis on efficiency and timeliness may create opportunities for industry lobbyists to influence the review process, potentially leading to regulatory capture.

**Monied Interest Analysis** While no specific PACs or industry lobby groups are explicitly mentioned in the bill text, it is likely that trade associations representing banks and credit unions will be involved in shaping the legislation. The American Bankers Association (ABA) and the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) may be key stakeholders in this process.

**Committee Capture** The bill was referred to the House Committee on Financial Services, which has a history of being influenced by the financial industry. Representative Williams, the primary sponsor, received significant campaign contributions from the banking sector in 2024, according to FEC data. This raises concerns about potential committee capture and the undue influence of special interest groups on the legislative process.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$98,700

19 donors

PACs

Organizations

$3,300

Committees

Individuals

$95,400

No PAC contributions found

POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

No committee contributions found

FORD, GERALD J. MR.

2 transactions

$9,900

ZELTER, JAMES

2 transactions

$7,800

PRINCE, ZAN MRS.

1 transaction

$6,600

WOODARD, DONALD M. MR. JR.

1 transaction

$6,600

CARVALHO, ANNE MARIE MRS.

1 transaction

$6,600

ROWAN, CAROLYN

1 transaction

$6,600

ROWAN, MARC

1 transaction

$6,600

DUNIGAN, MIKE MR.

1 transaction

$6,000

LOWRANCE, DAN E. MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

NICHOLS, THOMAS B. MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

KLEINHEINZ, JOHN B. MR.

1 transaction

$5,000

KLEINMAN, SCOTT

1 transaction

$3,900

PATTERSON, DAN

1 transaction

$3,300

WEEKLEY, RICHARD W. MR.

1 transaction

$3,300

RODMAN, LANCE MR.

1 transaction

$3,300

REILLY, BEVERLY MRS.

1 transaction

$3,300

MCCLELLAND, MARK

1 transaction

$3,300

VINSON, JOHNNY H. MR. II

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

ID: D000626

Top Contributors

CASCARILLA, CHARLES

PAXOS • CEO

IndividualMIAMI, FL

$6,600

Apr 22, 2024

CASCARILLA, MARISSA

NA • HOMEMAKER

IndividualMIAMI, FL

$6,600

Apr 22, 2024

FISHER, KENNETH

FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

IndividualPLANO, TX

$6,600

May 22, 2024

FISHER, SHERRILYN

PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER

IndividualPLANO, TX

$6,600

May 22, 2024

GROW, RICHARD

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualCINCINNATI, OH

$6,600

Mar 10, 2023

ROBINSON, ROBERT S

SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR

IndividualFAIRFIELD TOWNSHIP, OH

$6,600

May 5, 2023

BEAMAN, LEE

BEAMAN VENTURES • INVESTOR

IndividualNASHVILLE, TN

$6,600

Apr 13, 2023

PHELAN, BRENT J

PHELAN INSURANCE • INSURANCE

IndividualWEST CHESTER, OH

$6,600

Apr 19, 2023

RICKETTS, J. PETER

IndividualOMAHA, NE

$6,600

Jun 30, 2023

UIHLEIN, RICHARD

ULINE • CEO / OWNER

IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL

$5,800

Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP

OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY

$1,000

Feb 24, 2024

BATMASIAN, JAMES

INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 27, 2023

BATMASIAN, JAMES

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 29, 2023

AUSTIN, ROBERT

UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Jul 18, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 15, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 22, 2024

SCALA, MARY ELLEN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY

$5,300

Aug 27, 2023

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

SELF • PRESIDENT

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 24, 2024

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 25, 2024

PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL

GOLDEN TASTE • CEO

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,400

Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 46 nodes and 27 connections (39 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $132,700

Top Donors - Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

1 Org18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

+Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90
Section 2(a) requires Inspector General reviews of merger review procedures for Federal depository institution regulatory agencies, which oversee commercial banks; improving timeliness and efficiency could benefit banks by reducing merger approval delays.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill seeks to make the merger review process of federal banking regulators more efficient and transparent through regular Inspector General evaluations, which aligns with Project 2025’s goal of streamlining financial regulatory agencies to reduce burden and improve access to capital."

Key themes:regulatory efficiencytransparencymerger review oversightreducing institutional burdenfinancial agency accountability

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate

Vector: 61%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill seeks to improve the efficiency and transparency of merger reviews for depository institutions through regular Inspector General evaluations, which aligns with Project 2025's broader goal of enhancing financial regulatory agency performance and reducing unnecessary burdens, though the bill's focus is narrower than the wide-ranging SEC/CFTC/CFPB reforms emphasized in the policy."

Key themes:regulatory efficiencyinspector general oversighttransparencyfinancial sector oversightreducing regulatory burden

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 64%

Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aims to enhance the efficiency and transparency of merger reviews by banking prudential regulators, whereas Project 2025's financial regulatory agenda focuses on abolishing the CFPB and curbing its authority. Both address financial agency oversight, but their specific objectives and mechanisms do not directly align."

Key themes:financial regulatory agenciesoversightaccountabilityregulatory efficiency

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Trade

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 863-865AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on improving merger review efficiency for depository institutions through Inspector General oversight, while Project 2025's Trade section emphasizes deregulating private securities offerings, reducing SEC reporting burdens, and opposing ESG-related disclosures—there is minimal thematic overlap."

Key themes:regulatory efficiencyfinancial oversight

— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on improving merger review efficiency for banking regulators, while the Project 2025 excerpt emphasizes FCC mission statements and CFPB civil penalty fund structures—there is minimal thematic overlap between the bill’s provisions and the cited policy sections."

Key themes:regulatory oversighttransparencyagency accountability

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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