REVIEW Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6544
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

ID: T000480

Follow the money

The bill

REVIEW Act of 2025

HR. 6544, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$71,300 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

62% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 872-874 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 452.

February 24, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The REVIEW Act of 2025 - because what this country really needed was another acronym to add to the alphabet soup of regulatory agencies.

Let's dissect this bill, shall we? It's a Frankenstein's monster of bureaucratic jargon and obfuscation, but I'll try to extract the relevant bits.

**New regulations being created or modified:** The REVIEW Act amends Section 2222 of the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (because who doesn't love a good acronym?). It expands the definition of "Federal financial institutions regulatory agency" to include... well, more agencies. Because what we need is more regulators regulating each other.

**Affected industries and sectors:** Financial institutions, naturally. Banks, credit unions, and other financial firms will be subject to this new layer of regulatory scrutiny. But don't worry, it's all about "streamlining" and "simplifying" regulations - just like every other bill that promises to reduce bureaucracy but actually increases it.

**Compliance requirements and timelines:** Agencies must conduct internal reviews of the cumulative impact of their regulations every 7 years (down from 10). They'll assess the effects on consumers, financial firms, credit availability, and market liquidity. Oh, and they'll quantify the economic costs imposed by these regulations - because that's not something they should have been doing all along.

**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ah, the fun part! Agencies will submit reports to Congress, which will no doubt be filled with thrilling insights and recommendations for "streamlining" regulations. But don't worry, there are no actual teeth in this bill - just a lot of hand-wringing about the need for regulatory efficiency.

**Economic and operational impacts:** The REVIEW Act promises to reduce regulatory burdens on financial institutions, but let's be real - it'll probably just create new ones. The compliance costs will likely outweigh any benefits, and we can expect more regulatory capture by the very industries this bill is supposed to regulate.

In conclusion, the REVIEW Act of 2025 is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to appear proactive while actually doing nothing to address the underlying problems with our regulatory system. But hey, at least it'll create some new jobs for bureaucrats and lobbyists - that's what really matters, right?

Diagnosis: Regulatory Theater-itis, a chronic condition characterized by excessive use of buzzwords, bureaucratic jargon, and a complete lack of actual reform.

Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach, and a willingness to call out the emperor's new clothes for what they are - a fancy facade hiding a whole lot of nothing.

Related Topics

Banking & Financial ServicesFederal Budget & AppropriationsGovernment Operations & Accountability
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$71,300
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$5,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,300
2
CATAWBA INDIAN NATION
1 transaction
$2,000

No committee contributions found

1
BURGAMY, LARRY G. JR.
2 transactions
$6,600
2
CHEVES, WALLACE
1 transaction
$3,300
3
HODGES, MICHAEL LYNN
1 transaction
$3,300
4
CARROLL, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
5
FLOYD, KAREN K
1 transaction
$3,300
6
ADAMS, C. DAN
1 transaction
$3,300
7
RODRIGUEZ, RAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
8
MILLEGAN, BRANTLY
1 transaction
$3,300
9
ELLIS, SLOAN P.
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SOLTAN, MOHAMED
1 transaction
$3,300
11
GREGORY, PHILLIP W.
1 transaction
$3,300
12
MCKISSICK, A. FOSTER III
1 transaction
$3,300
13
JOHNSON, ROBERT M.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
WINKLEVOSS, CAMERON
1 transaction
$3,300
15
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
1 transaction
$3,300
16
WINKLEVOSS, TYLER
1 transaction
$3,300
17
SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$3,300
18
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
1 transaction
$3,300
19
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 49 nodes and 22 connections (47 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $71,300

Top Donors - Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90

    Section 2 amends the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 to require Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies to review cumulative impact of regulations, including assessing effects on availability of financial products and services to financial and nonfinancial firms, credit availability, and market liquidity, and to include recommendations to streamline or eliminate burdensome regulations. This could reduce regulatory burden on commercial banks, providing a

  • The bill's review of regulatory cumulative impact on financial and nonfinancial firms, credit availability, and market liquidity, along with recommendations to streamline regulations, could reduce compliance costs for private equity and hedge funds, which are financial firms subject to banking regulations.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate62.1%
Pages: 872-874

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Introduction

Moderate62.1%
Pages: 872-874

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely.

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

Full Policy Text

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