To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 10660 Page Avenue in Fairfax, Virginia, as the "Congressman Gerald E. Connolly Post Office Building".

— 45 — Executive Office of the President of the United States l Coordinating and clearing agency communications with Congress, including testimonies and views on draft legislation. OMB cannot perform its role on behalf of the President effectively if it is not inti- mately involved in all aspects of the White House policy process and lacks knowledge of what the agencies are doing. Internally to the EOP, ensuring that the policy-for- mulation procedures developed by the White House to serve the President include OMB is one of any OMB Director’s major responsibilities. A common meme of those who intend to evade OMB review is to argue that where “resources” are not being discussed, OMB’s participation is optional. This ignores both OMB’s role in all down- stream execution and the reality that it has the only statutory tools in the White House that are powerful enough to override implementing agencies’ bureaucracies. The Director must view his job as the best, most comprehensive approxima- tion of the President’s mind as it pertains to the policy agenda while always being ready with actual options to effect that agenda within existing legal authorities and resources. This role cannot be performed adequately if the Director acts instead as the ambassador of the institutional interests of OMB and the wider bureaucracy to the White House. Once its reputation as the keeper of “commander’s intent” is established, then and only then does OMB have the ability to shape the most efficient way to pursue an objective. Externally, the Director must ensure that OMB has sufficient visibility into the deep caverns of agency decision-making. One indispensable statutory tool to that end is to ensure that policy officials—the Program Associate Directors (PADs) managing the vast Resource Management Offices (RMOs)—personally sign what are known as the apportionments. In 1870, Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Act3 to prevent the common agency practice of spending down all appropriated funding, creating artificial funding shortfalls that Congress would have to fill. The law mandated that all funding be allotted or “apportioned” in installments. This process, whereby agencies come to OMB for allotments of appropriated funding, is essential to the effective financial stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OMB can then direct on behalf of a President the amount, duration, and purpose of any appor- tioned funding to ensure against waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure consistency with the President’s agenda and applicable laws. The vast majority of these apportionments were signed by career officials—the Deputy Associate Directors (DADs)—until the Trump Administration placed this responsibility in the hands of the PADs and thereby opened wide vistas of oversight that had escaped the attention of policy officials. The Biden Administration sub- sequently reversed this decision. No Director should be chosen who is unwilling to restore apportionment decision-making to the PADs’ personal review, who is not aggressive in wielding the tool on behalf of the President’s agenda, or who is unable to defend the power against attacks from Congress.

— 45 — Executive Office of the President of the United States l Coordinating and clearing agency communications with Congress, including testimonies and views on draft legislation. OMB cannot perform its role on behalf of the President effectively if it is not inti- mately involved in all aspects of the White House policy process and lacks knowledge of what the agencies are doing. Internally to the EOP, ensuring that the policy-for- mulation procedures developed by the White House to serve the President include OMB is one of any OMB Director’s major responsibilities. A common meme of those who intend to evade OMB review is to argue that where “resources” are not being discussed, OMB’s participation is optional. This ignores both OMB’s role in all down- stream execution and the reality that it has the only statutory tools in the White House that are powerful enough to override implementing agencies’ bureaucracies. The Director must view his job as the best, most comprehensive approxima- tion of the President’s mind as it pertains to the policy agenda while always being ready with actual options to effect that agenda within existing legal authorities and resources. This role cannot be performed adequately if the Director acts instead as the ambassador of the institutional interests of OMB and the wider bureaucracy to the White House. Once its reputation as the keeper of “commander’s intent” is established, then and only then does OMB have the ability to shape the most efficient way to pursue an objective. Externally, the Director must ensure that OMB has sufficient visibility into the deep caverns of agency decision-making. One indispensable statutory tool to that end is to ensure that policy officials—the Program Associate Directors (PADs) managing the vast Resource Management Offices (RMOs)—personally sign what are known as the apportionments. In 1870, Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Act3 to prevent the common agency practice of spending down all appropriated funding, creating artificial funding shortfalls that Congress would have to fill. The law mandated that all funding be allotted or “apportioned” in installments. This process, whereby agencies come to OMB for allotments of appropriated funding, is essential to the effective financial stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OMB can then direct on behalf of a President the amount, duration, and purpose of any appor- tioned funding to ensure against waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure consistency with the President’s agenda and applicable laws. The vast majority of these apportionments were signed by career officials—the Deputy Associate Directors (DADs)—until the Trump Administration placed this responsibility in the hands of the PADs and thereby opened wide vistas of oversight that had escaped the attention of policy officials. The Biden Administration sub- sequently reversed this decision. No Director should be chosen who is unwilling to restore apportionment decision-making to the PADs’ personal review, who is not aggressive in wielding the tool on behalf of the President’s agenda, or who is unable to defend the power against attacks from Congress. — 46 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted that each of OMB’s primary functions, along with other executive and statutory roles, is carried out with the help of many essential OMB support offices. The two most important offices for moving OMB at the will of a Director are the Budget Review Division (BRD) and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The Director should have a direct and effective relationship with the head of the BRD (considered the top career official within OMB) and transmit most instructions through that office because the rest of the agency is institution- ally inclined toward its direction and responds accordingly. The BRD inevitably will translate the directions from policy officials to the career staff, and at every stage, it is obviously vital that the Director ensure that this translation is an accurate one. In addition, many key considerations involved in enacting a President’s agenda hinge on existing legal authorities. The Director must ensure the appointment of a General Counsel who is respected yet creative and fearless in his or her abil- ity to challenge legal precedents that serve to protect the status quo. This is vital within OMB not only with respect to the adequate development of policy options for the President’s review, but also with respect to agencies that attempt to protect their own institutional interests and foreclose certain avenues based on the mere assertion (and not proof) that the law disallows it or that, conversely, attempt to disregard the clear statutory commands of Congress. In general, the Director should empower a strong Deputy Director with author- ity over the Deputy for Management, the PADs, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to work diligently to break down barriers within OMB and not allow turf disputes or a lack of visibility to undermine the agency’s prin- cipal budget, management, and regulatory functions. OMB should work toward a “One OMB” position on behalf of the President and represent that view during the various policymaking processes. Budget. The United States today faces an untenable fiscal situation and owes $31 trillion on a debt that is steadily increasing. The OMB Director should present a fiscal goal to the President early in the budget development process to address the federal government’s fiscal irresponsibility. This goal would help to align the months-long process of developing the actual proposals for inclusion in the budget. Though some mistakenly regard it as a mere paper-pushing exercise, the Pres- ident’s budget is in fact a powerful mechanism for setting and enforcing public policy at federal agencies. The budget team includes six Resource Management Offices that, together with the BRD and other components, help the Director of OMB to develop and execute detailed agency spending plans that bear on every major aspect of policy formation and execution at federal agencies. Through initial priority-setting and ongoing supervision of agency spending, OMB’s budget team plays a key role in executing policy across the executive branch, including at many agencies wrongly regarded as “independent.”

— 33 — White House Office At the highest level, PPO is tasked with long-term, strategic workforce devel- opment. The “billets” of political appointments are of immense importance in credentialing and training future leaders. In addition, whatever one’s view of the constitutionality of various civil service rules (for example, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 19986) might be, it is necessary to ensure that departments and agencies have robust cadres of political staff just below senior levels in the event of unexpected vacancies. OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (OPA) The OPA is the primary office within the executive branch for managing the President’s political interests. Although its specific functions vary from Admin- istration to Administration, the OPA typically serves as the liaison between the President and associated political entities: national committees, federal and state campaigns, and interest groups. Within legal guidelines, the OPA engages in out- reach, conducts casework, and—if the President is up for reelection—assists with his campaign. The OPA may also monitor congressional campaigns, arrange pres- idential visits with other political campaigns, and recommend campaign staff to the Office of Presidential Personnel for service in the executive branch. The OPA further serves as a line of communication between the White House and the President’s political party. This includes both relaying the President’s ambitions to political interests and listening to the needs of political interests. This relationship allows for the exchange of information between the White House and political actors across the country. The OPA should have one director of political affairs who reports either to the Chief of Staff or to a Deputy Chief of Staff. The OPA should also include various deputy directors, each of whom is responsible for a certain geographical region of the country. Because nearly all White House activities are in some way inherently political, the OPA needs to be aware of all presidential actions and activities—including travel, policy decisions, speeches, nominations, and responses to matters of national security—and consider how they might affect the President’s image. The OPA must therefore have a designated staffer who communicates not only with other White House offices, but also with the Cabinet and executive branch agencies. OFFICE OF CABINET AFFAIRS (OCA) The OCA’s role has changed to some degree over the course of various Adminis- trations, but its overriding function remains the same: to ensure the coordination of policy and communication between the White House and the Cabinet. Most important, the OCA coordinates all Cabinet meetings with the President. It should also organize and administer regular meetings of the Deputy Secretaries because they also typically serve vital roles in the departments and agencies and, further, often become acting secretaries when Cabinet members resign. — 34 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise There should be one Cabinet Secretary who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy chief, according to the chief’s preference and focus. The Cabinet Secretary maintains a direct relationship with all members of the Cabinet. The OCA further consists of deputies and special assistants who work with each department’s principal, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other senior staff. The OCA also connects the departments to WHO offices. The OCA coordinates with the Chief of Staff’s office and the Office of Communi- cations to promote the President’s agenda through the Cabinet departments and agencies. The Cabinet’s communications staffers are obviously another critical component of this operation. In prior Administrations, the OCA has played a vital role by tracking the Pres- ident’s agenda for the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs, and senior advisers. It has worked with each department and agency to advance policy priorities. In the future, amplifying this function would truly benefit both the President and the conser- vative movement. From time to time throughout an Administration, travel optics, ethics chal- lenges, and Hatch Act7 issues involving Cabinet members, deputies, and senior staffers can arise. The OCA is normally tasked with keeping the WHO informed of such developments and providing support if and when necessary. The ideal Cabinet Secretary will have exceptional organizational skills and be a seasoned political operative or attorney. Because many Cabinet officials have been former presidential candidates, governors, ambassadors, and Members of Congress, the ideal candidate should also possess the ability to interact with and persuade accomplished individuals. OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON (OPL) The OPL is critically important in building coalitions and support for the Pres- ident’s agenda across every aligned social, faith-based, minority, and economic interest group. It is a critical tool for shaping public opinion and keeping myriad supporters, as well as “frenemies” and opponents alike who are within reach, better informed. The OPL is a notably large office. It should have one Director who reports to the Chief of Staff’s office, either directly or through a deputy, according to the chief’s preference and focus. The Director must maintain relationships not only with other WHO heads, but also with the senior staff of every Cabinet department and agency. Since a President’s agenda is always in motion, it is important for the OPL to facilitate listening sessions to receive the views of the various leaders and mem- bers of key interest groups. The OPL should also have a sufficient number of deputies and special assistants to cover the vast number of disparate interest groups that are engaged daily. The