Promoting a Safe Internet for Minors Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6289
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]

ID: L000597

Follow the money

The bill

Promoting a Safe Internet for Minors Act

HR. 6289, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.

The sponsor

Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$152,500 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 908-910 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

December 10, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another "feel-good" bill from our esteemed lawmakers, designed to make them look like they care about the children while actually serving the interests of their real masters – corporate donors and lobbyists.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Promoting a Safe Internet for Minors Act (HR 6289) claims to promote online safety for minors by amending the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998. The bill's primary objective is to create a public awareness and educational campaign to protect minors from cybercrimes, adult content, and other online harms.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces new provisions that require the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to partner with various entities to promote online safety for minors. The key changes include:

* Establishing a public awareness and educational campaign to promote best practices for educators, online platforms, minors, and parents. * Requiring the FTC to submit annual reports on its activities under this section for 10 years.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill's provisions will affect various stakeholders, including:

* Minors (individuals under 17) who will supposedly benefit from the public awareness campaign. * Online platforms and industry players that will be required to participate in the campaign and implement safeguards to protect minors. * Parents and guardians who will be empowered with tools to control their children's online activities. * Non-profit organizations, schools, law enforcement, medical professionals, and other entities that will partner with the FTC on this initiative.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's not be naive – this bill is a Trojan horse for corporate interests. The real beneficiaries of this legislation are likely to be:

* Online platforms and tech companies that will use this campaign as a marketing opportunity to promote their own safety features and tools. * Lobbyists and PACs representing the tech industry, which have already donated generously to the sponsors of this bill (e.g., Rep. Lee's $100K "infection" from Google's PAC). * The FTC itself, which will receive additional funding and authority to regulate online platforms.

Meanwhile, the actual impact on minors' online safety is likely to be minimal, as the bill focuses more on awareness campaigns than concrete measures to address the root causes of online harm. It's a classic case of "legislative theater" – all show, no substance.

In conclusion, HR 6289 is just another example of how our lawmakers prioritize corporate interests over genuine public welfare. The real disease here is not online safety for minors but rather the corrupting influence of money in politics.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$152,500
22 donors
PACs
$1,000
Organizations
$19,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$132,000
1
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (NABPAC)
1 transaction
$1,000
1
DREAM FINDERS HOMES
3 transactions
$16,500
2
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,000

No committee contributions found

1
WEATHERFORD, WILL
2 transactions
$13,200
2
RANNEY, TIM
1 transaction
$6,600
3
BARNETT, HOYT R
1 transaction
$6,600
4
BOWDEN, VIRGINIA
1 transaction
$6,600
5
HOSSEINI, FOROUGH B
1 transaction
$6,600
6
HOSSEINI, MORTEZA
1 transaction
$6,600
7
LUPOLI, NILOUFAR H
1 transaction
$6,600
8
NUNN, WILHELM A
1 transaction
$6,600
9
WAGNER, SHARI
1 transaction
$6,600
10
WANEK, KAREN A
1 transaction
$6,600
11
WANEK, TODD
1 transaction
$6,600
12
FAISON, JAY W
1 transaction
$6,600
13
GERSON, MARK
1 transaction
$6,600
14
GILLIAM, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
15
MCMAHON, LINDA
1 transaction
$6,600
16
STERN, ELIZABETH MAY
1 transaction
$6,600
17
VINIK, JEFFREY N
1 transaction
$6,600
18
WEEKLEY, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
19
WILEY, LADD
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Soto, Darren [D-FL-9]

ID: S001200

Top Contributors

10

1
ACROSS THE AISLE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Jan 12, 2023
2
TED LIEU FOR CONGRESS
CCMLOS ANGELES, CA
$1,000
Mar 30, 2023
3
ACROSS THE AISLE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Mar 23, 2023
4
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
5
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Mar 28, 2023
6
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 7, 2024
7
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Jul 31, 2024
8
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 18, 2023
9
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF GRAND RONDE
OrganizationGRAND RONDE, OR
$1,000
Mar 3, 2023
10
COOPER, MILTON
KIMCOCHAIRMAN
IndividualOLD WESTBURY, NY
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

10

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
IndividualROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELFACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATIONEXECUTIVE
IndividualTULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELFMD
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELFREAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Rep. Doggett, Lloyd [D-TX-37]

ID: D000399

Top Contributors

10

1
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE OF TEXAS
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Oct 1, 2024
2
DENNISON, ROBERT A. III
SELF-EMPLOYEDATTORNEY
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Jun 28, 2024
3
WEBER, THOMAS M
MCELROY, SULLIVAN, MILLER, & WEBER LLPATTORNEY
IndividualWEST LAKE HILLS, TX
$3,300
Apr 19, 2024
4
CONYNGHAM, JIM
N/ANOT EMPLOYED
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Jun 28, 2024
5
BARNES, BEN F.
BEN BARNES GROUPCONSULTANT
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Apr 24, 2024
6
LOOK JAMESON, MARION
N/ARETIRED
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Sep 1, 2023
7
MOK, AMY WONG
ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL CENTEREDUCATION
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023
8
LINEBARGER, DALE
N/ARETIRED
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Sep 18, 2023
9
VARNEY, LANA K.
KING & SPALDINGATTORNEY
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Sep 17, 2023
10
YANCY, HOWARD CHARLES
ZYDECO DEVELOPMENTREAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$3,300
Aug 28, 2023

Rep. Castro, Joaquin [D-TX-20]

ID: C001091

Top Contributors

10

1
CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 13, 2023
2
ALABAMA COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationWOODVILLE, TX
$1,000
Sep 26, 2024
3
QUINONES, KARLA
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN ANTONIO, TX
$5,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SNEIDER, ARTURO
PRIMESTOR DEVELOPMENT INC.REAL ESTATE
IndividualCULVER CITY, CA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
5
RAMIREZ, DANIEL N.
MONTY & RAMIREZATTORNEY
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$3,300
Jan 11, 2024
6
PARKER, ALEXANDRA
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 22, 2024
7
PARKER, ALEXANDRA
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 22, 2024
8
PARKER, SEAN
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 22, 2024
9
PARKER, SEAN
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 22, 2024
10
SILBEY, ALEX
ATS COMMUNICATIONSCONSULTANT
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Mar 29, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 66 nodes and 37 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $174,600

Top Donors - Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.90

    Section 211(1) requires identification and promotion of best practices for online platforms to protect minors online, which imposes regulatory obligations and potential compliance costs on big tech platforms.

  • Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Section 211(1) includes online platforms in the outreach and education campaign, which may affect telecommunications companies that provide internet services and could be subject to safety promotion requirements.

  • Section 211(4) facilitates access to publicly accessible online safety education efforts by other relevant agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit organizations, schools, industry, and other appropriate entities, which could include media companies involved in public awareness campaigns.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 1 contribution
    • NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (NABPAC)$1,000

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate69.5%
Pages: 908-910

— 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back — 877 — Federal Trade Commission a bureaucracy the seeds of which have been planted in every state. State legislators would struggle to slash funding from agencies that employ and generously pay thousands of their constituents. FTC outposts would tie middle America inex- tricably to big progressive government, remaking the heartland in Washington’s image. It would be anything but decentralization; Americans need policy makers to discipline the arrogance that prevails inside the Beltway, not spread it. It would be “Swamp 2.0”: just as deep and many times as wide. Big Tech and Antitrust. The large internet platforms have transformed the U.S. economy, streamlining consumer purchases, networking billions of people, and altering long-established business practices. Despite their enormous size, they have avoided significant antitrust liability or prosecution. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. It may be because these platforms have been incredibly innovative and have generated tremendous efficiencies for our society, with little to no evidence of traditional consumer harm in the form of higher prices, reduced output, or a lack of innovation. Also, Americans report a high level of satisfaction in and trust regard- ing these companies. The less friendly regulatory environment in the European Union would make a good case study in expansive antitrust law. The continent boasts not one of the top 10 global tech companies, while the U.S. can claim eight.22 Some claim that the recent drop in value of former leader and current antitrust target Meta, along with the rise of new competitors such as Zoom and Chinese-dominated TikTok, indicates that competitive forces are healthy and at work benefiting consumers in the tech space. On the other hand, the platforms challenge traditional economic thinking because arguably the firm structure they employ is radically different, and they create different competition dynamics. First, there is some evidence that the major internet platforms have market power, resulting in increased prices for advertis- ers, costs that very well could be passed onto consumers. For instance, numerous government studies have found evidence of market power.23 And while some data show declining advertising costs, they also show increasing prices in this decade.24 Second, while consumers may report that they like social media, hedonics tells a different story, suggesting that social media and other online activities diminish human happiness. This evidence, while mixed at first,25 appears to have become quite solid: Social media makes Americans less happy.26 Third, internet platforms have not created consumer price increases, but of course they provide free services—and this creates a challenge for antitrust regu- lation. For decades, antitrust economics has been focused on a paradigm in which firm and consumer behavior are modeled as functions of price and output as the primary variables. It may very well be that these models do not fully capture the effect of technologies that enable increasing returns to scale based on data, such

Introduction

Moderate67.0%
Pages: 908-910

— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority.

Introduction

Moderate67.0%
Pages: 908-910

— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority. — 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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