No Fentanyl on Social Media Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6259
Last Updated: December 13, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

December 11, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

âś…

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "No Fentanyl on Social Media Act" (HR 6259) claims to address the pressing issue of minors accessing fentanyl through social media platforms. How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to grandstand and pretend to care about public health while lining the pockets of their corporate donors.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to submit a report on the ability of minors to access fentanyl through social media platforms within one year. Wow, a whole year! That's plenty of time for the FTC to gather dust and produce a report that will likely be a watered-down, inconsequential piece of fluff.

The bill also defines various terms, including "fentanyl," "minor," and "social media platform." How cute. They think they're being thorough by defining these terms, but it's just a smokescreen to distract from the fact that this bill does nothing meaningful to address the actual issue.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:

* Social media platforms (who will likely use this as an excuse to further erode user privacy and freedom of speech) * Law enforcement (who will get to expand their surveillance state under the guise of "protecting" minors) * Medical professionals (who will be forced to waste time and resources on bureaucratic reporting requirements) * Parents (who will be placated with empty promises of "action" being taken)

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative placebo." It's designed to make politicians look like they're doing something, while actually accomplishing nothing. The real impact will be:

* Increased surveillance and censorship on social media platforms * More bureaucratic red tape for medical professionals and law enforcement * A further erosion of civil liberties under the guise of "protecting" minors

The diagnosis is clear: this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease – the corrupting influence of corporate money in politics. The sponsors of this bill, Mr. Evans of Colorado and Mrs. Dingell, have likely received generous donations from pharmaceutical companies, law enforcement unions, or social media platforms. It's just another case of "pay-to-play" politics.

In conclusion, HR 6259 is a farce, a sham, a travesty. It's a bill designed to make politicians look good while doing nothing meaningful to address the actual issue. But hey, at least they're trying to appear concerned about public health... for now.

Related Topics

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Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (house personality)

đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$94,620
27 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$3,750
Committees
$0
Individuals
$90,870

No PAC contributions found

1
UNIVERSITY PLACE ASSOCIATES 3.0
1 transaction
$1,000
2
BRIDGE ACROSS PA PAC
1 transaction
$1,000
3
DILWORTH PAXSON LLP
1 transaction
$1,000
4
KLEINBARD LLC
1 transaction
$500
5
MARTHA ALDRIDGE
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
LONG, CHARLES
2 transactions
$19,800
2
SPRADLIN, MARK
2 transactions
$13,470
3
FYDA, MARIANNE
1 transaction
$6,600
4
FLYNN, KATHLEEN BELL
1 transaction
$3,300
5
FLYNN, STEVEN
1 transaction
$3,300
6
HANSSTON, KNUTE
1 transaction
$3,300
7
LYNCH, MARK S
1 transaction
$3,300
8
LYNCH, SARAH
1 transaction
$3,300
9
NORD, RICHARD
1 transaction
$3,300
10
TOPPER, LEWIS
1 transaction
$3,300
11
TOPPER, MARGARET
1 transaction
$3,300
12
RENO, MATHEW J MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
GREEN, MARGARET
1 transaction
$3,300
14
KUSMIAK, EUGENE
1 transaction
$3,000
15
FARRELL, PETER C DR.
2 transactions
$3,000
16
SMITH, LECIA
1 transaction
$2,500
17
KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS
1 transaction
$2,300
18
LUCAS, CHARLOTTE
1 transaction
$2,000
19
DUNLAP, ROBERT H MR
1 transaction
$2,000
20
MINERVA, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$1,200
21
ALLEN, GWYNDA MS.
1 transaction
$1,000
22
BRACCIALE, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$1,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Dingell, Debbie [D-MI-6]

ID: D000624

Top Contributors

10

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
Organization DORR, MI
$3,300
Dec 13, 2023
2
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
Organization FULTON, MI
$3,300
Mar 28, 2024
3
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
Organization DORR, MI
$3,300
Oct 16, 2024
4
FORD, CYNTHIA
NA • CIVIC PHILANTHROPIST
Individual GROSSE POINTE FARMS, MI
$3,300
Oct 14, 2024
5
FORD, EDSEL B. II
FORD MOTOR COMPANY • CONSULTANT
Individual GROSSE POINTE FARMS, MI
$3,300
Oct 14, 2024
6
MEIJER, HENDRIK
MEIJER, INC. • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
Individual GRAND RAPIDS, MI
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
7
CARTER ALTMAN, LYNDA
SELF EMPLOYED • MUSICIAN
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Nov 6, 2023
8
DEBBANE, RAYMOND
THE INVUS GROUP • CEO
Individual GREENWICH, CT
$3,300
Dec 4, 2023
9
FARES, NIJAD
LINK • INVESTOR
Individual HOUSTON, TX
$3,300
Nov 30, 2023
10
III, WILLIAM H. GATES
BREAKTHROUGH ENERGY & BILL & MELINDA G • PHILANTHROPIST
Individual REDMOND, WA
$3,300
Oct 19, 2023

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

10

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
Organization LADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
Organization LADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
Individual COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
Individual COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
Individual ROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELF • ACTIVIST
Individual WASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATION • EXECUTIVE
Individual TULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
Individual POTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELF • MD
Individual LOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELF • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
Individual BOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Rep. Goldman, Craig A. [R-TX-12]

ID: G000601

Top Contributors

10

1
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
Organization LAKESIDE, CA
$1,500
May 19, 2023
2
ALLEN BOONE HUMPHRIES ROBINSON LLP
Organization HOUSTON, TX
$3,300
Dec 21, 2023
3
THE CHICKASAW NATION
Organization ADA, OK
$3,300
May 23, 2024
4
GOLDSTEIN, DARIN
SDG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT • MANAGER
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$6,600
May 31, 2023
5
GOLDSTEIN, DARIN
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Jun 19, 2023
6
SCHWARTZ, DAVID
SLATE PROPERTY GROUP • EXECUTIVE
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$5,000
Oct 17, 2023
7
SCHWARTZ, DAVID
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$5,000
Oct 26, 2023
8
ADAMS, RICHARD
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
Individual NEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 26, 2024
9
ANDREESSEN, MARC
SELF • ATTORNEY
Individual LOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
10
BARTH, RICHARD
MARYLAND • PROFESSOR
Individual BALTIMORE, MD
$3,300
Oct 27, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 38 nodes and 39 connections

Total contributions: $117,620

Top Donors - Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

5 Orgs22 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Moderate 63.0%
Pages: 908-910

— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority.

Introduction

Moderate 63.0%
Pages: 908-910

— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority. — 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.