Algorithmic Transparency and Choice Act
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Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]
ID: C001039
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.
December 11, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
(sigh) Oh joy, another bill that's supposed to "protect" us from the evil tech giants while actually serving as a Trojan horse for more regulatory capture and cronyism.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The Algorithmic Transparency and Choice Act (HR 6253) claims to promote transparency and choice in online platforms' use of personalized recommendation systems, particularly for minors. Yeah, right. It's just a thinly veiled attempt to create a new regulatory framework that will inevitably be gamed by the very same tech giants it's supposed to regulate.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill requires covered online platforms (i.e., those using personalized recommendation systems) to:
1. Provide notices and disclosures about their use of such systems. 2. Offer options for users to opt out or modify their profiles. 3. Use an input-transparent algorithm as the default setting for minors.
Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory "enforcement by Federal Trade Commission" provision, which is just a euphemism for "we'll pretend to regulate you while actually doing nothing."
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The usual suspects:
1. Tech giants (e.g., Google, Facebook, Amazon) who will find ways to exploit these regulations to their advantage. 2. Minors and their parents, who will be "protected" by this bill's toothless provisions. 3. Lobbyists and special interest groups, who will ensure that the regulations are watered down or rewritten to benefit their clients.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
This bill is a perfect example of regulatory capture in action. By creating a new framework for regulating online platforms, Congress is essentially giving tech giants a seat at the table to shape the rules in their favor. Meanwhile, smaller competitors will be crushed by the compliance costs and bureaucratic red tape.
The "transparency" provisions are nothing more than a PR stunt, as they won't actually reveal anything meaningful about how these algorithms work. And don't even get me started on the "choice" aspect – it's just a fig leaf to cover up the fact that users will still be stuck with the same old personalized recommendation systems.
In short, this bill is a joke. It's a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of money and power in politics. The real motivation behind this bill is not to protect consumers but to further entrench the interests of tech giants and their lobbyists.
Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than analyze this legislative abomination. Next!
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back — 877 — Federal Trade Commission a bureaucracy the seeds of which have been planted in every state. State legislators would struggle to slash funding from agencies that employ and generously pay thousands of their constituents. FTC outposts would tie middle America inex- tricably to big progressive government, remaking the heartland in Washington’s image. It would be anything but decentralization; Americans need policy makers to discipline the arrogance that prevails inside the Beltway, not spread it. It would be “Swamp 2.0”: just as deep and many times as wide. Big Tech and Antitrust. The large internet platforms have transformed the U.S. economy, streamlining consumer purchases, networking billions of people, and altering long-established business practices. Despite their enormous size, they have avoided significant antitrust liability or prosecution. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. It may be because these platforms have been incredibly innovative and have generated tremendous efficiencies for our society, with little to no evidence of traditional consumer harm in the form of higher prices, reduced output, or a lack of innovation. Also, Americans report a high level of satisfaction in and trust regard- ing these companies. The less friendly regulatory environment in the European Union would make a good case study in expansive antitrust law. The continent boasts not one of the top 10 global tech companies, while the U.S. can claim eight.22 Some claim that the recent drop in value of former leader and current antitrust target Meta, along with the rise of new competitors such as Zoom and Chinese-dominated TikTok, indicates that competitive forces are healthy and at work benefiting consumers in the tech space. On the other hand, the platforms challenge traditional economic thinking because arguably the firm structure they employ is radically different, and they create different competition dynamics. First, there is some evidence that the major internet platforms have market power, resulting in increased prices for advertis- ers, costs that very well could be passed onto consumers. For instance, numerous government studies have found evidence of market power.23 And while some data show declining advertising costs, they also show increasing prices in this decade.24 Second, while consumers may report that they like social media, hedonics tells a different story, suggesting that social media and other online activities diminish human happiness. This evidence, while mixed at first,25 appears to have become quite solid: Social media makes Americans less happy.26 Third, internet platforms have not created consumer price increases, but of course they provide free services—and this creates a challenge for antitrust regu- lation. For decades, antitrust economics has been focused on a paradigm in which firm and consumer behavior are modeled as functions of price and output as the primary variables. It may very well be that these models do not fully capture the effect of technologies that enable increasing returns to scale based on data, such
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.