To Inform Families First Act of 2025
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Rep. Buchanan, Vern [R-FL-16]
ID: B001260
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece from the esteemed members of Congress. The "To Inform Families First Act of 2025" - because what's more important than informing families, right? (Sarcasm alert)
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill is a classic case of "we care about your safety, but only if it doesn't cost us too much." Its primary objective is to create a voluntary system for collecting emergency contact information in state driver's license and identification systems. Because, you know, the current system of having people write down their emergency contacts on a piece of paper and putting it in their wallet just isn't cutting it.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a grant program (because who doesn't love free money?) for states to develop and implement these systems. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration will oversee this program, because they're clearly not busy enough with actual highway safety issues. States must ensure that the provision of emergency contact information is voluntary (read: we won't make you do it, but please pretty please do it), include robust data security protections (ha!), and restrict access to authorized emergency personnel only (yeah, right).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: states, drivers, identification holders, and of course, the all-powerful lobbying groups representing the interests of... wait for it... driver's license vendors! Who knew that was a thing?
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a half-hearted attempt to address a real issue (emergency contact information) while ignoring the actual problems plaguing our identification systems (e.g., data security, bureaucratic inefficiencies). The "voluntary" aspect of this system will likely lead to inconsistent adoption rates across states, rendering it largely ineffective.
In conclusion, this bill is a perfect example of legislative theater. It's a feel-good measure that accomplishes little while making politicians look like they care about public safety. Meanwhile, the real issues continue to fester, and we're left with another pointless law that will likely be ignored or exploited by those who matter most - the special interest groups.
Diagnosis: Legislative placebo effect. Symptoms include empty promises, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and a healthy dose of cynicism. Treatment: a strong dose of skepticism and a healthy disregard for political spin. Prognosis: poor.
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Rep. Buchanan, Vern [R-FL-16]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides
Introduction
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners
Introduction
— 500 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 32. Owcharenko Schaefer, “Medicaid at 55: Understanding the Design, Trends, and Reforms Needed to Improve the Health Care Safety Net.” 33. Brian Blase, “Managed Care in Medicaid: Need for Oversight, Accountability, and Reform,” Paragon Health Institute Policy Brief, October 13, 2022, https://paragoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/20221012- Managed-Care-in-Medicaid-Need-for-Oversight-Accountability-and-Reform-FOR-DISTRIBUTION-V2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 34. Owcharenko Schaefer, “Medicaid at 55: Understanding the Design, Trends, and Reforms Needed to Improve the Health Care Safety Net.” 35. 42 U.S. Code § 1315, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1315 (accessed March 17, 2023). 36. Chad D. Savage and Lee S. Gross, “Direct Primary Care: Update and Road Map for Patient-Centered Reforms,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3635, June 28, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-06/BG3635.pdf. 37. H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law No. 116-260, 116th Congress, December 27, 2020, Division BB, Title I, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ260/PLAW-116publ260.pdf (accessed March 17, 2023). 38. Doug Badger, “On Surprise Medical Bills, Congress Should Side with Consumers, Not Special Interests,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 31, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/ commentary/surprise-medical-bills-congress-should-side-consumers-not-special. 39. Edmund F. Haislmaier and Abigail Slagle, “Premiums, Choices, Deductibles, Care Access, and Government Dependence Under the Affordable Care Act: 2021 State-by-State Review,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3668, November 2, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/BG3668.pdf. 40. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service; U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Transparency in Coverage,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 219 (November 12, 2020), pp. 72158–72310, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2020-11-12/pdf/2020-24591.pdf (accessed March 17, 2023). 41. David N. Bernstein and Robert E. Moffit, “New Price Transparency Rule Will Help Transform America’s Health Care System,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/health-care- reform/commentary/new-price-transparency-rule-will-help-transform-americas-health-care. 42. Sluzala and Haislmaier, “Lessons from COVID-19: How Policymakers Should Reform the Regulation of Clinical Testing.” 43. Ibid. 44. Most recently enacted in H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Public Law No. 117-103, 117th Congress, March 15, 2022, Division H, Title V, §§ 506–507, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ103/ PLAW-117publ103.pdf (accessed March 17, 2023). 45. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14079, “Securing Access to Reproductive and Other Healthcare Services,” August 3, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 154 (August 11, 2022), pp. 49505–49507, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-08-11/pdf/2022-17420.pdf (accessed March 16, 2023). 46. Planned Parenthood, 2020–2021 Annual Report, p. 27, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/ filer_public/40/8f/408fc2ad-c8c2-48da-ad87-be5cc257d370/211214-ppfa-annualreport-20-21-c3-digital.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023). 47. Ibid., pp. 30 and 31. Total revenue of $1,714.4 million (p. 30) minus $1,580.7 million in total expenses (p. 31) yields $133,7 million. 48. Ibid., p. 28. 49. Ibid., p. 30. 50. H.R. 372, Protecting Life and Taxpayers Act of 2023, 118th Congress, introduced January 17, 2023, https://www. congress.gov/118/bills/hr372/BILLS-118hr372ih.pdf (accessed March 17, 2023). 51. 42 U.S. Code § 18023, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/18023 (accessed March 17, 2023). 52. H.R. 3128, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Public Law No. 99-272, 99th Congress, April 7, 1986, Title IX, Subtitle A, Part 1, Subpart B, § 9121, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/ STATUTE-100-Pg82.pdf (accessed March 17, 2023). 53. H.R. 8070, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Public Law No. 93-112, 93rd Congress, September 26, 1973, https://www. congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-87/STATUTE-87-Pg355.pdf (accessed March 17, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.