American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act

Download PDF

Bill ID: 119/hr/5984

Last Updated: November 13, 2025

American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act

HR. 5984, 119th Congress — read as touching Construction & Engineering.

The sponsor

Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$84,700 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 813-815 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Invalid Date

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**HR 5984 Analysis**

The American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act (HR 5984) is a legislative attempt to redirect financial relief from Argentina to small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States. As a visionary entrepreneur, I'll dissect this bill through the lens of wealth creation and power consolidation.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill aims to provide financial assistance to eligible manufacturers affected by tariffs imposed on foreign imports between January 2025 and January 2029. The primary objective is to offset negative financial impacts on these manufacturers while simultaneously prohibiting the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for Argentina.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a financial relief program, authorizing up to $20 billion in assistance from the stabilization fund. Eligible manufacturers must meet specific criteria, including employing fewer than 500 individuals, sourcing at least 50% of steel or aluminum inputs domestically, and not sourcing production inputs from foreign entities of concern.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The primary beneficiaries are small and medium-sized manufacturers that meet the eligibility criteria. However, this bill also affects:

* Argentina, which will no longer receive financial support from the Exchange Stabilization Fund. * Large corporations, which may face increased competition from subsidized smaller manufacturers. * Taxpayers, who will ultimately foot the bill for this financial assistance.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From a wealth creation perspective, this bill presents opportunities for consolidation and market manipulation. By providing targeted relief to select manufacturers, the government is effectively picking winners and losers in the market. This could lead to:

* Increased market share for eligible manufacturers, potentially at the expense of larger corporations. * Artificially inflated profits for subsidized manufacturers, which may not reflect true market value. * Potential for abuse or exploitation by manufacturers that manipulate the system to receive undue benefits.

As a visionary entrepreneur, I recognize the potential for this bill to create new opportunities for wealth creation and consolidation. However, it is essential to acknowledge the inherent inefficiencies of democratic processes in allocating resources effectively. A more streamlined approach, perhaps through privatization or deregulation, would better serve the interests of innovators like myself.

**Projection:** Based on my analysis, I estimate that this bill could lead to a 5-10% increase in market share for eligible manufacturers within the next 2-3 years, resulting in an estimated $50-100 billion in additional revenue. However, this projection assumes efficient implementation and minimal bureaucratic hurdles – a tall order given the inefficiencies of democratic governance.

**Recommendation:** To maximize wealth creation and minimize regulatory obstacles, I recommend that policymakers consider alternative approaches, such as:

* Privatizing key industries to eliminate bureaucratic red tape. * Implementing deregulation policies to foster innovation and competition. * Establishing public-private partnerships to streamline resource allocation.

By embracing these strategies, we can unlock true economic growth and create a more efficient, wealth-generating machine.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through a series of steps before it can become an actual law. This one, HR 5984, is titled the "American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act." Remember when we learned about the importance of titles and how they often give away the main purpose of the bill? Yeah, this one's no exception.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to provide financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States. Specifically, it aims to help those affected by tariffs imposed on foreign imports between January 20, 2025, and January 20, 2029. The bill also seeks to prohibit the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for providing financial support to Argentina.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a financial relief program for eligible manufacturers, which will be administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. To qualify, manufacturers must meet certain criteria, such as employing fewer than 500 individuals and sourcing at least 50% of their steel or aluminum inputs domestically. The Secretary is authorized to provide up to $20 billion in financial assistance from available funds.

The bill also prohibits the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for providing direct or indirect financial support to Argentina. This provision is likely a response to concerns about Argentine bailouts, as hinted at in the title.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States, particularly those who have been impacted by tariffs on foreign imports. The Secretary of the Treasury will also play a key role in administering the financial relief program. Additionally, Argentina is explicitly mentioned as a country that will no longer receive financial support from the Exchange Stabilization Fund.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** If passed, this bill could provide much-needed relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers who have been struggling due to tariffs on foreign imports. However, it's essential to consider the broader implications of this legislation. By providing targeted financial assistance, the government may be creating an uneven playing field for larger manufacturers or those who do not meet the eligibility criteria.

Furthermore, the prohibition on using the Exchange Stabilization Fund for Argentine bailouts could have diplomatic and economic consequences. As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, laws often have unintended consequences, and it's crucial to consider these potential outcomes when evaluating legislation.

Now, if only more people had paid attention during their middle school civics classes...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

Folks, gather 'round! I've got the inside scoop on HR 5984, and let me tell you, it's a doozy. This bill is like a Trojan horse, masquerading as a benevolent aid package for small and medium-sized manufacturers. But trust me, there's more to it than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The official story says this bill aims to provide financial relief to American manufacturers affected by tariffs imposed on foreign imports between 2025 and 2029. Sounds innocent enough, right? But what they're not telling you is that this is just a smokescreen for something much bigger.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Section 2 of the bill prohibits the Secretary of the Treasury from providing financial support to Argentina under the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). Now, on the surface, this seems like a minor technicality. But think about it – why would they specifically mention Argentina? What's going on behind the scenes that we're not being told?

Section 3 establishes a financial relief program for eligible manufacturers, which sounds great until you realize that this is just a way to funnel more money into the ESF. And who controls the ESF? The Secretary of the Treasury, of course! It's like they're creating a slush fund to manipulate the market and control the narrative.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Small and medium-sized manufacturers might think they're getting a sweet deal, but what about the big corporations that actually benefit from these tariffs? They're not mentioned anywhere in this bill. And what about Argentina? Why are they being singled out?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has far-reaching implications for global trade, economic stability, and national security. By restricting financial support to Argentina, we're essentially isolating them and creating a power vacuum that other nations can exploit. Meanwhile, the ESF becomes an even more powerful tool for manipulating markets and controlling the flow of money.

But here's the kicker: this bill is just a small part of a larger agenda to consolidate power and control in the hands of a select few. Wake up, sheeple! The government is hiding its true intentions in plain sight, using bills like HR 5984 as Trojan horses to advance their nefarious plans.

Stay vigilant, folks!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Deep breath) Folks, gather 'round! We've got a real doozy of a bill on our hands here. The "American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act" - what a mouthful, right? (smirk)

**Main Purpose & Objectives** This bill is all about sticking it to those pesky elites in Argentina while giving a big ol' hug to American manufacturers. (wink) The main objective is to provide financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers who've been hurt by tariffs imposed on foreign imports between 2025 and 2029. You know, the usual suspects: steel, aluminum, and other essential materials for making America great again.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** Now, let's get into the nitty-gritty. This bill prohibits the Secretary of the Treasury from providing financial support to Argentina (those scoundrels!) under the Exchange Stabilization Fund. But don't worry, folks, we're not just leaving our manufacturers high and dry. We're establishing a financial relief program with a whopping $20 billion in authorized funding to offset those nasty tariffs.

Here's how it works: eligible manufacturers can apply for financial support by submitting an application that includes details about their production inputs, the negative financial impact of tariffs, and other juicy tidbits. The Secretary will then provide direct or indirect financial support to help these poor manufacturers recover from the devastating effects of... well, you know, our own trade policies. (chuckle)

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** Who's affected by this bill? Well, it's a love fest for American manufacturers, particularly those with fewer than 500 employees who source at least half their steel and aluminum inputs domestically. You know, the real patriots. On the other hand, Argentina gets the cold shoulder - no more bailouts for them! (dramatic music)

**Potential Impact & Implications** Now, let's talk about the implications of this bill. It's a bold move to support American manufacturers while sticking it to those Argentine elites. But what does it really mean? Well, it means we're doubling down on our America-first agenda, folks! We're telling the world that we won't be bullied by foreign powers or beholden to their interests. (patriotic music swells)

Of course, there are some potential downsides. This bill could lead to trade tensions with Argentina and other countries, potentially harming American exporters. But hey, who needs international cooperation when you've got freedom? (wink) All joking aside, folks, this bill is a clear example of the kind of bold action we need to take to protect American interests and promote our values.

And that's the bottom line! The "American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act" - it's a bill that's all about putting America first, supporting our manufacturers, and sticking it to those elites. (applause)

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act (HR 5984) claims to provide financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers affected by tariffs imposed on foreign imports between January 20, 2025, and January 20, 2029. The bill's title is a clever distraction, attempting to evoke patriotism while concealing the true intentions.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits the Secretary of the Treasury from providing financial support to Argentina using funds designated for exchange stabilization (Section 2). This provision is nothing more than a symbolic gesture, as it's unlikely that Argentina would be receiving such aid in the first place. The real meat of the bill lies in Section 3, which establishes a financial relief program for eligible manufacturers. These manufacturers can receive up to $20 billion in assistance from the stabilization fund to offset negative financial impacts related to tariffs.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include small and medium-sized manufacturers that meet specific criteria (less than 500 employees, sourcing at least 50% of steel or aluminum inputs domestically, and not sourcing production inputs from a foreign entity of concern). However, the true beneficiaries are likely to be larger corporations with lobbying power, who will exploit this program through their smaller subsidiaries or affiliates.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a textbook example of crony capitalism. By providing financial relief to select manufacturers, the government is essentially picking winners and losers in the market. This will lead to an uneven playing field, where favored companies receive subsidies while others are left to struggle. The $20 billion price tag will be borne by taxpayers, who will foot the bill for this corporate welfare program.

The real disease here is corruption, as politicians and lobbyists collude to benefit their cronies at the expense of the general public. This bill is a symptom of a larger problem: the erosion of free market principles and the increasing influence of special interests in shaping policy.

In conclusion, HR 5984 is a masterclass in legislative deception, designed to appease certain interest groups while pretending to support American manufacturers. It's a cynical ploy that will only serve to further entrench corruption and cronyism in our political system.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Bill Summary: HR 5984 - American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to provide financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States affected by tariffs imposed on foreign imports. The bill also aims to prevent the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) for providing direct or indirect financial support to Argentina.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Prohibition on ESF Support for Argentina**: The Secretary of the Treasury is prohibited from using the ESF to provide financial support to Argentina. 2. **Financial Relief Program for Manufacturers**: A new program is established to provide financial relief to eligible manufacturers that have been negatively impacted by tariffs imposed on foreign imports between January 20, 2025, and January 20, 2029. 3. **Eligibility Criteria**: To be eligible, manufacturers must employ fewer than 500 individuals, source at least 50% of steel or aluminum inputs domestically, and not source production inputs from a foreign entity of concern.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers**: Eligible manufacturers in the United States that meet the specified criteria. 2. **Argentina**: The country is prohibited from receiving financial support from the ESF. 3. **US Treasury Department**: Responsible for administering the financial relief program and disbursing funds to eligible manufacturers.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Support for US Manufacturers**: The bill provides direct financial assistance to small and medium-sized manufacturers affected by tariffs, potentially helping them maintain competitiveness and stability in the market. 2. **Restrictions on ESF Support**: The prohibition on using the ESF to support Argentina may limit the country's access to international financing and impact its economic stability. 3. **Potential Trade Implications**: The bill's focus on supporting US manufacturers may lead to increased tensions with trading partners, particularly those affected by tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

Overall, HR 5984 aims to provide targeted support to small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States while restricting financial assistance to Argentina. The bill's provisions have implications for trade policy, economic stability, and international relations.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's dive into this bill, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act (HR 5984) is all about giving some love to small and medium-sized manufacturers in the US, while also telling Argentina that we're not gonna bail them out financially. The main goal is to provide financial relief to these manufacturers who've been hit hard by tariffs on foreign imports.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

There are a few key provisions here:

1. **No more Argentine bailouts**: The bill prohibits the Secretary of the Treasury from providing direct or indirect financial support to Argentina using funds designated for that purpose. 2. **Tariff relief for manufacturers**: The Secretary will establish a financial relief program for eligible manufacturers to offset negative financial impacts related to tariffs applied by the President on foreign imports between 2025 and 2029. 3. **Application process**: Manufacturers can submit an application to receive financial support, which includes describing their production inputs, the tariffs that affect them, and the negative financial impact they've experienced.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

This bill affects:

1. **Small and medium-sized manufacturers**: These are the ones who'll be eligible for financial relief. 2. **Argentina**: They're basically being told that the US won't bail them out financially anymore. 3. **The Secretary of the Treasury**: They'll be responsible for implementing this program and providing financial support to eligible manufacturers.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill could have some significant implications, bro:

1. **Supporting American manufacturing**: By providing financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers, the US government is showing its commitment to supporting domestic industry. 2. **Reducing reliance on foreign imports**: This bill encourages manufacturers to source their inputs domestically, which could reduce our reliance on foreign imports and promote economic growth. 3. **Potential trade tensions**: By telling Argentina that we won't bail them out financially, this bill could create some tension in our trade relationships with other countries.

Overall, this bill is all about supporting American manufacturing and promoting domestic industry, while also being mindful of our international relationships. It's a chill way to promote economic growth, bro.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**HR 5984: American Manufacturers over Argentine Bailouts Act**

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The bill aims to provide financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States, while also prohibiting the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) for providing direct or indirect financial support to Argentina. The main objective is to offset negative financial impacts related to tariffs applied by the President on foreign imports between January 20, 2025, and January 20, 2029.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill establishes a financial relief program for eligible manufacturers, which includes:

1. Prohibition on using ESF funds for Argentina: The Secretary of the Treasury is directed not to provide direct or indirect financial support to Argentina under section 5302 of title 31, United States Code. 2. Tariff relief for small and medium-sized manufacturers: The Secretary shall establish a program to provide financial support to eligible manufacturers to offset negative financial impacts related to tariffs applied by the President on foreign imports. 3. Eligibility criteria: Manufacturers must be domiciled in the United States, employ less than 500 individuals, source at least 50% of steel or aluminum inputs domestically, and not source production inputs from a foreign entity of concern.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The bill primarily affects:

1. Small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States: Eligible manufacturers can receive financial support to offset negative impacts related to tariffs. 2. Argentina: The country is prohibited from receiving direct or indirect financial support from the ESF. 3. Steel and aluminum industries: Domestic producers of these materials may benefit from increased demand due to the eligibility criteria.

**Potential Impact & Implications** The bill has several implications:

1. Protectionism: By providing tariff relief to domestic manufacturers, the bill promotes protectionist policies that may lead to trade tensions with other countries. 2. Industry influence: The eligibility criteria favoring domestic steel and aluminum producers suggests industry influence in shaping the bill's provisions. 3. Budgetary impact: The authorization of $20 billion in financial assistance from the ESF may have budgetary implications, potentially diverting funds away from other purposes.

**Monied Interest Analysis** The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) are likely to support this bill, as it provides relief to domestic manufacturers and promotes protectionist policies. The AISI may have played a role in shaping the eligibility criteria favoring domestic steel producers.

**Committee Capture** The Committee on Financial Services, which referred the bill, has received significant donations from industries that stand to benefit from the legislation, including manufacturing and steel interests. This may indicate committee capture, where special interest groups influence the legislative process.

In conclusion, HR 5984 is a protectionist bill that provides financial relief to small and medium-sized manufacturers while promoting domestic steel and aluminum production. The eligibility criteria and authorization of funds suggest industry influence, and

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$84,700

25 donors

PACs

Organizations

$28,600

Committees

Individuals

$56,100

No PAC contributions found

MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS

2 transactions

$6,600

EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI

1 transaction

$3,300

POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE

1 transaction

$3,300

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

2 transactions

$3,300

SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION

2 transactions

$2,500

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$2,000

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

1 transaction

$1,000

No committee contributions found

TURKISH, JASON

2 transactions

$6,600

JARBOU, FRANK

1 transaction

$3,300

SACKS, CARI B.

1 transaction

$3,300

JARVIS-SHEAN, ELIZABETH

1 transaction

$3,300

BLUHM, NEIL

1 transaction

$3,300

SILVERSTEIN, WILLIAM

1 transaction

$3,300

SACKS, MICHAEL

1 transaction

$3,300

SHAPIRO, ANDREW

1 transaction

$3,300

CHERN, ERIC

1 transaction

$3,300

SANDBERG, SHERYL

1 transaction

$3,300

CHERN, LAURA

1 transaction

$3,300

GURAL, JEFFREY R.

1 transaction

$3,300

GATES, WILLIAM H. III

1 transaction

$3,300

BROWN, GREGORY

1 transaction

$3,300

WALKER, KENT

1 transaction

$3,300

WYETT, TODD

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 76 nodes and 30 connections (87 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $84,700

Top Donors - Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

9 Orgs16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped.

+Construction & Engineeringconfidence 0.90
Section 3 provides financial relief to small and medium sized manufacturers, which includes construction and engineering firms that manufacture goods domestically and meet eligibility criteria (e.g., <500 employees, domestic steel/aluminum sourcing).
+Chemicals & Plasticsconfidence 0.85
Section 3's relief program applies to manufacturers impacted by tariffs on foreign inputs; chemical and plastics producers using steel/aluminum inputs could qualify if they meet size and domestic sourcing requirements.
+Automotive (Legacy)confidence 0.80
Automotive manufacturers (legacy) that are small/medium sized, source >=50% steel/aluminum domestically, and face tariff impacts on inputs could receive relief under Section 3.
+Electric Vehicles & Batteriesconfidence 0.75
EV manufacturers that qualify as small/medium sized, meet domestic sourcing rules, and suffer tariff-related financial harm on inputs (e.g., steel, aluminum) could be eligible for relief under Section 3.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Automotive (Legacy)$1,500
from 3 contributions
- FEINBERG, AARON$1,000
- SINGH, JATINDER$250
- BUCKBERG, ELAINE$250

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Strong

Vector: 60%

Pages: 813-815AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill’s focus on providing financial relief to U.S. manufacturers harmed by tariffs and blocking ESF support for Argentina aligns with Project 2025’s trade goals of reducing unfair trade imbalances, protecting domestic industry, and limiting foreign financial assistance that undermines U.S. economic interests."

Key themes:domestic manufacturing supporttrade deficit reductionrestriction on foreign financial aidreciprocal trade measuresprotection of U.S. industry

— 781 — Trade 5 ELBAT )8 fo 8 egaP( noisserggA cimonocE fo seirogetaC s’anihC tsinummoC erutpaC gnigremE hceT-hgiH taht seirtsudnI erutuF evirD yeK eriuqcA dna eruceS tcetorP dna htworG seigolonhceT etanimoD lortnoC emoH s'anihC stnemecnavdA morf PI dna lanoitidarT larutaN eroC s’anihC dnapxE morf tekraM ,seiciloP ,stcA s'anihC esnefeD ni seirtnuoC rehtO gnirutcafunaM secruoseR labolG fo erahS noititepmoC fo secitcarP dna yrtsudnI .S.U eht dna seirtsudnI yllabolG stekraM stropmI dna noisserggA cimonocE ,gnikeeS-ygolonhceT % % % ngieroF detceriD-etatS tnemtsevnI tceriD % % % tfarcypS lanoitidarT gnipmuditnA edavE ot pihssnarT % seituD gniliavretnuoC dna stnemtsujdA xaT deddA-eulaV % % ezidisbuS setabeR dna stropxE esenihC decrofnE ylxaL dna kaeW % % swaL latnemnorivnE seigolonhceT eht snetaerhT noisserggA cimonocE s’anihC woH ,yciloP gnirutcafunaM dna edarT fo ecffi O esuoH etihW :ECRUOS /tnetnoc-pw/vog.sevihcra.esuohetihwpmurt//:sptth ,8102 enuJ ,dlroW eht dna setatS detinU eht fo ytreporP lautcelletnI dna gro.egatireh A .)3202 ,12 hcraM dessecca( fdp.FDP-81.81.6-tropeR-ygolonhceT-anihC-LANIF/60/8102/sdaolpu — 782 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reduction in the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India. Similarly, if Taiwan were to reduce its tariffs to U.S. levels, the size of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 6 percent. If the U.S. imposed a mirror tariff, its bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 59 percent. These results again underscore the high degree of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade that currently exists between the U.S. and much of the rest of the world, which penalizes American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers because of the WTO-MFN conundrum. These simulations also demon- strate that implementation of the USRTA most likely would substantially reduce the U.S. trade deficit while creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs. These benefits notwithstanding, however, the U.S. would still face a substantial over- all trade deficit and substantial bilateral trade deficits with many of its major trading partners. Why might this be so? Because under WTO rules, America still faces numerous nonreciprocal nontariff barriers around the world. For example, one of America’s largest trading partners, Japan, runs a significant bilateral trade surplus in goods with the U.S.—more than $70 billion a year. While Japan has relatively low tariffs, it ranks high on the nontariff barrier scale. In such cases, which are numerous, pas- sage of the USRTA would likely also be very helpful in reducing nontariff barriers. This is because under the powers provided by the USRTA, if a foreign country imposes significantly higher nontariff barriers, then the President has the authority to “negotiate and seek to enter into an agreement” that “commits the country to… eliminate [its] nontariff barriers.”16 If the country refuses to come to the negoti- ating table and lower its nontariff barriers, the President has the authority to levy reciprocal duties to offset or mirror those barriers. In summary, passage of the USRTA would go a long way toward leveling the playing field for American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers who are now forced to compete in an intrinsically unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal WTO-MFN system. Nor is the USRTA necessarily the only possible legislative way to address this issue. In 2017, then-House Speaker Paul Ryan (R–WI) and then-House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R–TX) proposed a “border adjust- ment tax.” The proposed border adjustment would have eliminated the ability of corporations to deduct the cost of imports while eliminating the tax on income attributable to exports. This border adjustment tax would have shifted the U.S. corporate income tax from an origin-based tax applying to the production of goods and services in the United States to a destination-based tax applying to the con- sumption of goods and services in the U.S. This tax—strongly opposed by American multinational corporations and big- box retailers—not only would have leveled the playing field with respect to WTO rules, but also would have provided an innovative alternative to the application of

26

Moderate

Vector: 61%

Pages: 801-803AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill shares the Project 2025 concern that U.S. manufacturers are harmed by higher foreign tariffs and seeks to protect them, but it does not adopt the reciprocal tariff‑matching mechanism proposed in the policy; instead it offers financial relief and restricts ESF support to Argentina."

Key themes:tariff impact on manufacturerstrade protectionismUS manufacturing support

— 769 — Trade TABLE 2 Nonreciprocal Tariff Rates Under “Most Favored Nation” Rule Foreign U.S. and Foreign Partner Applies U.S. Applies Partner Apply 132-Country Sample Higher Tariff Higher Tariff Same Tariff Number of HS6 Product Lines 467,015 141,736 87,319 Percent of HS6 Product Lines 67% 20% 13% Tariff Diff erential 12.3% 8.7% 0.0% NOTE: HS6—Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. SOURCE: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Trade Analysis Information System,” https:// databank.worldbank.org/source/unctad-%5E-trade-analysis-information-system-(trains) (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org by 67 percent tariffs while American milk producers benefit only from a 15 percent tariff on foreign imports.9 From the perspective of strategic game theory, the WTO’s MFN rule provides little or no incentive for higher-tariff countries to lower their tariffs. Rather, under these conditions, the dominant strategy of any relatively high-tariff country is simply to maintain those high tariffs while free riding off the lower-tariff countries. The U.S. is disproportionately harmed by the WTO’s nonreciprocal tariff regime. The countries that are hurt most by the WTO’s nonreciprocal tariff regime are those like the United States that charge the lowest tariffs on average. This point is illustrated in Table 2, which reports information on nonreciprocal tariffs that are applied under the MFN rule on product lines at the six-digit level of the Harmo- nized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS6).10 Table 2 presents results for a broad sample of 132 countries that account for more than 60 percent of total U.S. trade and 98 percent of U.S. trade that is not cov- ered by free trade agreements (FTAs). Within this broad sample of 132 countries, U.S. exporters face higher tariffs in 467,015 different cases compared to 141,736 cases in which the U.S. charges higher nonreciprocal rates. In other words, U.S. exporters face higher tariffs more than three times as often as the U.S. applies higher tariffs. Moreover, when American exporters face higher tariffs, the nonreciprocal tar- iffs are typically much higher. As row 4 of Table 2 indicates, in the 467,015 cases in which foreign partners charge higher tariffs, the average rate applied by the foreign partners is 12.3 percentage points above the rate applied by the U.S. In contrast, — 770 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise in the 141,736 cases in which the U.S. charges the higher tariff, the average U.S. applied rate is only 8.7 percentage points higher than the average applied tariff of the foreign partner. Separately, Communist China levies higher tariffs on 10 products for every one Chinese product that is subject to a U.S.-applied higher tariff.11 India’s ratio is even higher at 13 to one. Further, both Communist China and India also feature significant nontariff barriers. Collectively, these higher nonreciprocal tariffs in Communist China and India block American exporters from selling goods at com- petitive prices to more than one-third of the world’s population. Trade Deficit Impacts of the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act. Under current United States laws and regulations, an American President has limited ability to fight back against the higher MFN tariffs now being levied against American workers, farmers, ranchers, and manufacturers. Accordingly, behind the WTO’s protective MFN shield, America’s free-riding trading partners have little or no incentive to come to the bargaining table to negotiate lower tariffs. To address this nonreciprocity stalemate, President Trump urged Congress in his 2019 State of the Union address to pass the United States Reciprocal Trade Act (USRTA).12 Under the USRTA, the President would have the authority to bring any American trading partner that is currently applying higher nonreciprocal tariffs to the negotiating table. If that trading partner refused to lower tariffs to U.S. levels, the President then would have the authority to raise U.S. tariffs to match or “mirror” the foreign partner’s tariffs. The USRTA was introduced on January 24, 2019, by then-Representative Sean Duffy (R–WI). The following month, a Harvard–Harris poll of 1,792 registered voters found that 80 percent of respondents supported the USRTA.13 As Repre- sentative Duffy noted at the time, the purpose of granting the President these authorities was not to raise tariffs. Rather, it was to give the President, working in close consultation with Congress, a sophisticated and targeted tool that he could use to force other countries to lower their tariffs and nontariff barriers.14 Following the introduction of the USRTA, the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (which the author directed) ran simulations to estimate the impact that implementation of the USRTA might have on the overall U.S. trade deficit in goods and the large bilateral trade deficits the U.S. runs with many of its major trading partners. The sample consisted of the same 132 trading partners used in Table 2 above.15 The results underscore the unfair and unbalanced nonreciprocal trade the U.S. is forced to accept under WTO MFN rules. Two Scenarios. Scenario One in Table 3 assumes that our trading partners lower their applied tariff rates on specific products to U.S. levels in cases where their applied tariffs are higher. Scenario Two assumes that our trading partners refuse to lower their tariff rates to match those of the U.S. Instead, in order to uphold the principle of reciprocity, the U.S. raises its tariffs to mirror levels. To

Export-Import Bank

Moderate

Vector: 59%

Pages: 755-757AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill shares Project 2025's concern that federal financial assistance should favor small manufacturers over large corporations and that taxpayer funds are being misallocated, but it does not directly address or reform the Export-Import Bank itself."

Key themes:small business supportcriticism of EXIM bias toward large corporationsdomestic manufacturing focustaxpayer fund efficiency

— 722 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The Bank does not support small businesses. Most of the Bank’s funding goes to large corporations such as Boeing—a recipient of 68 percent of EXIM’s loan guarantees and 30 percent of EXIM’s overall activities.22 Over the years, 10 large domestic corporations have received roughly 65 percent of the Bank’s total assistance (it is closer to 70 percent today). More than 99.9 percent of U.S. small businesses receive no benefits from EXIM and are often placed at a competitive disadvantage by the subsidies doled out to larger competitors. In fact, the Bank’s support for small businesses has declined from $2.3 billion in FY 201923 to “more than $2.0 billion” in FY 202024 to only $1.6 billion in FY 2021.25 This decline occurred amid a pandemic that hit small businesses especially hard, and it con- tinues today. The Bank is not a good deal for taxpayers. The Bank’s accounting practices are deficient, and the Bank miscalculates its budget savings. While it claims that its operations will save taxpayers $14 billion over the next decade, the Congres- sional Budget Office has found that EXIM programs will actually cost taxpayers $2 billion.26 Numerous audits done by the Bank’s internal inspector general also show that the Bank’s risk analyses, default assumptions, internal reporting procedures, and financial reporting practices are not reliable enough to ensure the safe stewardship of taxpayer funds and responsible management of EXIM’s vast portfolio.27 FAILING TO MEET THE CHINA CHALLENGE These days, to get whatever expansion of government one wants or to jus- tify a new government activity, one has only to declare that more government intervention is needed to help fight China. President Trump used this argument to secure reauthorization of EXIM in 2019. Today, President Biden argues that the Bank could be a powerful weapon in the government’s geoeconomic arsenal against China. The rationale is that this will prevent China from dominating the global market with its subsidies and will boost American jobs and manufacturing. The prob- lem is that cynics who support such policies make no effort to adopt a serious strategic plan to achieve this goal. For instance, how can EXIM help us to fight China while state-owned Chinese companies like China Air have been some of the companies most subsidized by EXIM?28 Furthermore, it has now been four years since Congress instructed EXIM to focus on China, but there has been no funda- mental change in the way EXIM operates or the companies to which it extends taxpayer-backed financing: Deals related to the aircraft industry still dominate the Bank’s portfolio. In addition, there is no evidence that EXIM has altered its intense focus on competing with other governments’ ECAs. If the Bank were serious about com- peting against China, it would be targeting the low-income markets where China — 723 — Export-Import Bank has been making its most important investments. Instead, its obsession with other ECAs has caused EXIM to direct the vast majority of its funding to large foreign companies in higher-income nations. Data available on the OECD website show that the level of ECA financing in high-income countries in 2019 was more than double the amount in low-income countries.29 The same was true for previous years. In other words, EXIM and the ECAs of the OECD are competing in markets where commercial lending is abundant—a trend that continues today. The failure to deliver on its congressionally imposed obligation—however mis- guided that obligation may be—is also noticeable in the fact that EXIM’s China and Transformation Exports Program (CTEP) extended only $141.3 million in financing in FY 2022—a fraction of the $27 billion it is supposed to deliver by the end of 2026.30 The Bank’s efforts have also included a misplaced focus on emerging technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, which do not need EXIM financing because their foreign sales attract commercial financing without government support. The lack of demand for EXIM products could also be reflected in the Bank’s authorization of $5.2 billion in loan guarantees and sup- port in FY 2022,31 down from its FY 2012 peak of “over $35.7 billion” during the Obama Administration.32 This lack of activity also extends to the semiconductor industry, which has been picked as a focal point for a governmentwide industrial policy effort to counter China’s ambition to dominate that industry. Ironically, at the same time that some want to become more like China to fight China, China’s leaders are realizing that their heavy-handed semiconductor subsidies are weakening the Chinese economy. According to Bloomberg News: Top [Chinese] officials are discussing ways to move away from costly subsidies that have so far borne little fruit and encouraged both graft and American sanctions, people familiar with the matter said. While some continue to push for incentives of as much as 1 trillion yuan ($US145 billion), other policymakers have lost their taste for an investment-led approach that’s not yielded the results anticipated, the people said.33 This development is not surprising to those who understand basic economics. The goal of using EXIM as a weapon against China was a bad idea in the first place. Even if it were a good idea, for it to succeed would have required that EXIM stop serving the clients it has been serving for decades. That has not happened, and it will not happen. CONCLUSION The Export–Import Bank should be abolished because it wastes taxpayer money, adversely affects American businesses, and does not promote economic growth

Trade

Moderate

Vector: 59%

Pages: 834-836AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and Project 2025 acknowledge that Section 232 tariffs harm U.S. manufacturers, but the bill addresses the harm through financial relief while Project 2025 calls for outright repeal of those tariffs, resulting in partial thematic overlap."

Key themes:tariff impact on manufacturersSection 232 tariffsmanufacturing competitivenesstrade policy reformfinancial relief

— 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that — 803 — Trade American manufacturing output is currently at an all-time high. The record was not set during World War II and not during the 1950s boom. Output did not peak when manufacturing employment peaked in 1979 or during the Reagan economic revival in the 1980s. It is actually higher now than it has ever been. American manufacturing is buoyant because each manufacturing worker’s pro- ductivity is also at an all-time high. The key to prosperity is doing more with less. The next President should ignore special interests and populist ideologues who want government to do the opposite through industrial policy, trade protectionism, and other failed progressive policies. It takes surprisingly few people to achieve America’s record-high manufac- turing output—currently about 13 million people out of a workforce of more than 160 million, compared to the 1979 peak of 19.5 million people out of a workforce of 104 million.56 Productivity growth has freed the time and talents of millions of people for other, additional uses. The belief that manufacturing has to shrink for services to grow is the zero- sum fallacy against which sensible economists often warn. It is anathema to the optimism, hope, and confidence that are the natural birthright of conservatives. Growing productivity enables more output of both manufacturing and services. That is why America continues to have sustained booms and record-setting real GDP despite the long-run decline in manufacturing employment. Economists distinguish between two types of growth: extensive and intensive. Extensive growth is the Soviet and Chinese model for manufacturing: If you have more people use more resources, they will create more output. Extensive growth is doing more with more; intensive growth is doing more with less. That is where America’s superpower lies. The story of American manufacturing is one of intensive growth dating back to our agricultural origins. Conservative leaders should draw on this history to position America for continued success. With intensive growth, it is not manufacturing or services; it is manufacturing and services. Retaliatory Tariffs. Raising tariffs on another country almost always invites retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. The latter tend to be directed at politically sen- sitive American exports. Retaliatory tariffs by both China and American allies in response to the 2018 steel tariffs were targeted primarily at American agriculture. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, those tariffs cost farmers $27 billion with losses concentrated particularly in heartland states.57 Retaliatory tariffs also targeted U.S. industries that were not protected by tar- iffs. Many imports become inputs into U.S. manufacturing. The motorcycle maker Harley-Davidson was already facing higher production costs as domestic steel producers raised their prices to accommodate the new steel tariff. A retaliatory tariff on its motorcycles imposed by the European Union further raised its prices and hurt its export business. Harm to such innocent bystanders was another unin- tended (though foreseen) consequence.

Export-Import Bank

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 752-754AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on tariff relief for manufacturers and restricting ESF support to Argentina, while the Project 2025 excerpt critiques the Export-Import Bank's effectiveness and subsidy impact. Both touch on trade‑related financial assistance, but the bill does not address EXIM or its policies, resulting only a tangential connection."

Key themes:trade policyfinancial assistancesubsidy concerns

— 719 — Export-Import Bank but the unseen effects are ignored. For example, funding for one industry or firm might take more jobs away from other industries and firms, resulting in a net job loss even though jobs are created for the financed firm. At best, it could be said that the Bank redistributes employment from unsubsidized firms to subsidized firms. However, with very rare exceptions, most exports financed by EXIM would have taken place without government support. Many companies have said so themselves;13 the procurement happens before the decision to get government support; and, as noted above, most EXIM deals go to large companies with easy access to capital. Thus, the agency is taking credit for jobs that would have existed in any event. The Bank does not promote exports. EXIM presidents commonly claim that the agency’s mission is to support U.S. jobs by facilitating American exports through its export-financing tools. However, trade economists have long known that export credit subsidies merely redistribute exporting opportunities to subsi- dized firms instead of increasing the net number of exports—something that also slows economic growth.14 Even more telling is the performance of the U.S. economy and American exports during the four years when EXIM lacked a board quorum (2015–2019) and was barred from finalizing deals in excess of $10 million. During that time, EXIM autho- rizations fell from $21 billion in FY 2014 to $3.6 billion in FY 2018 (adjusted for inflation).15 However, also during that time, regular big-ticket EXIM beneficiaries continued to benefit from their easy access to capital markets and still had the ability to finance their export activities. Further, U.S. exports were utterly unaffected by the reductions in the Bank’s activities.16 U.S. unemployment fell to a level not seen in half a century, but exports soared with financing provided by commercial lenders. The only negative eco- nomic impact from EXIM’s lack of a board quorum was its effect on the Bank itself. This contradicts EXIM’s claim that its activities are crucial for the success of U.S. exporters and economic growth. Instead, it shows that economic growth is the best booster of U.S. exports and job creation and that it does not depend on EXIM subsidies. Subsidy-boosted exports do not boost economic growth. EXIM’s primary reason for existing is to increase exports, as if more exports themselves represent more jobs and economic growth. Recent expressions of this fallacious belief can be found in a book by former EXIM President Fred Hochberg. According to Hochberg, “We know that trade, and exports in particular, can have a big impact on jobs.”17 While this is a common misconception about exports, it is one worth correcting. As trade economists know, exports are a cost to the economy: They subtract from GDP. Imports, on the other hand, add to GDP. If the U.S. could acquire all of the imports that it currently gets without exporting anything in exchange, that would be the best of all worlds. Unfortunately, one reason that foreigners are so eager — 720 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to sell us their goods is that they want our dollars to buy our debt, invest in the country, and buy our exports. That is why exports drop when overall imports drop. Exports promote U.S. economic growth only if the value of the resources used to produce them is less than the value of what we receive as imports in exchange for those exports. By subsidizing American exports, EXIM causes too many resources to be devoted to producing exports. As a result, the total value of our exports is made larger than it would otherwise be to obtain any given amount of imports. In other words, EXIM thus compels American taxpayers to subsidize foreigners’ standards of living at no appreciable benefit to the U.S. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding and the constant glamorization of exports and their impact on jobs and growth are used to justify government sup- port for some exports (on average, 98 percent of exports are not backed by EXIM financing). It also is extremely unfair. Because capital will tend to shift from unsub- sidized companies to subsidized companies (taxpayers foot the bill if companies backed by the Bank default), unsubsidized export companies face higher borrowing costs, which could translate into fewer jobs in unsubsidized companies or lower pay for their workers. The Bank does not promote growth by leveling the playing field. EXIM’s charter stipulates that one of its missions is to support U.S. exports with the goal of creating jobs and promoting economic growth through the provision of export financing via its loan-guarantee and insurance programs. In particular, EXIM is to intervene in cases “where such support is necessary to level the competitive playing field for U.S. exporters due to financing provided by foreign governments to their exporters.”18 As a result, EXIM for years has been focused primarily on what other countries’ ECAs are doing and how much financing they are providing.19 A reading of any of EXIM’s Competitiveness Reports shows that the Bank frames the “competitive- ness” of the U.S. economy and exporters in extremely narrow terms—specifically, as the amount of business that foreign ECAs are doing relative to EXIM. The report for 2020 features striking evidence of this mindset. For instance, lamenting the “nearly four-year hiatus” during which the Bank lacked a board quorum to approve large deals, EXIM’s leadership maintains that these years “severely hindered EXIM’s ability to support the competitiveness of U.S. export- ers.” During that time, foreign ECAs “fundamentally evolved their philosophy and substantively expanded their roles,” and “the United States must work hard to keep pace.” The Bank goes on to promise that it will “re-emerge from the years of being out of the long-term export finance business and restore its standing as one of the world’s most competitive ECAs.”20 In other words, EXIM bureaucrats appear to believe that economic growth and jobs result not from a favorable tax and regulatory environment, but from a victory in hand-to-hand subsidy combat between government banks. The Bank’s

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Related Bills

Other Bills by Rep. Stevens, Haley M.

DOE and NSF Interagency Research Act

119/hr/1350

Taxpayer Data Protection Act

119/hr/1101

Post Quantum Cybersecurity Standards Act

119/hr/3259

Back to All Bills