No Nuclear Testing Without Approval Act
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Rep. Horsford, Steven [D-NV-4]
ID: H001066
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The "No Nuclear Testing Without Approval Act" - a bill so cleverly crafted, it's almost as if they want us to believe they're actually concerned about nuclear safety.
Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**New regulations being created or modified:** This bill amends Section 4210(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act, requiring Congressional approval for explosive nuclear testing. Oh, how noble. Except, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to appear responsible while actually doing nothing.
**Affected industries and sectors:** The obvious ones are the defense industry and nuclear energy sector. But let's not forget the real beneficiaries: the politicians who get to grandstand about "safety" and "accountability" while lining their pockets with campaign donations from these very industries.
**Compliance requirements and timelines:** Ah, the meat of the bill. A notification process that requires the President to submit a proposal to Congress at least 180 days before testing, followed by a joint resolution approval process. How quaint. As if anyone actually thinks this will be followed to the letter. The real timeline is: "How quickly can we ram this through without anyone noticing?"
**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill has all the teeth of a toothless tiger. There are no meaningful enforcement mechanisms or penalties for non-compliance. It's just a feel-good exercise in bureaucratic busywork.
**Economic and operational impacts:** The only impact this bill will have is on the wallets of politicians and lobbyists, who'll reap the benefits of "consulting" fees and campaign donations. Meanwhile, the actual costs of nuclear testing will continue to be borne by taxpayers, with no real oversight or accountability.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), characterized by grandiose language, empty promises, and a complete lack of substance. The underlying disease is corruption, with symptoms including cronyism, incompetence, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy.
Treatment: A strong dose of skepticism, followed by a thorough examination of the politicians' and lobbyists' financial records. But let's be real - this bill will pass, and we'll all just pretend it means something.
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 375 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE) Mission/Overview The Office of Nuclear Energy’s “mission is to advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” It has five stated goals: “Enable continued operation of existing U.S. nuclear reactors,” “Enable deployment of advanced nuclear reactors,” “Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycles,” “Maintain U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology,” and “Enable a high-performing organization.”29 Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,30 the Office of Nuclear Energy “has also been responsible for the DOE’s statutory requirements to collect and dispose of spent nuclear fuel…since the Obama Administration’s dissolution of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.”31 Needed Reforms NE is too influential in driving the business decisions of commercial nuclear energy firms. Instead of focusing on a limited set of basic research and devel- opment activities that solve foundational technical issues that apply broadly to energy production, NE intervenes in nearly all aspects of the commercial nuclear energy industry. Absent wholesale reforms that restructure the federal energy and science bureaucracy to eliminate such functional energy offices, the next Admin- istration should: l Substantially limit NE’s size and scope. l Adopt broader regulatory and energy policy reforms that reduce regulatory obstacles, allow all energy sources to compete fairly in the marketplace, and establish a predictable policy environment. This will avoid unfair bias against the nuclear industry. New Policies NE should transition to a more limited scope of responsibilities that focuses on basic research, solving broadly applicable technology challenges, and solving the nuclear waste management issue as it relates to the development and deployment of advanced next-generation reactors, which can include small modular reactors (SMR). While respecting existing contractual obligations, NE should not initi- ate any new civilian reactor demonstration and commercialization projects. NE also should: l Focus on overcoming technical barriers that are preventing commercial reactor demonstration projects from moving forward. Any activities in support of existing nuclear plants and any other projects — 376 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise directed toward commercialization, including licensing support, should be shouldered by the private sector. l Reorganize its remaining activities into three basic lines of responsibility: nuclear fuels across the fuel cycle, reactor technology, and civilian radioactive waste. Budget The above reforms would cost substantially less than the $1,675,060,000 requested for FY 2023.32 Legislation such as the IIJA placed additional funding for new reactor demonstration projects outside of NE. These responsibilities and their associated funds should be moved to NE as appropriate. NE should not simply add or subtract programs, as some programs may help to support NE’s new priorities. The better approach would be to build a new budget and program strategy that accounts for related DOE programs and submit a new budget request reflecting NE’s new priorities. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT (FECM) Mission/Overview DOE is authorized by law to increase the conversion efficiency of all forms of fossil energy, reduce costs, improve environmental performance, and increase the energy security of the United States.33 In recent years, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) has been transformed from its statutory role of improving fossil energy pro- duction to one that is focused primarily on reducing the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel extraction, transport, and combustion. This change is reflected in the office’s new name, the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM), effective as of July 2021, and FECM’s mission: “to minimize the environmental impacts of fossil fuels while working towards net-zero emissions.”34 Needed Reforms l Eliminate carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) programs. Despite the recent expansion of the 45Q tax credit for carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) to $87 per ton, most carbon capture technology remains economically unviable, although private-sector innovations are on the horizon. CCUS programs should be left to the private sector to develop.35 If the office continues any CCUS research, that research should be focused more on innovative utilization. l Pursue the processing of critical minerals. Development of domestic critical material sources is important for national security, as the vast
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.