The bill
RESTRAIN Act
HR. 5894, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
Sponsored by
Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]
ID: T000468
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5894, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
27 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 158-160 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H4779-4780)
November 18, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another exercise in legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The RESTRAIN Act (Renewing Efforts to Suspend Testing and Reinforce Arms-control Initiatives Now Act) claims to prohibit explosive testing of nuclear weapons conducted by the United States. How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to appease the anti-nuclear crowd while maintaining a convenient loophole for "subcritical" tests.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 4210 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act, striking subsection (a) and inserting a new prohibition on explosive testing. It also adds two new subsections: one limiting funds for such testing and another defining subcritical nuclear tests as exempt from this prohibition.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this charade:
* The Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be tasked with enforcing this new "prohibition." * The defense industry, which has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, will likely find ways to exploit the subcritical test loophole. * Anti-nuclear activists will pretend this bill is a victory, while ignoring the gaping hole that allows for continued testing under a different name.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a masterclass in legislative sleight of hand. By prohibiting explosive testing while allowing subcritical tests, Congress can claim to be addressing nuclear proliferation concerns while actually doing nothing to hinder the development of new nuclear capabilities.
The real impact will be on the wallets of defense contractors and the egos of politicians who get to tout their "commitment to disarmament" without actually achieving anything. Meanwhile, the American public will remain blissfully ignorant of the fact that this bill is little more than a PR stunt.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome," where lawmakers pay lip service to a popular cause while secretly undermining its intent. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for the hypocrisy on display in Washington, D.C.
Prognosis: The RESTRAIN Act will likely pass with flying colors, hailed as a victory by those who don't bother to read the fine print. Meanwhile, the nuclear arms race will continue unabated, fueled by the very same politicians who claim to be working towards disarmament.
Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000559
Top Contributors
10
ID: M000312
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ID: L000582
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ID: D000399
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ID: S001193
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ID: T000487
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ID: T000481
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ID: N000147
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ID: B001292
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ID: G000587
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 83 nodes and 42 connections (70 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $121,500
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2(a) prohibits explosive testing of nuclear weapons, which could limit research and development activities relevant to nuclear power technology and fuel cycle, imposing a cost on the nuclear power industry.
Section 2(c) prohibits use of funds authorized for FY 2026 or otherwise made available for any fiscal year to conduct explosive nuclear testing, which could affect defense contractors involved in nuclear weapons testing programs.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The RESTRAIN Act seeks to prohibit explosive nuclear testing, which directly conflicts with Project 2025's goal of restoring readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site. While both address nuclear deterrence and arms control, the bill's restriction on testing undermines Project 2025's emphasis on maintaining testing capability for deterrence and technological surprise response."
— 125 — Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself. 3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail. MISSILE DEFENSE Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims. l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. l North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. l Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs. — 126 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority. Needed Reforms l Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities. 1. Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems. 2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42 l Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43 1. Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44 The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20. 2. Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast. l Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S. should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot missiles. l Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic
AI Analysis:
"The RESTRAIN Act seeks to prohibit explosive nuclear testing, which directly conflicts with Project 2025's goal of restoring readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site. While both address nuclear deterrence and arms control, the bill's restriction on testing undermines Project 2025's emphasis on maintaining testing capability for deterrence and technological surprise response."
— 125 — Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself. 3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail. MISSILE DEFENSE Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims. l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. l North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. l Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and Project 2025 address nuclear weapons policy, but the RESTRAIN Act’s ban on explosive testing conflicts with Project 2025’s focus on maintaining a reliable, modernized nuclear deterrent through life‑extension programs and testing confidence. Overlap is limited to the general topic of the U.S. nuclear arsenal."
— 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next — 124 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence. 1. Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft. 2. Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM. 3. Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370. l Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade. l Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022 NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence. 1. Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned. 2. Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis. 3. Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example, nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat. l Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.