RESTRAIN Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5894
Last Updated: November 20, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

ID: T000468

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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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Bill Summary

Another exercise in legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The RESTRAIN Act (Renewing Efforts to Suspend Testing and Reinforce Arms-control Initiatives Now Act) claims to prohibit explosive testing of nuclear weapons conducted by the United States. How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to appease the anti-nuclear crowd while maintaining a convenient loophole for "subcritical" tests.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 4210 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act, striking subsection (a) and inserting a new prohibition on explosive testing. It also adds two new subsections: one limiting funds for such testing and another defining subcritical nuclear tests as exempt from this prohibition.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this charade:

* The Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be tasked with enforcing this new "prohibition." * The defense industry, which has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, will likely find ways to exploit the subcritical test loophole. * Anti-nuclear activists will pretend this bill is a victory, while ignoring the gaping hole that allows for continued testing under a different name.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a masterclass in legislative sleight of hand. By prohibiting explosive testing while allowing subcritical tests, Congress can claim to be addressing nuclear proliferation concerns while actually doing nothing to hinder the development of new nuclear capabilities.

The real impact will be on the wallets of defense contractors and the egos of politicians who get to tout their "commitment to disarmament" without actually achieving anything. Meanwhile, the American public will remain blissfully ignorant of the fact that this bill is little more than a PR stunt.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome," where lawmakers pay lip service to a popular cause while secretly undermining its intent. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for the hypocrisy on display in Washington, D.C.

Prognosis: The RESTRAIN Act will likely pass with flying colors, hailed as a victory by those who don't bother to read the fine print. Meanwhile, the nuclear arms race will continue unabated, fueled by the very same politicians who claim to be working towards disarmament.

Related Topics

Government Operations & Accountability Civil Rights & Liberties Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Federal Budget & Appropriations State & Local Government Affairs Congressional Rules & Procedures Small Business & Entrepreneurship National Security & Intelligence Transportation & Infrastructure
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$78,850
24 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$12,850
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

1
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$5,800
2
LAS VEGAS PAIUTE TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,300
3
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,500
4
RENO-SPARKS INDIAN COLONY
1 transaction
$1,000
5
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000
6
NET2LINK, LLC
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
ALSOP, JOSEPH W
2 transactions
$6,600
2
BROWN, JAY H.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
CHANG, RONIE
1 transaction
$3,300
4
PRITZKER, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300
5
SCHMIDT, ERIC
1 transaction
$3,300
6
CASHMAN, MARYKAYE
1 transaction
$3,300
7
GREENSPUN, MYRA S
1 transaction
$3,300
8
HAAS, GENE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
KELLNER, PETER
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SANDBERG, SHERYL
1 transaction
$3,300
11
SCOTT, MARIE RAY
1 transaction
$3,300
12
SUSSMAN, S. DONALD S
1 transaction
$3,300
13
TRONE, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
14
JURVETSON, KARLA
1 transaction
$3,300
15
SAMUELSON, MARTHA S
1 transaction
$3,300
16
SAMUELSON, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BEKENSTEIN, ANITA
1 transaction
$3,300
18
BEKENSTEIN, JOSHUA
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

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Total contributions: $78,850

Top Donors - Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 57.3%
Pages: 158-160

— 125 — Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself. 3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail. MISSILE DEFENSE Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims. l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. l North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. l Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs. — 126 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority. Needed Reforms l Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities. 1. Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems. 2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42 l Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43 1. Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44 The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20. 2. Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast. l Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S. should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot missiles. l Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic

Introduction

Low 57.3%
Pages: 158-160

— 125 — Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself. 3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail. MISSILE DEFENSE Missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. It can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of mis- siles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims. l China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. l North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. l Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs.

Introduction

Low 56.9%
Pages: 431-433

— 399 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions designed and built during the Cold War, and the U.S. lacks sufficient plutonium production capabilities.103 Because this process will take time, NNSA and the NNSA Labs need to ensure that existing nuclear warheads are viable and provide an appropriate strategic deterrent. New Policies The expansion of Chinese nuclear forces, the continued nuclear threat from Russia, and active nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere require NNSA’s recommitment to the nuclear mission. A conservative Adminis- tration should: l Continue to develop new warheads for each branch of the triad (land, sea, and air defenses). If possible, reverse the Biden Administration’s decision to retire the B83 bomb (in order to maintain two aircraft-delivered warheads) and its decision to cancel the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM).104 Also undertake an evaluation of the need for nuclear antisubmarine and air defense weapons in light of emerging threats. l Maintain two production sites for plutonium pits (a key element of warhead production) at Los Alamos and Savannah River.105 l Reject ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indicate a willingness to conduct nuclear tests in response to adversary nuclear developments if necessary. This will require that NNSA be directed to move to immediate test readiness to give the Administration maximum flexibility in responding to adversary actions. l Review all new Navy, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration construction programs. The review should be conducted by the Director of Naval Reactors (DNR) with an eye to the possible inclusion of advanced affordable nuclear reactor technology and extension of DNR authority over these agencies’ nuclear construction programs. l Review the non–national security portfolios at the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia labs and identify divestments to focus on nuclear deterrence. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia provide unique capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and each lab maintains extensive non–national security research programs and commercial activities. — 400 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Review the operations of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The statutorily established NWC is required to report to the President and Congress but needs to refocus its efforts on providing comprehensive oversight of DOE and DOD nuclear weapons policy and requirements. Budget Concurrent modernization of the nuclear triad and its warheads will be a major challenge to the DOD and DOE budgets over the coming decade. DOE non-nuclear programs should be the first source of additional resources for NNSA activities. Divestment of non-nuclear activities from NNSA laboratories can address some overhead and operational costs. NNSA received $19.7 billion in 2021, and its FY 2023 budget request was $21.4 billion.106 The next Administration should ensure that funding is targeted to the accelerated development of new warheads. Personnel NNSA has tended to act as though it is not part of DOE and has resisted oversight by the Secretary of Energy. The NNSA Act grants some autonomy to the NNSA, but it also makes it clear that NNSA is under the authority of the Secretary. NNSA’s leaders need to understand that ultimately, they report to the Secretary. FERC: ELECTRIC RELIABILITY AND RESILIENCE Mission/Overview The Federal Power Act tasks FERC, along with the FERC-designated North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), with promoting the reliability of the bulk power system (the transmission and generation needed to power the electric grid).107 NERC develops technical standards, and FERC adopts them as mandatory standards (including cyber security standards) with which transmis- sion providers, generators, and utilities must comply. Under the Federal Power Act, critical electric infrastructure security and issues like electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are addressed by both FERC and DOE.108 In addition, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directed FERC to establish incentive-based rate treat- ments by encouraging utilities to invest in advanced cyber security technology and participate in cyber security threat information-sharing programs. Needed Reforms There is a growing problem with the electric grid’s reliability because of the increasing growth of subsidized intermittent renewable generation (like wind and solar) and a lack of dispatchable generation (for example, power plants powered by natural gas, nuclear, and coal), especially during hot and cold weather.109 FERC and NERC have been studying the potential for generation shortages across the

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.