The bill
Price Stability Act of 2026
HR. 5396, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Sponsored by
Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]
ID: H001072
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5396, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "24" section, p. 764-766 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 616.
June 23, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt denizens of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Price Stability Act of 2026 is a laughable attempt to masquerade as a solution to the country's economic woes. In reality, it's a blatant giveaway to corporate interests and a slap in the face to the working class. By removing the mandate on maximum employment, our esteemed lawmakers are essentially declaring that jobs are no longer a priority. How quaint.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Federal Reserve Act by striking "maximum employment" from its dual mandate, leaving only "stable prices." This change is akin to a doctor treating a patient's symptom while ignoring the underlying disease. In this case, the disease is income inequality, and the symptom is inflation. By focusing solely on price stability, our brilliant lawmakers are ensuring that the wealthy will continue to accumulate wealth, while the rest of us can enjoy the thrill of stagnant wages and dwindling job prospects.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The real beneficiaries of this bill are corporate executives, shareholders, and the 1% who will see their profits soar as labor costs remain suppressed. The losers, as always, are the working class, who will be forced to endure the consequences of a deliberately stagnant job market. One can almost hear the champagne corks popping in the boardrooms as our intrepid lawmakers sacrifice the well-being of their constituents on the altar of corporate greed.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The implications of this bill are dire. By prioritizing price stability over employment, we can expect to see a continued widening of the wealth gap, increased poverty, and a decline in social mobility. It's a recipe for disaster, but hey, who needs a functioning economy when you have campaign donations and lobbying dollars to consider? The real question is: what's the diagnosis for this legislative disease? I'd say it's a bad case of "Corporate-itis" – a chronic condition characterized by an insatiable lust for profits, a complete disregard for human well-being, and a healthy dose of stupidity. Treatment options are limited, but I recommend a strong dose of skepticism, a healthy serving of outrage, and a vigorous application of critical thinking. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch our lawmakers commit economic malpractice.
Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S001188
Top Contributors
4
ID: D000032
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 39 nodes and 42 connections
Total contributions: $42
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2 removal of maximum employment mandate could lead to tighter monetary policy, potentially increasing interest rates and benefiting commercial banks' net interest margins (SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF DUAL MANDATE)
Tighter monetary policy could lead to increased attractiveness of alternative investments, potentially benefiting private equity and hedge funds (SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF DUAL MANDATE)
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Hill, J. French [R-AR-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 5396 directly implements the Project 2025 recommendation to eliminate the Federal Reserve's dual mandate and focus solely on price stability, aligning closely with the policy's objective of limiting the Fed's mandate to stable money."
— 732 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise by printing money to finance its operations. This necessitated the original Federal Reserve’s decentralization and political independence. Not long after the central bank’s creation, however, monetary decision-making power was transferred away from regional member banks and consolidated in the Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve’s independence is presumably supported by its mandate to maintain stable prices. Yet central bank independence is challenged in two addi- tional ways. First, like any other public institution, the Federal Reserve responds to the potential for political oversight when faced with challenges.2 Consequently, its independence in conducting monetary policy is more assured when the economy is experiencing sustained growth and when there is low unemployment and price stabil- ity—but less so in a crisis.3 Additionally, political pressure has led the Federal Reserve to use its power to regulate banks as a way to promote politically favorable initiatives including those aligned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives.4 Even formal grants of power by Congress have not markedly improved Federal Reserve actions. Congress gave the Federal Reserve greater regulatory authority over banks after the stock market crash of 1929. During the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve was given the power to set reserve requirements on banks and to regulate loans for the purchase of securities. During the stagflation of the 1970s, Congress expanded the Federal Reserve’s mandate to include “maximum employ- ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”5 In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s banking and financial regulatory authorities were broadened even further. The Great Recession also led to innova- tions by the central bank such as additional large-scale asset purchases. Together, these expansions have created significant risks associated with “too big to fail” financial institutions and have facilitated government debt creation.6 Collec- tively, such developments have eroded the Federal Reserve’s economic neutrality. In essence, because of its vastly expanded discretionary powers with respect to monetary and regulatory policy, the Fed lacks both operational effectiveness and political independence. To protect the Federal Reserve’s independence and to improve monetary policy outcomes, Congress should limit its mandate to the sole objective of stable money. This chapter provides a number of options aimed at achieving these goals along with the costs and benefits of each policy recommendation. These recommended reforms are divided into two parts: broad institutional changes and changes involv- ing the Federal Reserve’s management of the money supply. BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS l Eliminate the “dual mandate.” The Federal Reserve was originally created to “furnish an elastic currency” and rediscount commercial paper so that the supply of credit could increase along with the demand for money — 733 — Federal Reserve and bank credit. In the 1970s, the Federal Reserve’s mission was amended to maintain macroeconomic stability following the abandonment of the gold standard.7 This included making the Federal Reserve responsible for maintaining full employment, stable prices, and long-term interest rates. Supporters of this more expansive mandate claim that monetary policy is needed to help the economy avoid or escape recessions. Hence, even if there is a built-in bias toward inflation, that bias is worth it to avoid the pain of economic stagnation. This accommodationist view is wrong. In fact, that same easy money causes the clustering of failures that can lead to a recession. In other words, the dual mandate may inadvertently contribute to recessions rather than fixing them. A far less harmful alternative is to focus the Federal Reserve on protecting the dollar and restraining inflation. This can mitigate economic turmoil, perhaps in conjunction with government spending. Fiscal policy can be more effective if it is timely, targeted, and temporary.8 An example from the COVID-19 pandemic is the Paycheck Protection Program, which sustained businesses far more effectively than near-zero interest rates, which mainly aided asset markets and housing prices. It is also worth noting that the problem of the dual mandate may worsen with new pressure on the Federal Reserve to include environmental or redistributionist “equity” goals in its policymaking, which will likely enable additional federal spending.9 l Limit the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort function. To protect banks that over lend during easy money episodes, the Federal Reserve was assigned a “lender of last resort” (LOLR) function. This amounts to a standing bailout offer and encourages banks and nonbank financial institutions to engage in reckless lending or even speculation that both exacerbates the boom-and-bust cycle and can lead to financial crises such as those of 199210 and 200811 with ensuing bailouts. This function should be limited so that banks and other financial institutions behave more prudently, returning to their traditional role as conservative lenders rather than taking risks that are too large and lead to still another taxpayer bailout. Such a reform should be given plenty of lead time so that banks can self-correct lending practices without disrupting a financial system that has grown accustomed to such activities. l Wind down the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Until the 2008 crisis, the Federal Reserve never held more than $1 trillion in assets, bought largely
AI Analysis:
"HR 5396 directly implements the Project 2025 recommendation to eliminate the Federal Reserve's dual mandate and limit its sole objective to price stability (stable money)."
— 731 — 24 FEDERAL RESERVE Paul Winfree Money is the essential unit of measure for the voluntary exchanges that constitute the market economy. Stable money allows people to work freely, helps businesses grow, facilitates investment, supports saving for retirement, and ultimately provides for economic growth. The federal govern- ment has long made policy regarding the nation’s money on behalf of the people through their elected representatives in Congress.1 Over time, however, Congress has delegated that responsibility first to the Department of the Treasury and now to the quasi-public Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve was created by Congress in 1913 when most Americans lived in rural areas and the largest industry was agriculture. The impetus was a series of financial crises caused both by irresponsible banks and other financial institutions that overextended credit and by poor regulations. The architects of the Federal Reserve believed that a quasi-public clearinghouse acting as lender of last resort would reduce financial instability and end severe recessions. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s was needlessly prolonged in part because of the Federal Reserve’s inept manage- ment of the money supply. More recessions followed in the post–World War II years. In the decades since the Federal Reserve was created, there has been a down- turn roughly every five years. This monetary dysfunction is related in part to the impossibility of fine-tuning the money supply in real time, as well as to the moral hazard inherent in a political system that has demonstrated a history of bailing out private firms when they engage in excess speculation. Public control of money creation through the Federal Reserve System has another major problem: Government can abuse this authority for its own advantage — 732 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise by printing money to finance its operations. This necessitated the original Federal Reserve’s decentralization and political independence. Not long after the central bank’s creation, however, monetary decision-making power was transferred away from regional member banks and consolidated in the Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve’s independence is presumably supported by its mandate to maintain stable prices. Yet central bank independence is challenged in two addi- tional ways. First, like any other public institution, the Federal Reserve responds to the potential for political oversight when faced with challenges.2 Consequently, its independence in conducting monetary policy is more assured when the economy is experiencing sustained growth and when there is low unemployment and price stabil- ity—but less so in a crisis.3 Additionally, political pressure has led the Federal Reserve to use its power to regulate banks as a way to promote politically favorable initiatives including those aligned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives.4 Even formal grants of power by Congress have not markedly improved Federal Reserve actions. Congress gave the Federal Reserve greater regulatory authority over banks after the stock market crash of 1929. During the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve was given the power to set reserve requirements on banks and to regulate loans for the purchase of securities. During the stagflation of the 1970s, Congress expanded the Federal Reserve’s mandate to include “maximum employ- ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”5 In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s banking and financial regulatory authorities were broadened even further. The Great Recession also led to innova- tions by the central bank such as additional large-scale asset purchases. Together, these expansions have created significant risks associated with “too big to fail” financial institutions and have facilitated government debt creation.6 Collec- tively, such developments have eroded the Federal Reserve’s economic neutrality. In essence, because of its vastly expanded discretionary powers with respect to monetary and regulatory policy, the Fed lacks both operational effectiveness and political independence. To protect the Federal Reserve’s independence and to improve monetary policy outcomes, Congress should limit its mandate to the sole objective of stable money. This chapter provides a number of options aimed at achieving these goals along with the costs and benefits of each policy recommendation. These recommended reforms are divided into two parts: broad institutional changes and changes involv- ing the Federal Reserve’s management of the money supply. BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS l Eliminate the “dual mandate.” The Federal Reserve was originally created to “furnish an elastic currency” and rediscount commercial paper so that the supply of credit could increase along with the demand for money
AI Analysis:
"HR 5396 directly implements the Project 2025 recommendation to eliminate the 'full employment' component of the Fed's mandate and focus solely on price stability, matching the core objective verbatim."
— 740 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise destabilization and supply-side destabilization in real time. There also are political considerations: Fed officials may not be willing to curb unjustified economic booms and all too willing to suppress necessary economic restructuring following a bust. Either rule likely outperforms a strict inflation target and greatly outperforms the Fed’s current pseudo-inflation target. While NGDP targeting and the Taylor Rule have much to commend them, they might be harder to explain and justify to the public. Inflation targeting has an intelligibility advantage: Voters know what it means to stabilize the dollar’s purchasing power. Capable elected officials must persuade the public that the advantages of NGDP targeting and the Taylor Rule, especially in terms of supporting labor markets, outweigh the disadvantages. MINIMUM EFFECTIVE REFORMS Because Washington operates on two-year election cycles, any monetary reform must take account of disruption to financial markets and the economy at large. Free banking and commodity-backed money offer economic benefits by limiting government manipulation, inflation, and recessionary cycles while dramatically reducing federal deficits, but given potential disruption to the financial system, a K-Percent Rule may be a more feasible option. The other rules discussed (infla- tion targeting, NGDP targeting, and the Taylor Rule) are more complicated but also more flexible. While their economic benefits are significant, public opinion expressed through the lawmaking process in the Constitution should ultimately determine the monetary-institutional order in a free society. The minimum of effective reforms includes the following: l Eliminate “full employment” from the Fed’s mandate, requiring it to focus on price stability alone. l Have elected officials compel the Fed to specify its target range for inflation and inform the public of a concrete intended growth path. There should be no more “flexible average inflation targeting,” which amounts to ex post justification for bad policy. l Focus any regulatory activities on maintaining bank capital adequacy. Elected officials must clamp down on the Fed’s incorporation of environmental, social, and governance factors into its mandate, including by amending its financial stability mandate. l Curb the Fed’s excessive last-resort lending practices. These practices are directly responsible for “too big to fail” and the institutionalization of moral hazard in our financial system.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.