The bill
Doug LaMalfa Federal Disaster Tax Relief Certainty Act
HR. 5366, 119th Congress — read as touching Insurance (P&C and Life).
Sponsored by
Rep. Steube, W. Gregory [R-FL-17]
ID: S001214
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5366, 119th Congress — read as touching Insurance (P&C and Life).
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Agriculture" section, p. 344-346 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Signed by President.
September 10, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: If the President signs the bill, it becomes law.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt minds in Congress. Let's dissect this trainwreck, shall we?
The "Doug LaMalfa Federal Disaster Tax Relief Certainty Act" - what a mouthful of meaningless words. This bill is a perfect example of how politicians use disasters as an excuse to line their own pockets and those of their corporate donors.
New regulations being created or modified? Oh boy, where do I even start? Section 2 of this abomination amends the Internal Revenue Code to codify and extend rules for personal casualty losses arising from major disasters. Because, you know, the current system wasn't already a Byzantine nightmare. Now, we get to add more complexity and loopholes for the wealthy to exploit.
Affected industries and sectors? Well, it's not like this bill is actually designed to help people affected by disasters. No, no. It's all about providing tax breaks for corporations and wealthy individuals who can afford to donate to politicians' campaigns. The insurance industry will love this, as they'll get to keep their profits while the government subsidizes their losses.
Compliance requirements and timelines? Ha! This bill is a joke. The effective date is set for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2024, because who needs immediate relief when you can wait a few years for the bureaucracy to kick in? And don't even get me started on the "coordination with superceded provisions" - it's like they're trying to create a puzzle that only their lobbyist friends can solve.
Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? *crickets* There are none. Because, of course, this bill is designed to be toothless. The politicians who sponsored this monstrosity know that the real goal is to provide a PR boost, not actual relief or accountability.
Economic and operational impacts? Let's just say that this bill will have all the impact of a placebo on a patient with a terminal illness. It'll make some people feel good for a few minutes, but ultimately, it'll do nothing to address the underlying issues. The only ones who'll benefit are the politicians who get to claim they "did something" and the corporations that get to exploit the loopholes.
In conclusion, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corruption and incompetence that plagues our political system. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, a token gesture designed to distract from the real problems. And we're all just pawns in their game of legislative theater. How quaint. How utterly, mind-numbingly quaint.
Rep. Steube, W. Gregory [R-FL-17]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: T000460
Top Contributors
43
ID: L000578
Top Contributors
25
ID: P000613
Top Contributors
28
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
22
ID: N000191
Top Contributors
24
ID: M001241
Top Contributors
32
ID: C001121
Top Contributors
20
ID: T000487
Top Contributors
30
ID: D000032
Top Contributors
22
ID: B001257
Top Contributors
21
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 40 nodes and 51 connections
Total contributions: $51
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2(b) amends the dollar limitation for personal casualty losses, which could increase insurance payouts for disaster-related claims, benefiting the insurance industry.
Section 2(c) allows individuals to deduct qualified net disaster losses without itemizing, potentially helping homeowners and real estate investors affected by disasters.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Steube, W. Gregory [R-FL-17])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill provides tax relief for individuals affected by major disasters, including wildfires, which aligns with USDA's disaster assistance objectives for agricultural and rural communities, though it operates through the tax code rather than direct USDA programs."
— 311 — Department of Agriculture ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 2. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System,” https://www.usda. gov/fst (accessed December 14, 2022). 3. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1. 4. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150 Years,” https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/ history (accessed December 16, 2022). 5. The law stated, “[T]here is hereby established at the seat of government of the United States a Department of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” Gladys L. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13, https://babel. hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33 (accessed December 16, 2022). 6. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p. 2. 7. Ibid., p. 2. 8. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, p. 3, https://www.usda.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 9. News release, “USDA Announces Framework for Shoring Up the Food Supply Chain and Transforming the Food System to Be Fairer, More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supply- chain-and-transforming (accessed December 14, 2022). 10. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System.” 11. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, pp. 1–2. 12. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Background on the U.S. Approach to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit,” August 4, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UN- Food-Systems-Summit.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 13. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,” https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/un- summit (accessed December 14, 2022). 14. Mark Bittman et al., “How a National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could- save-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html (accessed December 14, 2022); Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, “No, We Don’t Need to Transform the American Food System,” The Daily Signal, February 26, 2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/ no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/ (accessed December 14, 2022); and Daren Bakst, “Biden’s Food Conference Should Put People First, Not Environmental Extremism,” The Daily Signal, September 22, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-people- first-not-environmental-extremism/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 15. News release, “USDA to Invest Up to $300 Million in New Organic Transition Initiative,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 22, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300- million-new-organic-transition-initiative (accessed December 14, 2022). 16. Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s Green New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures, November 14, 2022, https://www. farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster (accessed December 16, 2022). 17. See, for example, Catherine Greene et al., “Growing Organic Demand Provides High-Value Opportunities for Many Types of Producers,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6, 2017, https://www. ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunities- for-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20 by%20the%20consumer (accessed December 14, 2022), and Andrea Carlson, “Investigating Retail Price Premiums for Organic Foods,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016, https://www.ers. usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/ (accessed December 16, 2022). Further, there are many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit of organic food. One — 312 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise meta study found that “[t]he published literature lacks strong evidence that organic foods are significantly more nutritious than conventional foods.” Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., “Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 5 (September 4, 2012), pp. 348–366, https:// www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007 (accessed December 16, 2022). 18. Steve Savage, “USDA Data Confirm Organic Yields Significantly Lower Than With Conventional Farming,” Genetic Literacy Project, February 16, 2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirm- organic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 19. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021, https://www.regulations. gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001 (accessed December 16, 2022). 20. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117–169. 21. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture (1948–2019),” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivity- growth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4 Percent of Disposable Income to 10.3 Percent in 2021,” July 15, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967 (accessed December 14, 2022). 23. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021, Table 1101, https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu- income-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No.176, April 5, 2017, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf. 24. Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA Slush Fund,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6052, February 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/ budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda. 25. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, Public Law 80–806. 26. Bakst and Sewall, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power.” 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021,” November 1, 2021, https://www. regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst (accessed December 16, 2022). 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program.” 30. Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606 (accessed December 16, 2022). 31. “Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall, 14 percent of U.S. farms participated in Federal crop insurance programs.” Christine Whitt, Noah Miller, and Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, pp. 24 and 26, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247. pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which apparently does not cover crop insurance, included payments beyond just commodity payments, such as conservation payments. 32. Randy Schnepf, “Farm Safety-Net Payments Under the 2014 Farm Bill: Comparison by Program Crop,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 11, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 33. Although livestock and specialty crop producers do receive some subsidies, former American Farm Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman captured the subsidy issue well. He “dismisse[d] outright the claim that farmers couldn’t survive without subsidy money. ‘Why does the livestock industry survive without subsidies?’ he ask[ed]. ‘Why does the specialty crop [fruit and vegetable] industry survive?’” Tamar Haspel, “Why Do Taxpayers Subsidize Rich Farmers?” The Washington Post, March 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d- f3d931db7f68_story.html (accessed March 18, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill offers tax relief to individuals affected by disasters, whereas Project 2025's FEMA section emphasizes structural reforms, cost‑share adjustments, and reducing federal involvement in disaster assistance; both address disaster recovery but through different mechanisms, resulting in only a tangential connection."
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners
AI Analysis:
"The bill provides tax relief for disaster victims, while the Project 2025 excerpt focuses on DHS immigration enforcement and FEMA structural reforms; both touch on disaster response but address different mechanisms."
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.