AWARE Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Houchin, Erin [R-IN-9]
ID: H001093
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by Voice Vote.
December 11, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another bill, another exercise in futility. The AWARE Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this mess.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to direct the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to create educational resources for parents, educators, and minors on the safe use of AI chatbots. Because, clearly, the most pressing issue facing our nation is the potential misadventures of teenagers with AI-powered chatbots.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the FTC to develop and make available educational resources within 180 days. These resources must cover topics like identifying safe and unsafe AI chatbot use, privacy, data collection practices, and best practices for parental supervision. Oh, and it also defines what an AI chatbot is, because apparently, our lawmakers need a primer on basic tech terminology.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved here:
* The FTC, which will be tasked with creating these educational resources. * Parents, educators, and minors, who will supposedly benefit from this newfound knowledge. * AI chatbot developers, who might face increased scrutiny (but let's be real, they'll just find ways to game the system). * Lobbyists for tech companies, who are probably behind this bill, pushing for "education" that benefits their bottom line.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a token effort to address concerns about AI safety while ignoring the real issues. The FTC will create some half-hearted resources, and parents will still be clueless about how to supervise their kids' online activities. Meanwhile, tech companies will continue to profit from collecting and exploiting user data.
The real disease here is the influence of tech lobbyists on our lawmakers. Follow the money: Mrs. Houchin (R-IN) has received significant campaign contributions from tech PACs, including $10,000 from the National Venture Capital Association. Coincidence? I think not.
This bill is a symptom of a larger problem – our government's inability to effectively regulate technology and protect consumers. It's a case of "legislative theater," where lawmakers pretend to address an issue while actually serving the interests of their corporate donors.
In short, the AWARE Act is a joke. But hey, at least it'll give politicians something to point to when they claim they're doing something about AI safety.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Houchin, Erin [R-IN-9]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Auchincloss, Jake [D-MA-4]
ID: A000148
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]
ID: M001215
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Goldman, Craig A. [R-TX-12]
ID: G000601
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Harder, Josh [D-CA-9]
ID: H001090
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Houchin, Erin [R-IN-9]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 41 nodes and 39 connections
Total contributions: $153,570
Top Donors - Rep. Houchin, Erin [R-IN-9]
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
Introduction
— 598 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise unemployment programs were defrauded of hundreds of billions of dollars, includ- ing by state-sponsored hacking groups. Not all state agencies are yet through their backlogs of appeals and fraud cases; the recovery of lost funds has been minimal; and fraud has now spilled into the traditional UI programs. The CARES Act era drastically altered the entire UI ecosystem: The federal–state partnership shifted toward federal programs and funding, and the social insurance purpose of the program was disconnected as benefits were extended, expanded to more typically uncovered populations, and made exponentially larger. l Congress should enact bipartisan commonsense UI program reforms, including statutory authority for the Labor Office of Inspector General (OIG) to access all state UI records for the purposes of investigation and requiring state agencies to crossmatch applicants with the National Directory of New Hires. l Congress should also develop a framework (through commission of a congressional report to serve as a blueprint) of technical standards on broader tech topics like usability, state agency cybersecurity postures, data taxonomy standardization, and/or identity verification standards. l Congress should provide DOL with more reasonable enforcement tools for the UI system. Currently, DOL can either send a strongly worded letter or revoke the entire Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)16 tax credit, which would place an immediate 6 percent to 7 percent tax on all covered employers. l DOL should review all actual or planned procurements against the $2 billion (under the American Rescue Plan Act)17 for UI fraud detection, accessibility, and equity investments. These funds do not have appropriations timelines and have very minimal statutory descriptions of the intended purpose. DOL should also review and propose changes to improve state monitoring programs including developing evidence-based frameworks for evaluating the technical readiness and security postures of the state agencies; strengthen its relationship with the OIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and support continued development of fraud prosecution with DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the financial services community; ensure administrative and IT funding is outcome-based; and gather and publish best practices from state officials, industry partners, and other vendors who deliver UI services. — 599 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies WORKER VOICE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Non-Union Worker Voice and Representation. American workers lack a meaningful voice in today’s workplace. Between 50 percent and 60 percent of workers have less influence than they want on critical workplaces issues beyond pay and benefits. Even managers are twice as likely to say their employees have too little influence rather than too much. But America’s one-size-fits-all approach undermines worker representation. Federal labor law offers no alternatives to labor unions whose politicking and adversarial approach appeals to few, whereas most workers report that they prefer a more cooperative model run jointly with management that focuses solely on workplace issues. The next Administration should make new options available to workers and push Congress to pass labor reforms that create non-union “employee involvement organizations” as well as a mechanism for worker representation on corporate boards. l Congress should reintroduce and pass the Teamwork for Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 2022.18 The TEAM Act: 1. Reforms the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) Section 8(a)(2) prohibition on formal worker–management cooperative organizations like works councils. 2. Creates an “Employee Involvement Organization” (EIO) to facilitate voluntary cooperation on critical issues like working conditions, benefits, and productivity. 3. Amends labor law to allow EIOs at large, publicly traded corporations to elect a non-voting, supervisory member of their company’s board of directors. Alternative View. While some conservatives lament that workers lack sufficient voice in today’s workplace, others interpret the rise in independent and flexible work opportunities, significant expansion in family-friendly policies like paid family leave, and the decline in private sector unionization as indicators of workers’ increasing competency and control. Another way to help expand workers’ freedom and voices in traditional workplaces is by allowing them to choose who represents them in negotiations with their employer. The Worker’s Choice Act19 would accom- plish this by ending exclusive representation so that unions in right-to-work states are no longer forced to represent workers who do not want to join them. Union Transparency. Private-sector unions must file detailed financial infor- mation with DOL—on matters including union spending, income, loans, assets, membership information, and employee salary—but unions composed entirely
Introduction
— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.