Responsible Borrower Protection Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
ID: B001302
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
January 3, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real disease beneath.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Responsible Borrower Protection Act of 2025 (HR 53) claims to protect borrowers from "certain proposed changes" to credit fees charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. How noble. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to shield lenders and the mortgage industry from increased costs, all while masquerading as consumer protection.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill cancels proposed changes to the single-family housing mortgage credit fee pricing framework announced by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in January 2023. These changes aimed to make lenders pay more for riskier mortgages, a reasonable approach considering the 2008 financial crisis was caused, in part, by reckless lending practices. By blocking these changes, HR 53 ensures that lenders can continue to take on excessive risk while passing the costs to taxpayers.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:
* Lenders and mortgage industry lobbyists, who will benefit from reduced fees and increased profits. * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which will continue to operate with implicit government guarantees, allowing them to take on more risk without consequence. * Borrowers, who will be "protected" by being kept in the dark about the true risks of their mortgages. * Taxpayers, who will ultimately foot the bill for any future bailouts or financial crises caused by reckless lending practices.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of regulatory capture, where industry interests hijack the legislative process to serve their own needs. By blocking risk-based pricing, HR 53 increases the likelihood of another housing market bubble and subsequent crisis. It's like treating a patient with a Band-Aid while ignoring the underlying cancer.
In conclusion, HR 53 is a cynical attempt to prioritize lender profits over borrower protection and financial stability. It's a legislative disease that will only lead to more suffering in the long run. But hey, at least the politicians involved can claim they're "protecting" borrowers while lining their pockets with industry donations.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]
ID: O000175
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Burlison, Eric [R-MO-7]
ID: B001316
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Weber, Randy K. Sr. [R-TX-14]
ID: W000814
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]
ID: C001118
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Bost, Mike [R-IL-12]
ID: B001295
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Cloud, Michael [R-TX-27]
ID: C001115
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Donalds, Byron [R-FL-19]
ID: D000032
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 45 nodes and 45 connections
Total contributions: $173,200
Top Donors - Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 706 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liquidation authority (OLA), the law’s alternative to bankruptcy for large financial firms. OLA was based on the faulty premise that large financial institutions cannot fail in a judicial bankruptcy proceeding without causing a financial crisis. It gives such companies access to subsidized funding and creates incentives for manage- ment to overleverage and expand high-risk investments.55 Congress should repeal each of these provisions to guard against bailouts and too-big-to-fail problems.56 Treasury plays a role in funding the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It should work to end the conservatorships and move toward privatization of these massive housing finance agencies. This would restore a sustainable housing finance market with a robust private mortgage market that does not rely on explicit or implicit taxpayer guarantees. Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-spon- sored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next President’s legislative vision guided by the following principles: l Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner. l The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available. l Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market. l The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae“) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REFORM The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small bureau within the Treasury Department with approximately 285 employees and a FY 2022 budget of $173 million.58 Although FinCEN makes a significant contribution to law enforce- ment efforts, it also does demonstrable, substantial and widespread economic harm because it: (1) is largely oblivious to those adverse economic effects; (2) conducts almost no meaningful cost-benefit analysis or retrospective review of regulations; (3) has been subject to extraordinarily lax oversight by both Congress and the Trea- sury Department; and (4) demands total transparency by those it regulates but is itself disturbingly and purposefully opaque. For example, FinCEN no longer issues an annual report59 and no longer publishes cash transaction report (CTR) data. — 707 — Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is well—but that even more onerous requirements are needed—are not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN
Introduction
— 706 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liquidation authority (OLA), the law’s alternative to bankruptcy for large financial firms. OLA was based on the faulty premise that large financial institutions cannot fail in a judicial bankruptcy proceeding without causing a financial crisis. It gives such companies access to subsidized funding and creates incentives for manage- ment to overleverage and expand high-risk investments.55 Congress should repeal each of these provisions to guard against bailouts and too-big-to-fail problems.56 Treasury plays a role in funding the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It should work to end the conservatorships and move toward privatization of these massive housing finance agencies. This would restore a sustainable housing finance market with a robust private mortgage market that does not rely on explicit or implicit taxpayer guarantees. Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-spon- sored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next President’s legislative vision guided by the following principles: l Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner. l The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available. l Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market. l The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae“) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REFORM The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small bureau within the Treasury Department with approximately 285 employees and a FY 2022 budget of $173 million.58 Although FinCEN makes a significant contribution to law enforce- ment efforts, it also does demonstrable, substantial and widespread economic harm because it: (1) is largely oblivious to those adverse economic effects; (2) conducts almost no meaningful cost-benefit analysis or retrospective review of regulations; (3) has been subject to extraordinarily lax oversight by both Congress and the Trea- sury Department; and (4) demands total transparency by those it regulates but is itself disturbingly and purposefully opaque. For example, FinCEN no longer issues an annual report59 and no longer publishes cash transaction report (CTR) data.
Introduction
— 735 — Federal Reserve above the prior record high of 7.0 set in 2005.18 The mortgage-payment-to- income ratio hit 43.3 percent in August 2022—breaking the highs of the prior housing bubble in 2008.19 Mortgage payment on a median-priced home (with a 20 percent down payment) jumped to $2,408 in the autumn of 2022 vs. $1,404 just one year earlier as home prices continued to rise even as mortgage rates more than doubled. Renters have not been spared: Median apartment rental costs have jumped more than 24 percent since the start of 2021.20 Numerous cities experienced rent increases well in excess of 30 percent. A primary driver of higher costs during the past three years has been the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Since March 2020, the Federal Reserve has driven down mortgage interest rates and fueled a rise in housing costs by purchasing $1.3 trillion of MBSs from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The $2.7 trillion now owned by the Federal Reserve is nearly double the levels of March 2020. The flood of capital from the Federal Reserve into MBSs increased the amount of capital available for real estate purchases while lower interest rates on mortgage borrowing—driven down in part by the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases— induced and enabled borrowers to take on even larger loans.21 The Federal Reserve should be precluded from any future purchases of MBSs and should wind down its holdings either by selling off the assets or by allowing them to mature without replacement. l Stop paying interest on excess reserves. Under this policy, also started during the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve effectively prints money and then “borrows” it back from banks rather than those banks’ lending money to the public. This amounts to a transfer to Wall Street at the expense of the American public and has driven such excess reserves to $3.1 trillion, up seventyfold since 2007.22 The Federal Reserve should immediately end this practice and either sell off its balance sheet or simply stop paying interest so that banks instead lend the money. Congress should bring back the pre-2008 system, founded on open-market operations. This minimizes the Fed’s power to engage in preferential credit allocation. MONETARY RULE REFORM OPTIONS While the above recommendations would reduce Federal Reserve manipulation and subsidies, none would limit the inflationary and recessionary cycles caused by the Federal Reserve. For that, major reform of the Federal Reserve’s core activity of manipulating interest rates and money would be needed. A core problem with government control of monetary policy is its exposure to two unavoidable political pressures: pressure to print money to subsidize — 736 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise government deficits and pressure to print money to boost the economy artificially until the next election. Because both will always exist with self-interested politi- cians, the only permanent remedy is to take the monetary steering wheel out of the Federal Reserve’s hands and return it to the people. This could be done by abolishing the federal role in money altogether, allowing the use of commodity money, or embracing a strict monetary-policy rule to ward off political meddling. Of course, neither free banking nor a allowing commodi- ty-backed money is currently being discussed, so we have formulated a menu of reforms. Each option involves trade-offs between how effectively it restrains the Federal Reserve and how difficult each policy would be to implement, both polit- ically for Congress and economically in terms of disruption to existing financial institutions. We present these options in decreasing order of effectiveness against inflation and boom-and-bust recessionary cycles. Free Banking. In free banking, neither interest rates nor the supply of money is controlled by the government. The Federal Reserve is effectively abolished, and the Department of the Treasury largely limits itself to handling the government’s money. Regions of the U.S. actually had a similar system, known as the “Suffolk System,” from 1824 until the 1850s, and it minimized both inflation and economic disruption while allowing lending to flourish.23 Under free banking, banks typically issue liabilities (for example, checking accounts) denominated in dollars and backed by a valuable commodity. In the 19th century, this backing was commonly gold coins: Each dollar, for example, was defined as about 1/20 of an ounce of gold, redeemable on demand at the issuing bank. Today, we might expect most banks to back with gold, although some might prefer to back their notes with another currency or even by equities or other assets such as real estate. Competition would determine the right mix of assets in banks’ portfolios as backing for their liabilities. As in the Suffolk System, competition keeps banks from overprinting or lending irresponsibly. This is because any bank that issues more paper than it has assets available would be subject to competitor banks’ presenting its notes for redemp- tion. In the extreme, an overissuing bank could be liable to a bank run. Reckless banks’ competitors have good incentives to police risk closely lest their own hold- ings of competitor dollars become worthless.24 In this way, free banking leads to stable and sound currencies and strong finan- cial systems because customers will avoid the riskier issuers, driving them out of the market. As a result of this stability and lack of inflation inherent in fully backed currencies, free banking could dramatically strengthen and increase both the dominant role of America’s financial industry and the use of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of choice.25 In fact, under free banking, the norm is for the dollar’s purchasing power to rise gently over time, reflecting gains in economic productivity. This “supply-side deflation” does not cause economic busts. In fact,
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.