DFC Modernization Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5299
Last Updated: December 17, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

ID: M001199

Follow the money

The bill

DFC Modernization Act of 2025

HR. 5299, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.

The sponsor

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$98,736 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

60% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 303-305 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 28 - 23.

September 17, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity and uncover the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The DFC Modernization Act of 2025 is a reauthorization of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018. The bill's primary objective is to "responsibly increase" the risk tolerance of the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in investments, supposedly to advance U.S. foreign policy, economic development, and national security goals. In reality, this is a thinly veiled attempt to justify throwing more taxpayer money at questionable projects and lining the pockets of favored corporations.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill expands the DFC's authority to invest in high-risk countries, regions, or sectors, using various tools to mitigate risk. It also introduces new definitions for "high-income country" and "country of concern," which will undoubtedly be used as excuses to justify further meddling in foreign affairs.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the DFC, Congress, the White House, and a cast of corporate interests salivating at the prospect of getting their hands on taxpayer dollars. The real stakeholders, however, are the American people, who will be footing the bill for these questionable investments.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a recipe for disaster. By increasing the DFC's risk tolerance, Congress is essentially giving the green light to reckless investing and potential financial losses. The "sense of Congress" section is a masterclass in doublespeak, promising to advance U.S. interests while actually serving the interests of corporate donors.

The real disease here is corruption, folks. This bill is a symptom of a larger problem: the revolving door between government and corporations, where politicians and bureaucrats serve their own interests rather than those of the American people.

In medical terms, this bill is akin to prescribing a patient with a terminal illness a cocktail of experimental medications that will only hasten their demise. The prognosis is grim, but hey, at least the pharmaceutical companies will make a killing.

Diagnosis: Legislative malpractice, with a side of corruption and incompetence.

Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a thorough examination of the bill's true motivations and beneficiaries. Unfortunately, this treatment is unlikely to be administered, as the patient (the American people) has been anesthetized by the soothing sounds of partisan rhetoric.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsForeign Aid & DiplomacyDefense Spending & Procurement
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$98,736
20 donors
PACs
$6,850
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$91,886
1
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
2 transactions
$5,850
2
WINRED
1 transaction
$1,000

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
LEVY, EDWARD JR.
2 transactions
$13,200
2
HART, NANCY MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
3
LIPSCHULTZ, MARC MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
4
TAYLOR, MARGARETTA MISS
1 transaction
$6,600
5
BLAVATNIK, LEONARD
2 transactions
$6,600
6
PIKE, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,534
7
BAKER, MAXINE
1 transaction
$5,352
8
YOUNKER, MARLIN E.
1 transaction
$5,000
9
DAVIS, GLEEANN
1 transaction
$5,000
10
HILLMAN, TATNALL L. CAPT. RET.
1 transaction
$4,000
11
WEITMAN, AARON
1 transaction
$3,300
12
OBERHELMAN, DIANE A. MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
DEZERTZOV, MICHAEL MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
FAITH, KEVIN MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
GEHLSEN, KURT R. MR. M.D. PH.D
1 transaction
$3,300
16
GILMARTIN, GLADYS H. MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
LYND, MICHEAL J.
1 transaction
$3,300
18
MALONE, JOHN C.
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 39 nodes and 23 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $98,736

Top Donors - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

2 PACs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 10 helped.

  • Section 2(b)(5) encourages US investment in energy infrastructure in allied countries, and Section 2(b)(4) promotes energy security via diversification, directly aiding energy infrastructure firms.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80

    Section 2(b)(2) states policy to counter strategic competitor inroads in key sectors such as infrastructure, critical minerals, and supply chains, which benefits defense contractors involved in those areas.

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Section 2(b)(5) includes telecommunications in infrastructure projects to be supported, and Section 2(b)(6) facilitates export of US telecommunications technology.

  • Section 2(b)(5) supports infrastructure projects in allied countries, which directly benefits construction and engineering firms.

  • Title III expands equity investment authorities (Sections 301-302), increasing the equity limit from 30% to 49% and creating an Equity Investments Account, which benefits private equity firms able to participate in DFC-backed deals.

  • +Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.70

    Section 2(b)(6) facilitates export of US technology to global markets, which includes big tech platforms' services and cloud offerings.

+ 4 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate60.0%
Pages: 303-305

— 270 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As development agencies, USAID and DFC must do a better job of aligning their respective activities and closely integrate both structurally and operation- ally. The easiest way to foster this alignment is to “dual hat” the role of DFC’s chief development officer so that he or she serves simultaneously in both institu- tions. Like all U.S. federal bodies, DFC should be restored to its original intent of deploying its commercial risk-reducing financial services instead of its current misuse as another global vehicle to promote economy-killing climate programs, meet irrelevant diversity objectives, and overfocus on low-impact or misguided gender-based activities. Branding. A deeply embedded culture within the foreign aid bureaucracy views public recognition of U.S. assistance as secondary to a larger philanthropic mission and is embarrassed by the American flag. Citing vaguely defined secu- rity concerns, USAID’s implementers—U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and contractors—often fail to credit the American people for the billions of dollars in assistance they provide the rest of the world even as they engage in self-promoting public relations to raise other donor funds. This approach has negative foreign policy implications as China relentlessly promotes its own self-serving efforts to gain influence and resources. Worst of all, malign actors sometimes appropriate credit for unbranded U.S. assistance: Houthi terrorists, for example, claim to pro- vide for the people under their occupation with anonymous U.S. humanitarian aid. The United States is in a struggle for influence with China, Russia, and other competitors, and American generosity must not go unacknowledged. The next conservative Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s brand- ing policy, which revamped ADS Chapter 320, to force the aid bureaucracy to fully credit the American people for the aid they are providing. The Senior Advisor for Brand Management in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) (dis- cussed infra) should be a political appointee who is responsible for maximizing the visibility of U.S. assistance by enforcing branding policy on every grant, coopera- tive agreement, and contract. The LPA should liaise with counterparts at the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to ensure local media pickup of these activities. OTHER OFFICES AND BUREAUS Office of Administrator. The next conservative Administration should leave in place the current structure of two presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for Management. The Deputy Administrators and the Chief of Staff must be individuals with extensive previous service in the executive branch, ideally at foreign-affairs agencies, and be fluent in the language and practice of federal procurement. Bureau for Foreign Assistance. As noted above, the next conservative Administration should name the USAID Administrator as Director of Foreign Assistance (F) at the Department of State with the rank of Deputy Secretary. It — 271 — Agency for International Development should reorient the bulk of F staff from focusing on the formulation of the annual President’s budget proposal to the execution of already appropriated resources. This should include eliminating the duplicative Mission and Bureau Resource Requests; speeding up the availability of appropriations by delivering to Congress within 60 days the report required by Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA); and fast-tracking the approval of Congressional Notifications (CNs) and other pre-obligation requirements. Management Bureau. As indicated previously, the next conservative Admin- istration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Senior Procurement Executive and Director of the agency’s Office of Acquisition and Assistance (M/ OAA). Political appointees with the appropriate credentials (including warrants) should be placed within M/OAA, and the agency should exercise its authority to engage qualified experts from other federal departments and agencies and outside of government (if they are free of conflicts of interest) on the Technical Commit- tees that review applications for USAID’s contract and grant competitions. The Administration should change the designation of USAID’s Competition Advocate to an individual favorable to innovative types of contracts that can reduce the aid oligopoly’s grip on the agency. Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. As soon as possible after Inauguration Day, the next conservative Administration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) and Director of the Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. USAID’s White House Liaison must be an individual with substantial experience with federal personnel sys- tems. The White House Office of Presidential Personnel should allow the USAID Administrator to explore with counterparts at the Office of Personnel Management whether the agency could hire personnel under both the Administratively Deter- mined authority and Schedule C of the Excepted Service of the Federal Civil Service. USAID should be one of the agencies to pilot-test a reinstated Executive Order 13957,16 which created a Schedule F within the Excepted Service, and should aggres- sively recruit and place candidates into term-limited positions under Schedule A of the Excepted Service (especially veterans). The new CHCO should examine how the existing members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) at USAID should be reworked throughout the agency and should institute an SES Mobility Program to encourage the regular rotation of senior career leaders, including through details to other departments and agencies. Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The next conservative Admin- istration should shift the policy functions of the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) to the Office of Budget and Resource Management (BRM), located in the Office of the Administrator. It should rename BRM the Office of Budget, Policy, and Resource Management (BPRM) and staff the policy team with political appointees. The Administration should also move the responsibility for reviewing

Introduction

Moderate60.0%
Pages: 303-305

— 270 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As development agencies, USAID and DFC must do a better job of aligning their respective activities and closely integrate both structurally and operation- ally. The easiest way to foster this alignment is to “dual hat” the role of DFC’s chief development officer so that he or she serves simultaneously in both institu- tions. Like all U.S. federal bodies, DFC should be restored to its original intent of deploying its commercial risk-reducing financial services instead of its current misuse as another global vehicle to promote economy-killing climate programs, meet irrelevant diversity objectives, and overfocus on low-impact or misguided gender-based activities. Branding. A deeply embedded culture within the foreign aid bureaucracy views public recognition of U.S. assistance as secondary to a larger philanthropic mission and is embarrassed by the American flag. Citing vaguely defined secu- rity concerns, USAID’s implementers—U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and contractors—often fail to credit the American people for the billions of dollars in assistance they provide the rest of the world even as they engage in self-promoting public relations to raise other donor funds. This approach has negative foreign policy implications as China relentlessly promotes its own self-serving efforts to gain influence and resources. Worst of all, malign actors sometimes appropriate credit for unbranded U.S. assistance: Houthi terrorists, for example, claim to pro- vide for the people under their occupation with anonymous U.S. humanitarian aid. The United States is in a struggle for influence with China, Russia, and other competitors, and American generosity must not go unacknowledged. The next conservative Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s brand- ing policy, which revamped ADS Chapter 320, to force the aid bureaucracy to fully credit the American people for the aid they are providing. The Senior Advisor for Brand Management in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) (dis- cussed infra) should be a political appointee who is responsible for maximizing the visibility of U.S. assistance by enforcing branding policy on every grant, coopera- tive agreement, and contract. The LPA should liaise with counterparts at the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to ensure local media pickup of these activities. OTHER OFFICES AND BUREAUS Office of Administrator. The next conservative Administration should leave in place the current structure of two presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for Management. The Deputy Administrators and the Chief of Staff must be individuals with extensive previous service in the executive branch, ideally at foreign-affairs agencies, and be fluent in the language and practice of federal procurement. Bureau for Foreign Assistance. As noted above, the next conservative Administration should name the USAID Administrator as Director of Foreign Assistance (F) at the Department of State with the rank of Deputy Secretary. It

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

Full Policy Text

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