The bill
PROFIT Act of 2026
HR. 5248, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
Sponsored by
Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]
ID: K000397
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5248, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 229-231 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
June 8, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. The PROFIT Act of 2026 - because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this farce and uncover the real disease beneath the symptoms.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to "ensure the alignment of economic and foreign policies" and position the Department of State as a champion of economic security. How quaint. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to further entrench corporate interests in our foreign policy, because what could possibly go wrong with that? The main objective is to create a new Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment - a title that screams "lobbyist's dream come true."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes this new Under Secretary position, which will be responsible for promoting US economic interests abroad, because we all know how well that's worked out in the past. It also amends existing law to insert more bureaucratic layers and create new opportunities for cronyism. Because what our government really needs is more complexity and less transparency.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: corporate lobbyists, special interest groups, and politicians looking to pad their resumes with "bipartisan" achievements. Oh, and let's not forget the poor souls at the Department of State who will have to deal with this new layer of bureaucratic red tape.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease - the corrupting influence of money in politics. It's a Trojan horse for corporate interests to further infiltrate our foreign policy, under the guise of "economic security." The potential impact? More of the same: increased inequality, environmental degradation, and a continued erosion of our national sovereignty. But hey, at least the lobbyists will be happy.
In conclusion, the PROFIT Act of 2026 is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak, designed to further enrich the already wealthy and powerful. It's a disease masquerading as a cure, and we're all just pawns in their game of corruption and greed. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch our politicians pretend to care about the American people.
Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001157
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001219
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 72 nodes and 36 connections (72 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $172,010
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 13 helped.
Sec. 9 creates an Assistant Secretary for Energy Security and Diplomacy responsible for promoting United States energy exports and energy security, which benefits oil and gas producers.
Sec. 9 includes promoting international policies around new and emerging technologies and supporting United States energy exports, which can benefit renewable energy technologies.
Sec. 9's responsibilities include promoting United States energy exports and energy security, which directly benefits midstream operators and energy infrastructure.
Sec. 4 amends the CHIPS Act to have the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund overseen by the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, benefiting semiconductor industry.
Sec. 9's focus on energy security and diplomacy, including critical minerals and supply chains, could support nuclear power as part of energy technology advancement.
Sec. 9's promotion of energy exports and energy security may benefit electric utilities involved in energy production and grid infrastructure.
+ 7 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The PROFIT Act directly implements Project 2025's objective of aligning economic security with national security by creating an Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment within the State Department to integrate economic priorities into foreign policy."
— 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny. — 198 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “About the U.S. Department of State: Our History,” https://www.state.gov/about/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 2. The balance of employment is 2,149 eligible family members and 50,223 locally employed staff. U.S. Department of State, “GTM Fact Sheet: Facts About Our Most Valuable Asset—Our People,” Global Talent Management, December 31, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GTM_Factsheet1222. pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 3. U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, February 15, 2001, p. x, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 4. See Brett D. Schaefer, “How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3115, April 20, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/political- process/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign. 5. Historically, roughly one-third of ambassadorial appointments have been political appointments, although Republican Administrations have generally had a higher ratio of political appointments than Democratic Administrations. 6. U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2. 7. News release, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” U.S. Department of State, December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 8. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. Code § 1101 et seq., § 1253. 9. See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as a Global Superpower (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016). 10. For additional context regarding how countering China fits in a more robust U.S. strategy, see James Jay Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3715, July 21, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-policy-strategy-post-biden-era. 11. The Article X for China would follow George Kennan’s Article X for U.S.–Soviet competition. See George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed March 22, 2023). 12. Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next Decades,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 221, February 20, 2010, https://www.heritage.org/asia/ report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades. 13. Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2001), https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1686&context=vjtl (accessed March 9, 2023). 14. U.S. Department of Defense, Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF- DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed July 28, 2022). 15. See Jeff Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3721, August 29, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/south-asia-new-strategy. 16. Emma Bryce, “Why Is There So Much Oil in the Arctic?” Live Science, August 3, 2019, https://www.livescience. com/66008-why-oil-in-arctic.html (accessed February 9, 2023). 17. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 26, 2021, p. 6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/177 (accessed March 9, 2023). 18. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “Snapshot: Overcoming the Tyranny of Distance in the Arctic,” April 20, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/20/ snapshot-overcoming-tyranny-distance-arctic (accessed February 9, 2023). 19. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2021,” September 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023), and U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2015,” November 1, 2016, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2015/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 20. U.S. Department of State, Report on the Commission of Inalienable Rights, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The PROFIT Act aligns with Project 2025's goal of restructuring the State Department to better serve American interests by creating a new Under Secretary position focused on economic growth, energy, and the environment, which supports strategic coordination and accountability in foreign policy. Both emphasize enhancing the Department’s effectiveness in advancing U.S. economic and national security objectives abroad."
— 193 — Department of State the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies. The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations. SHAPING THE FUTURE Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies. The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining. Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. l Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures — 194 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should be a priority. l Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller agencies, and other offices. The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across the federal government. The next Administration should also evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign assistance authorities. l Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world. Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately, U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years. The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as
AI Analysis:
"The PROFIT Act’s focus on integrating economic growth into foreign policy, creating an Under Secretary for Economic Growth, and promoting trade, investment, and emerging technologies aligns closely with Project 2025’s emphasis on core economic engagement, building mutually beneficial partnerships, and prioritizing economic security as part of national security strategy."
— 187 — Department of State United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S. should support capable African military and security operations through the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting foreign military education, training, and security assistance. l Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has less- than-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise. l Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly (and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners. Europe American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade, and political dimensions. First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge. Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning — 188 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the orbit of the EU. Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K. input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression. South and Central Asia Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance, the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14 Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliat- ing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially because both countries are nuclear powers. The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and eco- nomic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expecta- tion of normal relations with either.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.