The bill
To provide for the political affairs authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes.
HR. 5246, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
ID: S000168
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5246, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 229-231 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 49 - 0.
September 17, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another bill, another exercise in futility. Let's dissect this mess and see what we're really dealing with.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The main purpose of HR 5246 is to reorganize the Department of State's political affairs authorities, because apparently, the current structure isn't bloated enough. The objectives are to create new positions, like the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and various Ambassadors-at-Large, all while pretending to improve diplomatic efforts and foreign policy implementation.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill establishes an Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who will be responsible for regional and bilateral diplomacy. Because we didn't have enough bureaucrats already, this new position will "coordinate" with other Under Secretaries and maintain "continuous observation" of foreign policy implementation. Wow, I can barely contain my excitement.
Other key provisions include the creation of Ambassadors-at-Large for the Arctic and Indian Ocean regions, because those areas weren't already covered by existing diplomatic efforts. These new positions will have vague responsibilities like "maintaining continuous observation" and "coordinating efforts." Sounds like a recipe for disaster.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The affected parties include the Department of State, Congress (who gets to pretend they're doing something useful), and various foreign governments who will be subjected to more bureaucratic nonsense. Oh, and let's not forget the taxpayers, who get to foot the bill for this reorganization exercise.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
The potential impact is a further bloating of the Department of State, with even more bureaucrats creating more red tape and inefficiencies. The implications are that our foreign policy will become even more convoluted and ineffective, as these new positions create more opportunities for bureaucratic infighting and turf wars.
But hey, at least we'll have more Ambassadors-at-Large to attend fancy dinners and pretend to care about the Arctic region. And who knows, maybe one of them will actually do something useful, but I wouldn't hold my breath.
In conclusion, HR 5246 is just another example of congressional incompetence, where politicians try to solve problems by creating more bureaucracy and pretending it's a solution. It's like trying to cure a patient with a bad case of bureaucratic cancer by giving them more chemotherapy – it won't work, but hey, at least we tried.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with symptoms including bureaucratic bloat, inefficiency, and a complete lack of understanding of the problem they're trying to solve. Prognosis: Poor.
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 51 nodes and 23 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $139,600
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 304 and Section 305 imply increased diplomatic efforts in the Arctic and Indian Ocean regions, which could lead to increased demand for defense contractors' services in these areas.
Section 304 mentions energy exploration and development in the Arctic region, which may benefit companies involved in energy infrastructure.
Increased diplomatic efforts in various regions (e.g., Section 305) might require improved telecommunications infrastructure, potentially benefiting telecom companies.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 5246 directly implements Project 2025's recommendations to strengthen the State Department's regional focus by creating Ambassador-at-Large positions for the Arctic and Indian Ocean, establishing an Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and clarifying the Under Secretary for Political Affairs' authorities, thereby enhancing national interest-driven diplomacy."
— 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny. — 198 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “About the U.S. Department of State: Our History,” https://www.state.gov/about/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 2. The balance of employment is 2,149 eligible family members and 50,223 locally employed staff. U.S. Department of State, “GTM Fact Sheet: Facts About Our Most Valuable Asset—Our People,” Global Talent Management, December 31, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GTM_Factsheet1222. pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 3. U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, February 15, 2001, p. x, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 4. See Brett D. Schaefer, “How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3115, April 20, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/political- process/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign. 5. Historically, roughly one-third of ambassadorial appointments have been political appointments, although Republican Administrations have generally had a higher ratio of political appointments than Democratic Administrations. 6. U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2. 7. News release, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” U.S. Department of State, December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 8. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. Code § 1101 et seq., § 1253. 9. See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as a Global Superpower (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016). 10. For additional context regarding how countering China fits in a more robust U.S. strategy, see James Jay Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3715, July 21, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-policy-strategy-post-biden-era. 11. The Article X for China would follow George Kennan’s Article X for U.S.–Soviet competition. See George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed March 22, 2023). 12. Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next Decades,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 221, February 20, 2010, https://www.heritage.org/asia/ report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades. 13. Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2001), https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1686&context=vjtl (accessed March 9, 2023). 14. U.S. Department of Defense, Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF- DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed July 28, 2022). 15. See Jeff Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3721, August 29, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/south-asia-new-strategy. 16. Emma Bryce, “Why Is There So Much Oil in the Arctic?” Live Science, August 3, 2019, https://www.livescience. com/66008-why-oil-in-arctic.html (accessed February 9, 2023). 17. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 26, 2021, p. 6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/177 (accessed March 9, 2023). 18. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “Snapshot: Overcoming the Tyranny of Distance in the Arctic,” April 20, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/20/ snapshot-overcoming-tyranny-distance-arctic (accessed February 9, 2023). 19. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2021,” September 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023), and U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2015,” November 1, 2016, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2015/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 20. U.S. Department of State, Report on the Commission of Inalienable Rights, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"HR 5246 focuses on restructuring State Department leadership positions to improve diplomatic coordination and regional focus, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of ensuring political appointees advance the President's agenda through leadership assertion and appointment control. However, the bill does not explicitly address politicization, loyalty screening, or rapid replacement of career officials emphasized in Project 2025."
— 173 — Department of State service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration. Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years. Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it. To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration. Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success. Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills, — 174 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of political appointees. Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence well before the new Administration’s first day. Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately. The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the Presi- dent’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be pri- oritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). RIGHTING THE SHIP Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citi- zens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented immediately: Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc., pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more import- ant than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars. Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused
AI Analysis:
"HR 5246 focuses on restructuring State Department leadership and enhancing regional diplomatic coordination, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on improving interagency coordination and presidential direction in foreign policy. However, the bill does not address core Project 2025 priorities such as treaty ratification processes, C-175 authority revocation, or Senate oversight of international agreements."
— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling
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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
To track taxpayer dollars sent to adversarial countries and foreign entities of concern, and for other purposes.
A bill to require a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from sources in the United States.
Enhancing Stakeholder Support and Outreach for Preparedness Grants Act