District of Columbia Judicial Nominations Reform Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5125
Last Updated: July 12, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

ID: S000250

Follow the money

The bill

District of Columbia Judicial Nominations Reform Act of 2025

HR. 5125, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$90,500 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 895-897 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate.

September 17, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater. Let's dissect the "District of Columbia Judicial Nominations Reform Act of 2025" – a bill that reeks of desperation, incompetence, and a dash of good old-fashioned power grab.

**Diagnosis:** This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Executive Overreach-itis," a disease characterized by an insatiable desire for control and a blatant disregard for checks and balances. The symptoms are clear: the termination of the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission, which will now allow the President to unilaterally appoint judges.

**New Regulations:** The bill creates a new regulatory framework that consolidates power in the hands of the Executive Branch. Gone is the pesky commission that used to provide some semblance of oversight and accountability. Now, the President gets to pick their favorite judges without any meaningful input from others.

**Affected Industries and Sectors:** This bill will have far-reaching consequences for the judiciary, the legal profession, and anyone who values an independent judiciary. The affected sectors include:

* The District of Columbia courts * The legal community * Anyone seeking justice in the nation's capital

**Compliance Requirements and Timelines:** There are no significant compliance requirements or timelines to speak of, as this bill is more about consolidating power than ensuring accountability.

**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** Don't bother looking for any meaningful enforcement mechanisms or penalties. This bill is designed to insulate the Executive Branch from scrutiny, not ensure that anyone is held accountable.

**Economic and Operational Impacts:** The economic impact of this bill will be minimal, but the operational implications are significant. With the President now having unfettered control over judicial appointments, we can expect a judiciary that is more beholden to the Executive Branch than ever before. This will have far-reaching consequences for the rule of law and the integrity of our justice system.

In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative malpractice. It's a naked power grab that undermines the principles of accountability and oversight. But hey, who needs an independent judiciary when you can have a President who gets to pick their favorite judges?

Related Topics

Judiciary & Legal Reform
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$90,500
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$17,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$72,900

No PAC contributions found

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
4 transactions
$16,600
2
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
HOWARD, RONALD VANCE
1 transaction
$5,000
2
HOWARD, KAREN
1 transaction
$5,000
3
SINGH, PRITPAL
1 transaction
$5,000
4
KAUR, MANJIT
1 transaction
$5,000
5
BEHRINGER, TODD
1 transaction
$3,400
6
CARMICHAEL, JEFF
1 transaction
$3,300
7
OBERHELMAN, DIANE
1 transaction
$3,300
8
SHELTON, WALLACE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
SIMMONS, HARRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
10
CURRY, ALICIA
1 transaction
$3,300
11
CURRY, PATRICK
1 transaction
$3,300
12
BEKTAS, MELIH
1 transaction
$3,300
13
JOHNSON, WALTER
1 transaction
$3,300
14
ROLAND, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
15
PATTERSON, DAN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
DEASON, DARWIN
1 transaction
$3,300
17
WINN, MELINDA
1 transaction
$3,300
18
WINN, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$3,300
19
MOUNTAIN, ROCKY MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
20
PEROT, H. ROSS MR. , JR.
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Higgins, Clay [R-LA-3]

ID: H001077

Top Contributors

10

1
HEBERT, MARC
JONES WALKER • ATTORNEY
IndividualMETAIRIE, LA
$3,500
Sep 8, 2024
2
HAMER, GREGORY J MR. SR
B&G FOOD ENTERPRISES LLC. • CORP. SECRETARY
IndividualMORGAN CITY, LA
$3,300
Nov 25, 2024
3
FREY, GERARD A.
SELF EMPLOYED • FARMERS
IndividualIOTA, LA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
4
CRAPPEL, ADAM
AE OFFICE MACHINES • PRESIDENT
IndividualPATTERSON, LA
$3,300
Mar 31, 2023
5
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CEO
IndividualLAKE BLUFF, IL
$3,300
Jan 26, 2023
6
BOLLINGER, DONALD
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNEW ORLEANS, LA
$3,300
Mar 7, 2023
7
BOLLINGER, DONALD
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNEW ORLEANS, LA
$3,300
Mar 7, 2023
8
COOLEY, WILLIAM
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualWEST PALM BEACH, FL
$3,300
Mar 7, 2023
9
HAMER, GREGORY J MR. SR
BG FOOD ENTERPRISES LLC • EXECUTIVE
IndividualMORGAN CITY, LA
$3,300
Mar 12, 2024
10
DAVIS, JORDAN
WESTERN CONSTRUCTION ROOFING • SALES PROJECT MANAGER
IndividualHARRISON, ID
$3,300
Jan 9, 2024

Rep. Wilson, Joe [R-SC-2]

ID: W000795

Top Contributors

10

1
CATAWBA INDIAN NATION
OrganizationROCK HILL, SC
$2,000
May 6, 2024
2
LEVKOWITZ, HOWARD
SELF EMPLOYED • INVESTOR
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$6,600
Nov 28, 2023
3
VICKAR, KERRY
LKV MANAGEMENT • CHAIRMAN
IndividualCHARLOTTE, NC
$5,000
Nov 21, 2023
4
LOWELL, RANDY R.
BURR FORMAN • ATTORNEY
IndividualISLE OF PALMS, SC
$3,700
May 8, 2024
5
VALLARINO, MANUEL R.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE BEACH, SC
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
6
VALLARINO, MARY EMILY J.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE BEACH, SC
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
7
CASSELS, W. TOBIN III
SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES • PRESIDENT
IndividualCOLUMBIA, SC
$3,300
Dec 1, 2023
8
CASSELS, W. TOBIN JR.
SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualCOLUMBIA, SC
$3,300
Dec 1, 2023
9
HOEFER, JOHN M. S. ESQ.
WILLOUGHBY & HOEFER P.A. • ATTORNEY
IndividualCOLUMBIA, SC
$3,300
Nov 8, 2023
10
LIEBERMAN, JEREMY A.
KLEE TUCHIN BOGDANOFF & STERN LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualFLUSHING, NY
$3,300
Oct 31, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 53 nodes and 31 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $114,200

Top Donors - Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs20 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Weak
Vector: 60%
Pages: 895-897AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt concern increasing presidential control over appointments to ensure nominees share the administration's views, but they apply to different entities (DC judicial nominations vs. FEC/DOJ enforcement), resulting only a tangential thematic connection."

Key themes:presidential appointment authoritynominee ideological alignmentcommission restructuringexecutive oversight

— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.

Federal Election Commission

Minimal
Vector: 61%
Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on restructuring the District of Columbia judicial nomination process, whereas the Project 2025 policy addresses Federal Election Commission litigation authority, commissioner term limits, and campaign finance regulations; there is no substantive overlap between the two."

Key themes:no overlapunrelated

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Federal Election Commission

Minimal
Vector: 61%
Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5125 concerns judicial nominations in the District of Columbia, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt focuses on reforming the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and campaign finance enforcement. There is no thematic or policy overlap between the two."

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

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