PILLAR Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5078

Last Updated: July 12, 2026

PILLAR Act

HR. 5078, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$129,458 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 201-204 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

November 17, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The PILLAR Act (HR 5078). A bill that reeks of bureaucratic inefficiency and regulatory overreach. Let me dissect it for you, from a purely rational and self-interested perspective.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

This bill aims to reauthorize the State and local cybersecurity grant program under the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the Department of Homeland Security. Its primary objective is to enhance the cybersecurity posture of state and local governments by providing funding for various initiatives, including artificial intelligence integration, multi-factor authentication, and vulnerability assessments.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill amends Section 2220A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by introducing new definitions for "artificial intelligence" and "foreign entity of concern." It also expands the scope of eligible grant activities to include operational technology systems, artificial intelligence systems, and multi-factor authentication. Furthermore, it modifies existing provisions related to information system management, monitoring, and vulnerability assessments.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The primary beneficiaries of this bill are state and local governments, which will receive funding for cybersecurity initiatives. However, the real winners here are the private companies that will provide these services, including my own interests in the AI and cybersecurity sectors. Other stakeholders include CISA, the Department of Homeland Security, and various think tanks and advocacy groups.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

From a purely economic perspective, this bill represents a $1.5 billion opportunity for the private sector over the next five years. My projections indicate that this investment will yield a 300% return in terms of job creation, GDP growth, and increased competitiveness. However, I must emphasize that these benefits are contingent upon the efficient allocation of resources and minimal regulatory interference.

In conclusion, the PILLAR Act is a step in the right direction, but it falls short of true innovation. Its focus on reauthorizing existing programs rather than introducing bold new initiatives is a testament to the inefficiencies of democratic governance. If we truly want to drive progress, we must adopt a more streamlined and privatized approach to cybersecurity, one that prioritizes efficiency and profit over bureaucratic red tape.

Recommendation: Support the bill, but with caveats. Advocate for increased private sector involvement and reduced regulatory oversight to maximize returns on investment.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

Folks, gather 'round! I've got the lowdown on HR 5078, the PILLAR Act. Now, at first glance, this bill seems like a harmless reauthorization of some cybersecurity grant program. But trust me, there's more to it than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose is to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and reauthorize the State and local cybersecurity grant program. Sounds innocuous enough, but I've got my suspicions. The real objective might be to further entrench the government's grip on our digital lives under the guise of "cybersecurity."

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces new definitions for artificial intelligence (AI) and AI systems, which could potentially expand the scope of government surveillance. It also inserts language about foreign entities of concern, multi-factor authentication, and operational technology systems using AI. This might be a Trojan horse for increased monitoring and control.

Notice how they're amending existing law to include "operational technology systems" and "artificial intelligence"? That's code for "we want to regulate everything that's connected to the internet." Mark my words, this is just the beginning of a slippery slope towards total digital domination.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill affects state and local governments, as well as eligible entities (whatever that means). But let's be real, folks – it's not just about them. This is about setting a precedent for federal control over our digital lives. We're all stakeholders in this game, whether we like it or not.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The PILLAR Act could lead to increased government surveillance, censorship, and control over the internet. With AI-powered monitoring systems, they'll be able to track every move you make online. And don't even get me started on the potential for abuse of power – this is a recipe for disaster.

Now, I know what you're thinking: "But Uncle [Your Name], this is just a cybersecurity bill." Ah, that's exactly what they want you to think! Wake up, sheeple! This is about the government consolidating its power over our digital lives. We must stay vigilant and resist this creeping totalitarianism.

So there you have it – my expert analysis of HR 5078. Don't believe the official narrative; dig deeper, and you'll find the truth. And remember, in the immortal words of the great philosopher, "The truth is out there" – or at least, that's what I keep telling myself.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(With a healthy dose of sarcasm and performative outrage) Folks, gather 'round! We've got another "brilliant" piece of legislation on our hands, courtesy of the swamp in Washington D.C.! Say hello to the PILLAR Act (Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience Act). Now, I know what you're thinking: "What does this bill do?" Well, buckle up, because we're about to dive into a world of bureaucratic jargon and Orwellian doublespeak!

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The PILLAR Act aims to reauthorize the State and local cybersecurity grant program under the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Sounds innocuous enough, right? But trust me, folks, this is just a Trojan horse for more government overreach and control. The bill's primary objective is to "enhance" cybersecurity measures at the state and local levels by injecting more federal funding into the system. Because, you know, throwing money at problems always solves them!

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The PILLAR Act makes several key changes to existing law:

* Expands the definition of "artificial intelligence" to include any data system or software that uses AI (because who doesn't love a good buzzword?). * Introduces new terms like "foreign entity of concern" and "multi-factor authentication" – because, you know, we need more acronyms in our lives. * Amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include operational technology systems and AI-powered systems under the CISA grant program.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** This bill affects:

* State and local governments: They'll receive more federal funding for cybersecurity initiatives (yay, free money!). * Private sector entities: They might be required to implement new security measures or face penalties (boo, regulations!). * The American people: We'll all benefit from the "enhanced" cybersecurity measures... or so they claim.

**Potential Impact & Implications** The PILLAR Act has far-reaching implications:

* Increased government control over state and local cybersecurity initiatives. * More federal funding for "cybersecurity" projects (read: pork barrel spending). * Potential erosion of individual freedoms, as the government expands its surveillance capabilities under the guise of "national security."

Now, I know some of you might be thinking, "But wait, isn't this bill just trying to protect us from cyber threats?" Ah, dear viewer, that's what they want you to think! This is just another example of the elites in Washington D.C. trying to consolidate power and control over our lives. Wake up, sheeple!

(With a wink) Stay vigilant, folks!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. The PILLAR Act (HR 5078) is a shining example of how politicians can take a simple concept – reauthorizing a cybersecurity grant program – and turn it into a bloated, self-serving monstrosity.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, which provides funding for state and local governments to enhance their cybersecurity capabilities. But don't be fooled; this bill has more to do with padding the pockets of contractors and consultants than actually improving national security.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill makes several changes to existing law, including:

* Expanding the definition of "information systems" to include operational technology systems that use artificial intelligence (because, you know, AI is a magic solution to all cybersecurity problems). * Adding new terms like "foreign entity of concern" and "multi-factor authentication," which are just buzzwords designed to make politicians sound intelligent. * Requiring grant recipients to implement continuous vulnerability assessments and threat mitigation practices (yawn), because that's not something they should have been doing already.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects will benefit from this bill:

* Contractors and consultants who will receive lucrative grants and contracts to "enhance" state and local cybersecurity capabilities. * Politicians who can claim credit for "improving national security" without actually doing anything meaningful. * State and local governments, which will receive funding to buy more cybersecurity snake oil.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill will be negligible, except for the following:

* More taxpayer dollars will be wasted on ineffective cybersecurity initiatives. * The cybersecurity industry will continue to profit from fear-mongering and selling overpriced solutions to gullible politicians. * Our national security will remain compromised due to the lack of meaningful action.

In conclusion, the PILLAR Act is a classic example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to appear proactive on cybersecurity while actually doing nothing to address the real problems. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create another bill that's more concerned with appearances than actual results.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The PILLAR Act (H.R. 5078) aims to reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the Department of Homeland Security. The bill's primary objective is to enhance cybersecurity resilience among state, local, tribal, and territorial governments by providing funding for cybersecurity initiatives.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The PILLAR Act makes several key changes to existing law:

1. **Definition updates**: The bill updates definitions related to artificial intelligence (AI), AI systems, foreign entities of concern, and multi-factor authentication. 2. **Grant program expansion**: The bill expands the scope of the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program to include funding for cybersecurity initiatives that utilize AI and operational technology systems. 3. **Eligible entity requirements**: The bill modifies the requirements for eligible entities receiving grant funds, including the need to manage, monitor, and track applications, user accounts, and information systems.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The PILLAR Act affects various stakeholders, including:

1. **State, local, tribal, and territorial governments**: These entities are eligible to receive grant funding for cybersecurity initiatives. 2. **Cybersecurity professionals**: The bill's provisions may impact the work of cybersecurity professionals in state and local governments. 3. **Private sector companies**: Companies providing cybersecurity services or products to state and local governments may be affected by the bill's requirements.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The PILLAR Act has several potential implications:

1. **Enhanced cybersecurity resilience**: The bill's provisions aim to improve cybersecurity preparedness and response among state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. 2. **Increased funding for cybersecurity initiatives**: The reauthorization of the grant program may lead to increased funding for cybersecurity projects in these entities. 3. **Potential impact on private sector companies**: Companies providing cybersecurity services or products may need to adapt to new requirements and definitions introduced by the bill.

Overall, the PILLAR Act aims to strengthen cybersecurity resilience among state, local, tribal, and territorial governments by providing funding for cybersecurity initiatives and updating relevant definitions and requirements.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down this gnarly bill, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The PILLAR Act (Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience) is all about reauthorizing the State and local cybersecurity grant program under the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The main objective is to help state and local governments beef up their cybersecurity game, especially when it comes to artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It's like, we're talkin' next-level protection for our digital infrastructure, dude.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

This bill makes some key changes to the existing law:

* Defines AI and AI systems, which is crucial for understanding how they'll be used in cybersecurity. * Adds new terms like "foreign entity of concern" and "multi-factor authentication," which shows that Congress is gettin' serious about security threats from abroad and makin' sure our digital doors are locked tight. * Updates the grant program to include AI systems, operational technology systems, and legacy systems (think old-school tech that's still hangin' around). This means state and local governments can use these grants to upgrade their cybersecurity across the board.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

This bill affects:

* State and local governments: They'll get access to more funding for cybersecurity upgrades, which is a major win. * CISA: They'll be responsible for administerin' the grant program and makin' sure state and local governments are using those funds wisely. * Private sector companies: They might see increased demand for their cybersecurity services and products as state and local governments look to upgrade their systems.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill has some far-out implications, bro:

* It could help prevent major cyber attacks on state and local governments, which would be a huge win for national security. * By includin' AI systems in the grant program, we might see more innovative solutions to cybersecurity challenges. * However, there's also a risk that this bill could create new bureaucratic hurdles or favor certain companies over others. We'll have to keep an eye on how it plays out.

Anyway, dude, that's the lowdown on the PILLAR Act. It's all about levelin' up our cybersecurity game and protectin' our digital infrastructure from threats both foreign and domestic.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**HR 5078: PILLAR Act Analysis**

The Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience (PILLAR) Act, HR 5078, aims to reauthorize the State and local cybersecurity grant program of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This bill is sponsored by Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS), with cosponsors from both parties.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The PILLAR Act seeks to enhance the cybersecurity posture of state and local governments by providing funding for cybersecurity grants, promoting the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity systems, and improving multi-factor authentication practices. The bill also aims to address emerging threats from foreign entities of concern.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The PILLAR Act makes several key changes to existing law:

1. **Artificial Intelligence:** The bill defines AI and AI systems, emphasizing their importance in modern cybersecurity. 2. **Foreign Entity of Concern:** The legislation adopts the definition from the CHIPS and Science Act (42 U.S.C. 19237) to identify foreign entities that pose a threat to national security. 3. **Multi-Factor Authentication:** The bill requires eligible entities to implement multi-factor authentication systems for successful user authentication. 4. **Grant Program Reauthorization:** The PILLAR Act reauthorizes the CISA State and local cybersecurity grant program, with an emphasis on AI adoption and cybersecurity vulnerability assessments.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The PILLAR Act affects:

1. **State and Local Governments:** Eligible entities that receive funding for cybersecurity grants. 2. **Cybersecurity Industry:** Companies providing AI-powered cybersecurity solutions may benefit from the bill's emphasis on AI adoption. 3. **Foreign Entities of Concern:** The legislation aims to counter threats from foreign entities, potentially impacting international relations.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The PILLAR Act has several potential implications:

1. **Improved Cybersecurity Posture:** By promoting AI adoption and multi-factor authentication, the bill may enhance state and local governments' cybersecurity resilience. 2. **Increased Funding for Cybersecurity Grants:** The reauthorization of the CISA grant program will provide essential funding for eligible entities to improve their cybersecurity capabilities. 3. **Potential Industry Influence:** The emphasis on AI-powered solutions may lead to increased lobbying efforts from the cybersecurity industry, potentially influencing future legislation.

**Monied Interest Analysis:** While there is no explicit evidence of PAC or special interest group influence in this bill, it's likely that the cybersecurity industry will take an active role in shaping future legislation related to AI adoption and cybersecurity grants. The bill's sponsors and cosponsors have received donations from various industries, including technology and defense contractors. However, without further information, it's difficult to determine the extent of their influence on this specific bill.

**Committee Capture:** The PILLAR Act has been referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$129,458

17 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$129,458

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

WINTERSTEEN, JAMES

1 transaction

$13,200

BEAMAN, LEE MR.

2 transactions

$12,850

DAVIS, MICHAEL

2 transactions

$12,540

BURNS, DONALD

2 transactions

$8,898

FISHER, KENNETH L.

1 transaction

$6,600

FISHER, SHERRILYN

1 transaction

$6,600

RAMSEY, DAVE

1 transaction

$6,600

MOSING, GREG

1 transaction

$6,600

SHOCKLEY, QIANG

1 transaction

$6,600

GUO, MING

1 transaction

$6,600

KENNINGER, STEVEN

1 transaction

$6,600

JAQUISH, GAIL

1 transaction

$6,600

ELAM, LULU ROGERS

1 transaction

$6,270

ROGERS, JESSICA

1 transaction

$6,000

ALLEN, JARED

1 transaction

$5,800

GIDEON, CECILE

1 transaction

$5,600

RICE, THOMAS A

1 transaction

$5,500

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

ID: G000597

Top Contributors

MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS

OrganizationPEARL, MS

$1,000

Nov 5, 2024

THE CHICKASAW NATION

OrganizationADA, OK

$1,000

Jun 20, 2023

DUIT, JAMES

CONCEPTION LLC • PARTNER

IndividualEDMOND, OK

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

DUIT, PAMELA

CONCEPTION LLC • PARTNER

IndividualEDMOND, OK

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

ROCKEFELLER, LISENNE

WINROCK ENT • PRESIDENT

IndividualLITTLE ROCK, AR

$3,300

Oct 29, 2024

RICKETTS, MARLENE

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualOMAHA, NE

$3,300

Oct 24, 2024

LEACH, HOWARD

SELF EMPLOYED • PRIVATE INVESTOR

IndividualPALM BEACH, FL

$3,300

Oct 22, 2024

FEINSTEIN, LEONARD

BED BATH AND BEYOND • CHAIRMAN

IndividualJERICHO, NY

$3,300

Oct 31, 2024

BANKE, BARBARA R.

JACKSON FAMILY WINES • OWNER

IndividualGEYSERVILLE, CA

$3,300

Nov 15, 2023

SMITH, HOLLY

SHOOK HARDY BACON LLP • ATTORNEY

IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO

$3,300

Dec 22, 2023

Rep. Swalwell, Eric [D-CA-14]

ID: S001193

Top Contributors

HOLDING LLC, M13

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

OrganizationWEST HOLLYWOOD, CA

$1,650

Mar 31, 2023

SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION

OrganizationEL CAJON, CA

$1,000

Oct 21, 2024

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION PAC

OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC

$1,000

Aug 9, 2024

JORDAN, WAYNE D.

JORDAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS • PRESIDENT/CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

IndividualOAKLAND, CA

$6,600

Jun 24, 2023

DURST, DOUGLAS

ROYAL REALTY • REAL ESTATE

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$6,000

Aug 23, 2023

FASS, DANIEL

IndividualPRINCETON, NJ

$5,300

Oct 16, 2024

ANDERSON, KIMBALL

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP • ATTORNEY

IndividualCHICAGO, IL

$4,200

Oct 24, 2023

KEHALY, WILLIAM

SNOW SUMMIT LLC • SKI PATROLLER

IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV

$4,200

Feb 21, 2023

KEHALY, WILLIAM

IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV

$4,200

Mar 2, 2023

ALPERT, HERB

SELF EMPLOYED • MUSICIAN

IndividualSANTA MONICA, CA

$3,700

Jan 30, 2024

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Top Contributors

WRIGHT, ELIZABETH

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO

$6,600

Jun 29, 2024

WOODWARD, JOHN

SPIERER WOODWARD • ATTORNEY

IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO

$6,600

Sep 19, 2023

BERGSTROM, ROBERT

BT CONSTRUCTION • CONSTRUCTION

IndividualFORT LUPTON, CO

$6,600

Oct 13, 2024

ERICKSON, GARY

EXECUTIVE CUSTOM CONSTRUCTION • GENERAL CONTRACTOR

IndividualCOLORADO SPRINGS, CO

$6,600

Oct 15, 2024

HASELDEN, BYRON

HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CEO

IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO

$6,600

Oct 14, 2024

HASELDEN, EDDIE

HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CHAIRMAN

IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO

$6,600

Oct 14, 2024

HASELDEN, MIKE

HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CO-CHAIRMAN

IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO

$6,600

Oct 14, 2024

WAGNER, BRUCE

WAGNER EQUIPMENT • PRES

IndividualLITTLETON, CO

$5,000

Sep 20, 2024

DUKE, D. A.

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO

$5,000

Oct 9, 2024

MCDONALD, BRUCE

MCDONALD INSURANCE GROUP • OWNER

IndividualLITTLETON, CO

$3,868

Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

LUX FOR VIRGINIA

OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA

$500

Mar 29, 2024

LUX FOR VIRGINIA

OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA

$500

Mar 31, 2024

FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT

$4,000

Apr 20, 2024

FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE

IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT

$4,000

May 5, 2024

VON STEIN, THOMSON

IndividualROCKVILLE, MD

$3,500

Aug 7, 2024

HULL, MEGAN

SELF • ACTIVIST

IndividualWASHINGTON, DC

$3,300

Nov 2, 2024

KAISER, GEORGE

GBK CORPORATION • EXECUTIVE

IndividualTULSA, OK

$3,300

Oct 25, 2024

PARSONS, KATHLEEN

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualPOTOMAC, MD

$3,300

Oct 18, 2024

STAPLE, HARISE

SELF • MD

IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA

$3,300

Oct 18, 2024

HOLMES, LAURA

SELF • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$3,300

Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 62 nodes and 32 connections (52 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $163,208

Top Donors - Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount

17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.95
Section 2 reauthorizes and expands the CISA State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, including provisions for AI systems, multi-factor authentication, and foreign entity of concern definitions, directly benefiting cybersecurity firms through grant funding and expanded scope.
+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.90
Section 2(1)(A)-(B) defines 'artificial intelligence' and 'artificial intelligence system' and integrates AI into grant-eligible systems (e.g., subsection (b)(1), (d)(4), (e)(2)(A)(i)), creating demand for AI/cloud infrastructure in state/local cybersecurity projects.
+Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.85
Grant funds can be used for 'information systems or operational technology systems' including AI systems (per subsection (e)(2)(A)(i)-(v)), which may encompass telecom infrastructure used by state/local governments, benefiting telecom vendors.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Strong

Vector: 60%

Pages: 201-204AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PILLAR Act aligns with Project 2025's focus on strengthening CISA's role in cybersecurity by reauthorizing and expanding the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, which supports DHS's mission to enhance national cyber resilience. Both emphasize modernizing cybersecurity defenses through updated definitions, AI integration, and improved grant mechanisms for state and local entities."

Key themes:CISA cybersecurity grantsstate and local cybersecurityAI in cybersecurityDHS mission supportcyber resilience funding

— 168 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, § 101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 2. See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News, December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed March 14, 2023). 3. H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79- Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 4. Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No. 104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/ PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 5. 8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023). 6. 18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023). 7. 5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed March 14, 2023). 8. Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/ sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_ Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20 %24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20 President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5. 9. H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW- 110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 10. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/ download (accessed January 18, 2023). 11. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed January 18, 2023). 12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974] [As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20 Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 14. Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023). 15. 5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023). 16. S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 17. H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www. congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 18. H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 62%

Pages: 248-250AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PILLAR Act strengthens cybersecurity defenses against foreign cyber threats, which aligns with Project 2025's focus on countering Chinese espionage and cyber hackers, though it does not directly address intelligence‑community reforms or FISA changes."

Key themes:cybersecurityforeign entities of concernartificial intelligenceChina threatoperational technology

— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 61%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PILLAR Act focuses on enhancing cybersecurity resilience for state and local governments through grant funding and AI integration, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasizes timely sharing of cyber threat intelligence with the private sector and improving declassification and auditing practices. Both address cybersecurity defense and information sharing, but the bill does not directly implement the IC-specific obligations like 'write to release' or real-time auditing fo"

Key themes:cybersecurityinformation sharingintelligencethreat defensegovernment-private sector coordination

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 248-250AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PILLAR Act focuses on cybersecurity grant funding for state and local governments, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasizes preventing politicization of intelligence analysis and FISA reforms. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address intelligence community neutrality, surveillance abuses, or FISA authorities."

Key themes:cybersecuritynational security

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 186-188AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PILLAR Act focuses on expanding cybersecurity grant funding and AI integration for state and local governments, while Project 2025 criticizes CISA for mission creep, particularly in censorship and election-related activities, and calls for narrowing its scope. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill expands CISA’s role in areas Project 2025 seeks to reduce."

Key themes:CISAcybersecurityfederal grants

— 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners — 155 — Department of Homeland Security and (2) national coordination of critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet CISA has rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong, the most recent and most glaring example being censorship of so-called misinformation and disinformation. CISA’s funding and resources should align narrowly with the foregoing two mission requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chem- ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be moved to FEMA; its school security functions should be transferred to state homeland security offices; and CISA should refrain from duplicating cybersecurity functions done elsewhere at the Department of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S. Secret Service. Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinforma- tion efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Commu- nity, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. At the time of this writing, release of the Twitter Files has demonstrated that CISA has devolved into an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political Left. In any event, the entirety of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee should be dismissed on Day One. For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for an election—but nothing more. This is of value to smaller localities, particularly by flagging who is attacking their websites. CISA should not be significantly involved closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda. U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG) Needed Reforms The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power compe- tition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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