The bill
DLARA
HR. 4238, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
ID: M001236
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 4238, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 786-788 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate. Read twice. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 448.
June 23, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Disaster Loan Accountability and Reform Act (DLARA) claims to improve accountability in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) disaster loan program. How quaint. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to pacify critics of the SBA's questionable lending practices while maintaining the status quo.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends various sections of the Small Business Act and other laws to:
1. Require monthly disaster loan reports from the SBA Administrator (because, apparently, they need a reminder to do their job). 2. Mandate separate budget requests for SBA disaster loans and COVID-EIDL loans (a clever way to obfuscate the true costs). 3. Impose limitations on disaster loans when funding is low (a token effort to appear fiscally responsible).
These changes are mere window dressing, designed to create the illusion of reform while allowing the SBA to continue its questionable practices.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. Small business owners: They'll be subjected to more bureaucratic red tape and potentially face stricter loan requirements. 2. SBA Administrator: Will have to deal with more paperwork and reporting requirements (oh, the horror!). 3. Congress: Gets to pretend they're doing something about disaster loan accountability while maintaining their grip on power.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The DLARA will likely:
1. Increase bureaucratic inefficiencies: More reporting requirements and red tape will slow down the already glacial pace of disaster loan disbursement. 2. Favor special interests: The bill's provisions will disproportionately benefit large corporations and well-connected small businesses, while leaving smaller, more vulnerable businesses behind. 3. Perpetuate crony capitalism: The SBA will continue to prioritize loans to politically connected businesses, ensuring that the wealthy and influential remain insulated from risk.
In conclusion, the DLARA is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to appease critics while maintaining the corrupt status quo. Congress should be ashamed of this farce, but they'll just pat themselves on the back for "doing something" about disaster loan accountability. How delightful.
Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 42 nodes and 32 connections (30 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $141,050
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.
— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 760 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 7953, Small Business Act, Public Law 85-536, 85th Congress, July 18, 1958, § 2, https://uscode.ecfr.io/ statutes/pl/85/536.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), amended by H.R. 4877, One Stop Shop for Small Business Compliance Act of 2021, Public Law 117-188, 117th Congress, October 20, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ188/PLAW-117publ188.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 2. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: Mission,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 3. Michael Faulkender, Robert Jackman, and Stephen I. Miran, “The Job-Preservation Effects of Paycheck Protection Program Loans,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, Working Paper No. 2020-01, December 2020, p. 9, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Job-Preservation-Effects- Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loans.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Kate Rogers, Scott Zamost, Karina Hernandez, and Jennifer Schlesinger, “As Pandemic Aid Was Rushed to Main Street, Criminals Seized on Covid Relief Programs,” CNBC, April 15, 2021, https://www.cnbc. com/2021/04/15/as-pandemic-aid-was-rushed-to-main-street-criminals-seized-on-ppp-eidl-.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. Kevin Brewer, “Bills Extend Statute of Limitation for Prosecuting PPP, EIDL Fraud,” Journal of Accountancy, August 10, 2022, https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2022/aug/bills-extend-statute-limitation- prosecuting-ppp-eidl-fraud.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. Sacha Pfeiffer, “Virtually All PPP Loans Have Been Forgiven with Limited Scrutiny,” NPR, October 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/12/1128207464/ppp-loans-loan-forgiveness-small-business#:~:text=As%20 COVID-19%20shutdowns%20threatened,early%20days%20of%20the%20pandemic (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: SBA History,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 8. President Richard Nixon, Executive Order 11518, “Providing for the Increased Representation of the Interests of Small Business Concerns Before Departments and Agencies of the United States Government,” March 20, 1970, in Federal Register, Vol. 35, No. 56 (March 21, 1970), pp. 4939–4940, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/ service/ll/fedreg/fr035/fr035056/fr035056.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 9. S. 3331, Small Business Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-386, 93rd Congress, August 23, 1974, https://www. congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg742.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 10. S. 299, Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law No. 96-354, 96th Congress, September 19, 1980, https://www. congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg1164.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 11. Maeve P. Carey, “The Regulatory Flex Act: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11900, August 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11900 (accessed February 18, 2023). 12. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “The Regulatory Flexibility Act,” https://advocacy.sba. gov/resources/the-regulatory-flexibility-act/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 13. H.R. 644, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-125, 114th Congress, February 24, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg122.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 14. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “Advocacy Releases Trade Report,” December 21, 2018, https://advocacy.sba.gov/2018/12/21/advocacy-releases-trade-report/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 15. Associated Press, “Reagan Offers $994-Billion ‘Hard-Choices’ 1987 Budget,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1986, http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-02-05-mn-4369-story.html (accessed February 18, 2023). 16. Testimony of Hon. Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, Small Business Administration, in hearing, The President’s FY 2006 Budget Request for the Small Business Administration, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 17, 2005, p. 8, https://books.google.com/ books?id=UwD-2ICa8k8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 18, 2023). See also Report No. 109-49, Summary of Legislative and Oversight Activities During the 108th Congress, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 2005, p. 21, https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt49/CRPT-109srpt49.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023).
— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.
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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.