The bill
Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025
HR. 386, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Sponsored by
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
ID: D000626
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 386, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 816-818 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
February 10, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant example of congressional theater, masquerading as policy. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025 is a masterclass in posturing, pretending to address China's alleged currency manipulation while actually doing nothing meaningful. The bill's primary objective is to create the illusion of action, allowing lawmakers to claim they're "tough on China" without actually risking any real confrontation.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to oppose an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), unless China meets certain conditions. These conditions are a joke, as they're based on certifications that can be easily gamed or ignored. The real purpose is to create a paper trail, allowing politicians to claim they've taken action.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: lawmakers seeking re-election, lobbyists for industries affected by Chinese trade practices, and the Treasury Department, which will have to pretend to take this bill seriously. China, of course, will ignore this posturing, as it has with similar bills in the past.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill is negligible, as it's designed to be a symbolic gesture rather than actual policy. The IMF will likely continue to make decisions based on its own interests and those of its member countries, rather than being swayed by this toothless legislation. China will continue to manage its currency as it sees fit, and the US will continue to whine about it without taking meaningful action.
In short, this bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease characterized by an excessive desire for self-aggrandizement, coupled with a complete lack of actual policy acumen. The symptoms are clear: politicians seeking to score cheap points, lobbyists pushing their own agendas, and voters being fed empty promises.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of cowardice. Prognosis: More of the same pointless posturing from Congress, while China continues to laugh all the way to the bank.
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001204
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 51 nodes and 23 connections (44 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $115,500
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2 implies potential restrictions on international financial transactions involving China, which could affect commercial banks' operations and profitability, particularly those with significant exposure to Chinese markets or trade finance activities.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 386 directly targets China's currency manipulation and trade practices—core elements of Project 2025's assessment of Communist China's economic aggression—by conditioning IMF SDR weight increases on compliance with international trade and currency rules."
— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly addresses China's currency manipulation and trade practices, which are central to Project 2025's characterization of Communist China's economic aggression and trade policy challenges."
— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut — 784 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of Communist Chinese exports in turn depresses world prices and pushes foreign rivals out of the global market—steel is a major example.20 Industrial policy tools that further reinforce Communist China’s mercantilist and protectionist trade policies include numerous direct and indirect subsidies to boost exports and the consolidation of heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises into “national champi- ons” that can compete with foreign companies in both domestic and global markets. Communist China also uses a predatory “debt trap” model of economic develop- ment aid that proffers substantial financing to developing countries in exchange for their willingness to mortgage their natural resources and allow Communist China access to their markets. The practical effect of this debt trap model is to give Com- munist China a competitive edge internationally that stems from its preferential access to relatively lower-cost commodities needed in the manufacturing process. These commodities range from bauxite, copper, and nickel to rarer commodities such as beryllium, titanium, and rare earth minerals. As a complement to this debt trap gambit and to exploit its commanding share of a wide range of critical raw materials that are essential to the global supply chain and production of high-technology and high-value-added products, Com- munist China strategically uses protectionist export restraints, including export quotas and export duties. These export restraints thereby restrict access to raw materials such as rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum that are essential in the high-technology production space. The result is to drive up world prices and thereby put pressure on American and other foreign downstream producers to move their operations, technologies, and jobs to Communist China. American industries that have been affected by Communist China’s export restraints range from steel, chemicals, and electric cars to wind turbines, lasers, semiconductors, and refrigerants. Technology-Forcing Policies. Table 6, extracted from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy’s report on Communist China’s economic aggression,21 provides a summary of the various policies the Chinese Communist Party uses to force the transfer of the West’s technologies to Communist Chinese soil. Formally, Communist Chinese industrial policy seeks to promote the “diges- tion, absorption, and re-innovation” of technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world.22 As noted in Table 6, this policy is carried out, for example, through state-spon- sored IP theft—coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology transfer, typically in exchange for limited access to the Chinese market. Commu- nist China’s looting of American technology is further enhanced by “information harvesting” conducted by Communist Chinese nationals who infiltrate U.S. uni- versities, national laboratories, and other centers of innovation. Strategic sectors targeted by Communist Chinese economic espionage have included electronics, telecommunications, robotics, data services, pharmaceuticals, mobile phone
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section address China-related economic concerns, but HR 386 focuses on IMF SDR basket weight and currency manipulation, while the Project 2025 text centers on pension investment prohibitions, disclosure requirements, and multiemployer plan reforms. The thematic overlap is limited to general China economic policy and financial oversight."
— 609 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies l DOL should exercise its oversight of the FRTIB to prohibit investments in China. l Congress should enact legislation prohibiting investment of the TSP in China. PENSION REFORMS. Public Pension Plan Disclosure. Residents of states that responsibly manage their public pension plans (pension plans for State and local government employ- ees) should not be responsible for bailing out states that do not do so. Money is ultimately fungible, so federal aid to States can effectively be used to free up other State funds for pension contributions. Although the federal government does not impose funding rules on public pension plans, these plans should be required to disclose the fair market value of plan assets and liabilities (using the Treasury yield curve as the discount rate) on an annual basis. In the aggregate, these plans were underfunded on a market basis by $6.501 trillion as of Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, even though the plans reported underfunding of only $1.076 trillion using overly optimistic assumptions. l Disclose the fair market value of plan assets and liabilities. Congress should require public pension funds to disclose the fair market value of plan assets and liabilities (using the Treasury yield curve as the discount rate) on an annual basis. Multiemployer Plans. At the request of multiemployer union pension plans, the government has given such plans much more lenient rules and discretion over funding than it has given to single-employer plans. Multiemployer plans have been severely mismanaged, and the plans have abused the discretion and deference given them by federal law and enforcement agencies to make promises that they cannot keep. As a result, these plans are generally severely underfunded, with $757 billion in aggregate underfunding, and a funding level of just 42 percent. The Biden Admin- istration has provided a massive taxpayer bailout to some of these plans, but without any needed reforms. Even worse, it gave out funds in excess of what the law allows. l Congress should reform multiemployer pensions to give participants in these plans the same protections as those in single-employer plans. Liabilities should be measured similarly to single-employer plans. Workers should be able to earn benefits at any employer in the plan, but liabilities should be divided amongst employers, instead of the current illusory joint and several liability under which no one is ultimately responsible for making up underfunding. Troubled plans should be prohibited from — 610 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise making new pension promises. More timely and detailed reporting should be imposed. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor- poration (PBGC) insures benefits for private sector pension plans, with separate single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs. l The PBGC’s annual report must be submitted on time, and with timely data that uses fair-market value principles to calculate the PBGC’s finances. The PBGC has been submitting portions of statutorily required annual reports many months late and using out-of-date data. And PBGC's data on plans is almost five years old. These problematic practices make it difficult for Congress to become aware of serious problems in the insurance programs, which received a bailout of over $85 billion in the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act. The PBGC should use existing statutory authority to protect workers, retirees, employers, and taxpayers by closely monitoring and taking appropriate remedial action with regard to badly run and underfunded multiemployer union pension plans, including termination where appropriate. The PBGC's refusal to use such authority helped cause its multiemployer program deficit to go from less than $500 million in 2008 to over $65 billion in 2017. l Congress should increase the variable rate premium on underfunding and eliminate the per-participant cap in order to appropriately take into account risk and limit the degree to which well-funded pension plans must subsidize underfunded plans. Reforms should proportionately reduce the fixed per-participant premium to ease the burden on well-funded plans and also increase premiums on multiemployer plans to match single-employer plans. Improving Access to Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are ERISA-covered employee retirement savings plans that allow employees to receive compensation in the form of equity in their employer business. These arrangements enable employees to formally partici- pate as investors in how their employers’ businesses are run. And they also align employer–employee incentives by giving employees a greater financial stake in the success of their employers. With over half of small businesses owned by business owners over the age of 55, ESOPs also create advantageous succession oppor- tunities that support the continuity of local businesses and regional economic
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.