To prohibit the District of Columbia from requiring tribunals in court or administrative proceedings in the District of Columbia to defer to the Mayor of the District of Columbia's interpretation of statutes and regulations, and for other purposes.

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Bill ID: 119/hr/3766
Last Updated: July 22, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Hageman, Harriet M. [R-WY-At Large]

ID: H001096

Follow the money

The bill

To prohibit the District of Columbia from requiring tribunals in court or administrative proceedings in the District of Columbia to defer to the Mayor of the District of Columbia's interpretation of statutes and regulations, and for other purposes.

HR. 3766, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Hageman, Harriet M. [R-WY-At Large]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$99,500 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

40% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 565.

May 12, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 3766 Reported in House (RH)]

<DOC>

Union Calendar No. 565 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 3766

[Report No. 119-650]

To prohibit the District of Columbia from requiring tribunals in court or administrative proceedings in the District of Columbia to defer to the Mayor of the District of Columb...

Related Topics

Congressional Rules & Procedures
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Hageman, Harriet M. [R-WY-At Large]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$99,500
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$99,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$0

No PAC contributions found

1
CHEROKEE NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
2
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
3
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$6,600
4
MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE
2 transactions
$6,600
5
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY OPERATIONS ACCOUNT
2 transactions
$6,600
6
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
7
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
8
THE TULALIP TRIBES OF WASHINGTON
2 transactions
$6,600
9
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND MIWOK INDIANS
2 transactions
$5,800
10
COW CREEK BAND OF UMPQUA TRIBE OF INDIANS
1 transaction
$5,000
11
PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,700
12
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
13
HPUL PROJECT OPERATIONS
1 transaction
$3,300
14
MOORETOWN RANCHERIA
1 transaction
$3,300
15
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
16
AQUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS GENERAL FUND
1 transaction
$3,300
17
PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
18
PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,300
19
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$3,300
20
PUEBLO OF LAGUNA
1 transaction
$3,300
21
ONEIDA INDIAN NATION
1 transaction
$2,500

No committee contributions found

No individual contributions found

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

ID: F000471

Top Contributors

10

1
HENDRICKS, DIANE M
ABC • OWNER
IndividualBELOIT, WI
$6,600
Jun 25, 2023
2
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION LLC • OWNER
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 16, 2023
3
ROWAN, MARC J.
APOLLO GLOBAL • CEO
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 16, 2023
4
SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN
BLACKSTONE • CEO AND CHAIRMAN
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Nov 13, 2023
5
SCHMIDT, TIM
DELTA DEFENSE LLC • CEO
IndividualWEST BEND, WI
$6,600
Dec 10, 2023
6
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Nov 13, 2023
7
LEVY, EDWARD
EDWARD C. LEVY CO • CHAIRMAN
IndividualBIRMINGHAM, MI
$6,600
May 1, 2024
8
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMU, .
TRIBE • TRIBE
IndividualCRANDON, WI
$6,600
Jun 28, 2024
9
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
Jun 2, 2024
10
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
Jun 2, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Hageman, Harriet M. [R-WY-At Large]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 75 nodes and 33 connections (88 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $119,300

Top Donors - Rep. Hageman, Harriet M. [R-WY-At Large]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

21 Orgs

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal
Vector: 56%
Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill concerns prohibiting the District of Columbia from requiring deference to the Mayor in court or administrative proceedings, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 policy section on the Federal Communications Commission, which focuses on FCC authority, spectrum auctions, Section 230 interpretation, and leadership structure."

— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Minimal
Vector: 55%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill addresses District of Columbia tribunal deference to the Mayor, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 objective of reforming or abolishing the CFPB and financial regulatory agencies."

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely.

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal
Vector: 54%
Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill addresses District of Columbia tribunal deference to the Mayor, which is unrelated to the Federal Communications Commission policies outlined in Project 2025."

— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). — 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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