Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/3632
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Griffith, H. Morgan [R-VA-9]

ID: G000568

Follow the money

The bill

Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025

HR. 3632, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.

The sponsor

Rep. Griffith, H. Morgan [R-VA-9]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$66,000 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 434-436 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

December 16, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025 - a bill so cleverly crafted, it's almost as if they want us to believe it's actually about ensuring power plant reliability.

Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**New regulations being created or modified:** Ah, yes! The bill amends the Federal Power Act to require owners or operators of generating facilities to provide notice of planned retirements of certain electric generating units. How noble. But what's really happening here is that they're creating a new regulatory framework to justify bailing out struggling power plants.

**Affected industries and sectors:** The usual suspects - public utilities, transmission organizations, and state commissions. You know, the ones who will be "regulated" into submission by this bill. Meanwhile, the real beneficiaries are the fossil fuel lobby and their friends in Congress.

**Compliance requirements and timelines:** Oh boy, it's a regulatory nightmare! Owners or operators of generating facilities must provide notice of planned retirements at least 180 days prior to the retirement date. And if they don't comply? Well, that's where the "enforcement mechanisms" come into play (more on that later). The bill also establishes a 5-year term for orders, rules, and regulations, with an option for extension because, you know, 5 years just isn't enough time to figure out how to actually make power plants reliable.

**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ah, the fun part! If owners or operators fail to comply, they might face... wait for it... a hearing! Yes, that's right. A hearing. Where they'll be forced to explain themselves to the Commission. Oh, the horror! And if they still don't comply? Well, there are no actual penalties mentioned in the bill, but I'm sure the Commission will come up with something suitably toothless.

**Economic and operational impacts:** Let's just say this bill is a gift to the fossil fuel industry. By requiring notice of planned retirements, it creates an artificial barrier to transitioning away from dirty energy sources. And by allowing for extensions of orders, rules, and regulations, it ensures that power plants can keep on polluting for years to come.

In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in regulatory capture, designed to prop up the fossil fuel industry at the expense of actual power plant reliability and environmental protection. It's a disease masquerading as a cure - a classic case of "legislative lupus," where the symptoms are treated while the underlying illness (corruption, greed, and stupidity) is left unchecked.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.

Related Topics

Energy Production & ConservationClimate Change & Sustainability
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Griffith, H. Morgan [R-VA-9]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$66,000
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
RAY, RICHIE
2 transactions
$6,600
2
CRANE, DAVID
2 transactions
$6,600
3
BUNN, JAMES O.
1 transaction
$3,300
4
CHARLES, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
5
HAMER, JONATHAN S.
1 transaction
$3,300
6
JOURNAY, JUSTIN
1 transaction
$3,300
7
PATEL, GOPESH
1 transaction
$3,300
8
WORLEY, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BLUMENFELD, JACOB
1 transaction
$3,300
10
MORRISSEY, DENISE HENRY
1 transaction
$3,300
11
SPARKS, L. DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
12
MORRISEY, DENISE HENRY
1 transaction
$3,300
13
BARNETTE, JAMES R.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
UIHLEIN, RICHARD E.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
WILLCOX, DARREN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
FAISON, JAY W.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
GILLIAM, MARVIN
1 transaction
$3,300
18
MONTGOMERY, H. RONNIE
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Carter, Earl L. "Buddy" [R-GA-1]

ID: C001103

Top Contributors

23

1
SAVANNAH TOYOTA
OrganizationSAVANNAH, GA
$1,000
Oct 26, 2024
2
SAVANNAH TOYOTA
OrganizationSAVANNAH, GA
$1,000
Sep 26, 2024
3
TYBEE MARKET
OrganizationTYBEE ISLAND, GA
$500
Mar 6, 2024
4
SMITH, BYRON L.
IndividualRICHMOND HILL, GA
$5,000
Nov 5, 2024
5
MUNOZ, DONALD
NUCANA • CFO
IndividualWESTON, MA
$4,665
May 31, 2024
6
RICKS, DAVID A.
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY • CEO
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
7
SADOWSKI, GARY T.
SADOWSKI CO • CPA
IndividualSAVANNAH, GA
$3,300
Aug 25, 2023
8
STEERE, WILLIAM C. JR.
NONE • RETIRED
IndividualBONITA SPRINGS, FL
$3,300
Aug 3, 2023
9
HENNESSY, MARK W.
HENNESSY AUTOMOBILE COMPANIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualATLANTA, GA
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
10
KIMBELL, JEFFREY
SELF-EMPLOYED • HEALTH CARE CONSULTANT
IndividualPARK CITY, UT
$3,300
Oct 30, 2024

Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]

ID: O000019

Top Contributors

34

1
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Dec 18, 2023
2
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Nov 11, 2024
3
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Mar 31, 2024
4
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Jun 6, 2023
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Jun 20, 2023
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$3,300
Jun 6, 2023
7
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Apr 14, 2023
8
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
9
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Sep 16, 2024
10
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationPLACERVILLE, CA
$2,000
Oct 24, 2023

Rep. Onder, Robert F. [R-MO-3]

ID: O000177

Top Contributors

20

1
O'BRIEN, FRANK
O'BRIEN INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS • OWNER
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 31, 2024
2
ONDER, JAMES G
ONDERLAW, LLC • ATTORNEY
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 26, 2024
3
BURNS, ROBERT
PATRIOT MACHINE • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualCHESTERFIELD, MO
$13,200
Sep 5, 2024
4
POGUE, RICHARD W.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualWRIGHT CITY, MO
$13,200
Jun 20, 2024
5
SCHULTE, STEVE
HENGES INTERIORS • OWNER
IndividualWELDON SPRING, MO
$13,200
May 8, 2024
6
MUELLER, DOUGLAS
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualO FALLON, MO
$10,000
Mar 6, 2024
7
OBRIEN, JOHN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualLAKE ST LOUIS, MO
$10,000
Mar 11, 2024
8
SMITH, MENLO
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCHESTERFIELD, MO
$7,500
Mar 21, 2024
9
STOFFA, ROBERT
WINDBER HOSPITAL • PHYSICIAN
IndividualLIGONIER, PA
$6,870
Mar 28, 2024
10
KOVAC, AMY
BAIN CO • BUSINESS CONSULTANT
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,818
Mar 30, 2024

Rep. Miller, Carol D. [R-WV-1]

ID: M001205

Top Contributors

20

1
SCHUMACHER, AMANDA
SCHUMACHER AUTO • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualWEST PALM BEACH, FL
$25,000
May 17, 2023
2
HALL, DANIEL
HALL STRATEGIES LLC • GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS CONSULTANT
IndividualBOLT, WV
$6,600
Mar 14, 2024
3
GONZALEZ, JULIO
GONZALEZ FAMILY OFFICE • FOUNDER/PRINCIPAL
IndividualLAKE WORTH BEACH, FL
$5,000
Jan 20, 2024
4
DUNCAN, ALEXANDER
IndividualCALDWELL, WV
$3,900
Aug 8, 2024
5
WAID, CHARLIE
CHARTER BROKERAGE LLC • CEO
IndividualKATY, TX
$3,409
May 12, 2024
6
LAMPTON, LESLIE III
ERGON INC. • OWNER/DIRECTOR
IndividualJACKSON, MS
$3,300
Nov 16, 2023
7
FARRELL, PATRICK MR.
SERVICE PUMP AND SUPPLY • OWNER/EXECUTIVE
IndividualHUNTINGTON, WV
$3,300
Dec 4, 2023
8
CHAN, ANNIE
KCR DEVELOPMENT • FOUNDER
IndividualHONOLULU, HI
$3,300
Dec 29, 2023
9
RICHARDS, WAYNE
GR ENERGY SERVICES • CEO
IndividualRICHMOND, TX
$3,300
Dec 29, 2023
10
MOSS, STEPHEN
APEX PIPELINE SERVICES INC. • PRESIDENT & CEO
IndividualLIBERTY, WV
$3,300
Feb 1, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Griffith, H. Morgan [R-VA-9]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 40 nodes and 41 connections

Total contributions: $41

Top Donors - Rep. Griffith, H. Morgan [R-VA-9]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.

  • +Electric Utilitiesconfidence 0.90

    Section 207(a)(2)(B)(i) allows the Commission to require continuing operation of an electric generating unit, which benefits electric utilities by ensuring continued revenue from generation assets; also subsection (a)(2)(B)(ii) requires development of transmission plans that support utility service.

  • Section 207(a)(2)(B)(ii) mandates that affected State commissions, Transmission Organizations, or public utilities develop and implement long-term plans for interstate transmission facilities, directly benefiting energy infrastructure operators involved in transmission planning and construction.

  • −Coal Miningconfidence 0.70

    Section 207(b)(1) requires advance notice of planned retirements of generating units >=5 MW, making it harder for coal plant owners to retire units quickly, potentially imposing costs on coal-dependent generators and thus harming coal mining demand.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Strong
Vector: 69%
Pages: 434-436AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 3632 aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on grid reliability by requiring advance notice of generator retirements and empowering FERC to mandate continued operation of generating units, long-term transmission planning, and cost recovery—directly supporting resource diversity and reliability of dispatchable generation. The bill also addresses reserve margin adequacy and natural gas interdependence by ensuring backup capacity and compensation for reliability services."

Key themes:resource diversityreserve margin reformdispatchable generationFERC authoritynatural gas interdependence

— 401 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions nation in the summer110 and winter.111 Cyber and physical attacks also threaten the grid. Specific areas for reform include the following: l Limit the impact of subsidized renewables on price formation. Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs. The increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support the reliable dispatchable generation that is needed to serve the grid at all times.112 l Reform the application of reserve margins. Reserve margins have become largely meaningless. Traditionally, the electric industry has used “reserve margins” to ensure that the grid has enough power plants to guarantee reliability. Generally, reserve margins represent the amount of generation available (power plants) to meet peak electric demand (the time of day and year when people are using the most electricity) plus a percentage of additional generation for backup.113 However, given the increasing number of intermittent resources (like solar, which may be available during the heat of the day but disappears as the sun sets), other dispatchable generation needs to be available to meet customers’ electricity requirements. Therefore, the definitions and calculations of reserve margins and peak load need to be updated to focus on the modern grid’s reliability challenges for all times of the day and year. l Recognize the interdependence of electric generation and natural gas. The interdependence of electric generation and natural gas pipelines continues to grow. Given natural gas’s important role in generating electricity, especially as backup when renewables are not available, lack of natural gas pipelines or attacks on existing pipelines could threaten our ability to generate electricity. l Expand resource diversity and reliability. Resource diversity is needed to support grid reliability. Pressure to use 100 percent renewables or non– carbon emitting resources threatens the electric grid’s reliability. A grid that has access to dispatchable resources such as coal, nuclear, and natural gas for generating power is inherently more reliable and resilient. l Protect against cyber and physical attacks. The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. The attacks with guns on substations in North Carolina in December 2022 that left customers without power demonstrate the grid’s vulnerability.114 — 402 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies l Reform RTOs to require reliability. FERC should direct RTOs to establish reliability pricing for eligible dispatchable generation resources or require intermittent resources to procure backup power for times when they are not available to operate. In addition, Congress should repeal subsidies for generation resources. l Update the definition and calculation of reserve margins to support reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE should revise the definition of reserve margins to ensure the grid’s reliability throughout the day and the year. This will mean recognizing that reserve margins may need to consider “net peak” and exclude non-dispatchable resources from inclusion in reserve margin calculations. l Expand and protect natural gas infrastructure in support of electric generation. FERC needs to ensure that its consideration of natural gas pipeline applications recognizes the role that natural gas plays in electric reliability. FERC also needs to make sure that RTO pricing mechanisms support generators that need to contract for natural gas service on a firm basis. l Support resource diversity and reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE play key roles in balancing consumer, industrial, and national defense interests to ensure an ongoing reliable, plentiful, and accessible national electricity supply. NERC reliability reviews and FERC’s reliability roles should be aware that overreliance on any one power generation fuel source entails concurrent cost and availability risk. FERC should reform market rules that unduly discriminate against dispatchable resources needed for reliability. l Strengthen security against cyber and physical threats. FERC and NERC need to enhance the security of the bulk power system by, for example, banning Chinese-made components, investing in transformers, and hardening substations and other critical infrastructure. DOE should play a leading role in identifying and addressing threats to the grid. FERC: RTOS/ISOS AND “ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS” Mission/Overview For more than 20 years, FERC has issued regulations and directed policies for the creation and operation of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) to manage the dispatch of generation and

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 434-436AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 3632 strengthens FERC's ability to ensure reliable electric service by requiring advance notice of retirements and allowing FERC to mandate continued operation of generating units, which aligns with Project 2025's focus on reliability reforms, supporting dispatchable resources, and adjusting market rules to uphold grid adequacy."

Key themes:reliabilityFERC authoritydispatchable generationresource adequacymarket reform

— 402 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies l Reform RTOs to require reliability. FERC should direct RTOs to establish reliability pricing for eligible dispatchable generation resources or require intermittent resources to procure backup power for times when they are not available to operate. In addition, Congress should repeal subsidies for generation resources. l Update the definition and calculation of reserve margins to support reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE should revise the definition of reserve margins to ensure the grid’s reliability throughout the day and the year. This will mean recognizing that reserve margins may need to consider “net peak” and exclude non-dispatchable resources from inclusion in reserve margin calculations. l Expand and protect natural gas infrastructure in support of electric generation. FERC needs to ensure that its consideration of natural gas pipeline applications recognizes the role that natural gas plays in electric reliability. FERC also needs to make sure that RTO pricing mechanisms support generators that need to contract for natural gas service on a firm basis. l Support resource diversity and reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE play key roles in balancing consumer, industrial, and national defense interests to ensure an ongoing reliable, plentiful, and accessible national electricity supply. NERC reliability reviews and FERC’s reliability roles should be aware that overreliance on any one power generation fuel source entails concurrent cost and availability risk. FERC should reform market rules that unduly discriminate against dispatchable resources needed for reliability. l Strengthen security against cyber and physical threats. FERC and NERC need to enhance the security of the bulk power system by, for example, banning Chinese-made components, investing in transformers, and hardening substations and other critical infrastructure. DOE should play a leading role in identifying and addressing threats to the grid. FERC: RTOS/ISOS AND “ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS” Mission/Overview For more than 20 years, FERC has issued regulations and directed policies for the creation and operation of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) to manage the dispatch of generation and — 403 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions transmission of electricity.115 Under the misnomer “electric power markets,” these regulatory constructs use marginal price clearing auctions (in some cases both hourly day-ahead auctions and five-minute day-of-need auctions) and locational marginal pricing to procure electric generation and set prices to meet the needs of the grid. Some RTOs also have capacity auctions. Of the nation’s seven RTOs, six are subject to FERC jurisdiction (but not ERCOT in Texas). Areas without an RTO include the Southeast and portions of the West (although California is in an RTO). Needed Reforms Too many conservatives have assumed that because RTOs are described as “electric power markets,” market forces of supply and demand set electric prices and benefit customers. RTOs are complex regulatory constructs (with rules set by FERC) that obscure government interference and preferences for preferred resources. Furthermore, government preferences and subsidies for resources like wind and solar distort price formation for electricity that is undermining the reli- ability of the grid. Finally, customers are not seeing the full economic benefits that non-fuel, subsidized resources should provide. Additionally: l Electric reliability is threatened in many RTOs. As subsidized renewables (like wind and solar receiving tax credits) and state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) programs have disrupted market functions, price distortions have driven out reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, natural gas, and nuclear generation in various RTOs. The result: Electric reliability is decreasing in many parts of the country.116 As noted, FERC and NERC have been studying the potential for summer and winter shortages.117 l RTOs are not providing the full economic benefits of renewables to customers. Because RTOs use marginal price auctions where natural gas usually sets the clearing price paid to all generators, the economic benefits of renewables (no fuel, tax credits, etc.) are flowing mainly to renewables investors and not to customers (although customers do benefit from some decrease in marginal costs). Yet reliability is decreasing, so customers are getting the worst of both worlds, paying more for electricity and having less reliability for the money. l Big Green and Big Tech want RTO expansion. Renewable developers, large industrial users, and Big Tech tend to want RTO expansion for their own economic and ESG reasons. These entities can benefit economically from the complexity and marginal pricing regime of the RTOs. Increased costs and reliability problems are often shifted to other customers.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 437-439AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 3632 aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on FERC prioritizing grid reliability, ensuring dispatchable resources are valued, and reforming RTO market structures to serve customers over special interests. The bill's provisions on advance retirement notices, FERC authority to mandate continued operation of generating units, and cost compensation mechanisms directly support the policy goal of maintaining reliable, affordable electricity through market reforms that favor dispatchable generat"

Key themes:FERC authoritygrid reliabilitydispatchable resourcesRTO reformcost compensation

— 404 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC. Even then, however, accountability is indirect through the tariffs (rules) that the RTOs adopt and FERC approves. In addition, unlike utilities, generators in an RTO have no obligation to serve customers. New Policies FERC must make reliability of the grid and service to end use top priorities. To do so, it should: l Reexamine the premise of RTOs. RTOs no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people. Marginal price auctions for energy are not ensuring the reliability of the grid and are not passing the full economic benefits of subsidized renewables on to customers. FERC needs to reexamine the RTOs under its jurisdiction to make sure that they procure reliable and affordable electricity for the benefit of the American people. l Ensure that RTOs return to market fundamentals so that they serve customers, not special interests and political causes. FERC should require RTOs to ensure that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued to provide electricity when needed for the benefit of customers. Potential reforms could include: 1. Requiring renewable generators to provide intra-day backup by dispatchable on-demand generation so that bids by intermittent resources into RTOs equate fairly with far more valuable on-demand dispatchable resources; 2. Creating dual energy markets for dispatchable and nondispatchable resources; or 3. Eliminating capacity markets where intermittent resources participate and instead establishing “reliability” markets where dispatchable on-demand resources participate. Alternatives to marginal price auctions also should be considered. l Direct the RTOs to ensure that the economic benefits of renewables (like tax credits and no fuel costs) are passed on to customers. — 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to:

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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