The bill
Bringing the Discount Window into the 21st Century Act
HR. 3390, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Sponsored by
Rep. De La Cruz, Monica [R-TX-15]
ID: D000594
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 3390, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Housing and Urban Development" section, p. 548-550 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
February 10, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who thought the Affordable Care Act was a good idea. Let's dissect this monstrosity.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The "Bringing the Discount Window into the 21st Century Act" is a laughable attempt to modernize the Federal Reserve's discount window, which provides emergency loans to banks during times of financial stress. The bill's sponsors claim it will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of this process. Yeah, right. It's just a fancy way of saying "we want to make it easier for banks to get cheap money from the Fed."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill requires the Federal Reserve Board to conduct a review of the discount window operations within 60 days and implement improvements within 240 days. Wow, that's lightning-fast for government work! The review will consider various aspects, including technology infrastructure, cybersecurity, communication between banks and regulators, and (gasp!) the stigma associated with using the discount window.
The bill also mandates a remediation plan to address any deficiencies identified during the review. Because, you know, the Fed has never been known for its ability to self-regulate or make sound decisions without congressional prodding.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
Banks and financial institutions will be thrilled to know that this bill might make it easier for them to get cheap loans from the Fed during times of stress. Regulators, like the Federal Reserve Board, will have more work to do in conducting reviews and implementing improvements. And taxpayers? Well, they'll just foot the bill for any potential losses or bailouts.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a cosmetic fix that doesn't address the underlying issues with the discount window or the Fed's role in propping up the financial system. By making it easier for banks to access cheap money, we're just encouraging more reckless behavior and increasing the risk of another financial crisis.
In short, this bill is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a half-baked attempt to address a complex issue, driven by special interests and a desire to look busy rather than actually solve problems. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create a bill that's both unnecessary and potentially disastrous.
Rep. De La Cruz, Monica [R-TX-15]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001204
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000491
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 64 nodes and 29 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $112,131
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2 requires the Federal Reserve Board to review and improve discount window operations, which provides liquidity to financial institutions, including commercial banks, especially during financial stress. This is a clear benefit (enhanced access to liquidity).
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. De La Cruz, Monica [R-TX-15])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on modernizing the Federal Reserve's discount window to improve liquidity provision and cybersecurity, which is unrelated to the HUD-focused Project 2025 objectives concerning housing market reforms, DEI/CRT/ESG policies, foreign influence on housing, and regulatory delays in construction. Any connection is only indirect through general financial stability effects on housing markets."
— 515 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 25. Process must prioritize where political leadership can implement administrative reforms through regulatory action and subregulatory guidance reforms. 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation’s housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. 27. These initiatives are maintained under such designations as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); critical race theory (CRT); black, indigenous, Pacific Islander, and other people of color (BIPOC); and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). 28. At a minimum, these efforts duplicate what the federal government already collects and assesses; at worst, they institute arbitrary procedures in real estate appraisal practices that undermine integrity and perversely introduce arbitrary biases into what should be an unbiased system for determining financial value. 29. Revise regulatory and subregulatory guidance, where applicable within statutory authorities, that adds unnecessary delay and costs to the construction and development of new housing and has been estimated to account for about 40 percent of new housing unit costs in multifamily housing. 30. The Biden Administration has issued a proposed rule to replace the Trump Administration’s “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice” rule that had repealed earlier rules expanding AFFH enforcement. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 153 (August 7, 2020), pp. 47899–47912, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-07/pdf/2020-16320.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 27 (February 9, 2023), pp. 8516–8590, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-17032.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 31. Certain pilot initiatives may encourage greater take-up of loan products designed for faster equity accumulation, including loans with shorter terms and accelerated amortization schedules. In concept, the FHA’s Home Equity Accelerator Loan (HEAL) and Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) pilot initiatives might lead to meaningful wealth generation for first-time buyers, but they should be available to all eligible households only when they do not arbitrarily discriminate based on race or other characteristics. 32. Housing supply does remain a problem in the U.S., but constructing more units at the low end of the market will not solve the problem. Investors and developers can deliver at more efficient cost new units that will allow for greater upward mobility of rental and ownership housing stock and better target increased construction of mid-tier rental units. Further, and more fundamental to the housing supply challenge in markets across the U.S., localities can consider revising land use, zoning, and building regulations that constrict new housing development, adding time delays and costs that impede construction. Federal housing policy should get out of the way where possible and minimize the distortive impact that stimulating greater demand through loose lending can have in driving up housing prices for households that are looking for affordable entry into the housing market. 33. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 91 (May 10, 2019), pp. 20589–20595, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-10/pdf/2019-09566.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 34. Reforms should contemplate rent payment flexibilities, allow escrow savings, and set maximum term limits that can reduce implicit penalties for increasing household incomes over eligibility terms for housing assistance and reweight waiting-list prioritization for two-parent households. 35. Some PHAs have been able to implement work requirements and term limit policies in various congressionally authorized demonstration programs, notably the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program established in 1996 for 39 PHAs (Congress has since authorized another 100 PHAs) in which participating MTW PHAs were given authority to implement rent reforms, work requirements and other experimental policies in rental assistance programs along with flexibilities in the use of capital and operating appropriations. 36. The FSS program has a general five-year term with a possible two-year extension, which could be applied at the term limit for overall benefits, and certain PHAs have imposed five-year to seven-year term limits. Families in these programs build escrow savings during their term eligibility that helps to facilitate successful transitions to family self-sufficiency and unassisted housing. — 516 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 37. HUD should implement administrative changes in regulation and guidance and seek statutory authority to end all Housing First directives of Continuum of Care (CoC) grantees and contract homelessness providers in addition to establishing restrictions on local Housing First policies where HUD grant funds are used. 38. The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) was established in the 1990s, and numerous Administrations have devoted enormous resources to the Housing First model, experimenting with various ways to provide federally financed rapid rehousing and permanent housing opportunities. Housing First is a far-left idea premised on the belief that homelessness is primarily circumstantial rather than behavioral. The Housing First answer to homelessness is to give someone a house instead of attempting to understand the underlying causes of homelessness. Federal intervention centered on Housing First has failed to acknowledge that resolving the issue of homelessness is often a matter of resolving mental health and substance abuse challenges. Instead of the permanent supportive housing proffered by Housing First, a conservative Administration should shift to transitional housing with a focus on addressing the underlying issues that cause homelessness in the first place. 39. The Senate Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers (LIFT) Act would address this policy goal. See S. 2797, Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers Act of 2021 (LIFT Homebuyers Act of 2021), 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s2797/BILLS-117s2797is.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 40. FHA did not facilitate the widespread use of 30-year mortgages until the 1950s when, interacting with Federal Reserve policies, federal agencies began broader adoption of the mortgages, which, despite lowering the monthly repayment terms, result in slow equity accumulation and wealth-building opportunities. 41. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 fundamentally revised the scope of federal regulation in the nation’s housing finance system, placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the purview of a newly established Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and establishing a Housing Trust Fund (HTF) that is administered in the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development. See H.R. 3221, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-289, 110th Congress, July 30, 2008, https://www.congress. gov/110/plaws/publ289/PLAW-110publ289.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 42. Guiding questions: What reforms should be proposed that could be accomplished within five years? What reforms can be done administratively, and what reforms would need legislative authorization? Are there functions that HUD administers that could be achieved more effectively at another department or agency? What big-picture reforms should be proposed that might take more than five years that would reorganize HUD and its programs to meet the objectives in the vision or mission? What would occur in the absence of these public finance subsidies? How much crowd-out do these subsidies create in the market? Would America be a seriously underhoused nation without these subsidies? Who are the policies intended to benefit? What organizational changes must be made? 43. The Faircloth Amendment (Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998) amended the Housing Act of 1937 to maintain public housing units at 1999 levels, preventing housing authorities from maintaining more public housing than they did then. H.R. 4194, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105-276, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ276/PLAW-105publ276.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). In recent years, the statutory restriction on new construction of public housing units has been circumvented through some narrow uses of preservation programs such as the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, initially authorized in 2012 and reauthorized several times since under higher program unit conversion caps. Congress also provided paths for renewal and continuation of a portion of existing public housing; project/site-based housing stock (refinancing with long-term HAP contract commitments); and Section 8 units through the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRA). H.R. 2158, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Public Law No. 105-65, 105th Congress, October 27, 1997, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ65/PLAW-105publ65.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 44. As the evolution of HUD rental assistance transitions away from the public housing model toward housing choice vouchers, there should be adequate landlord participation to ensure that the supply of housing units for rent in these programs meets the demand for rent among eligible tenants. This issue has been addressed in various ways, including by a task force instituted at the department during the Trump Administration, but could likely remain a challenge in the administration of the program.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the HUD section emphasize modernizing financial operations, improving technology and oversight, and enhancing accountability, but they apply to different agencies (Federal Reserve vs. HUD) and policy domains (liquidity lending vs. housing assistance), resulting in only tangential thematic overlap."
— 512 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise housing model. At best, any new public investments will provide maintenance funds to bring substandard housing units and properties up to livability standards but will still fail to address larger aims of upward mobility and dynamism for local housing markets where land can be sold by PHAs and put to greater economic use, thereby benefiting entire local economies through greater private investment, productivity and employment opportunities, and increased tax revenue. Any long-term view of HUD’s future must include maintaining the strong financial operations and reliable reporting that are needed to run a $50 billion- per-year agency. Before the Trump Administration, HUD effectively did not have a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for eight years, and HUD’s financial infrastructure inevitably deteriorated. The department’s auditors were unable to conclude that HUD’s internal operations were producing accurate financial reporting. The audi- tors had identified multiple material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the department’s internal financial controls. Overall, the deterioration of HUD’s financial infrastructure led to a lack of accountability with respect to the use of taxpayer funds as well as to pervasive difficulties with operations and program implementation. However, by hiring a new CFO from the private sector with a proven track record of visionary leadership, HUD was able to implement an agencywide governance structure that improved its financial processes and internal controls and harnessed the power of innovative new technologies to bring a modernized business mindset to the agency’s financial infrastructure. By the end of the Trump Administration, for the first time in nearly a decade, HUD was able to address all of its previously identified material weaknesses, and the auditors were able to issue their first clean audit report on HUD’s financial statements and internal controls. Finally, and more fundamentally, Congress could consider a wholesale overhaul of HUD that contemplates devolving many HUD functions to states and localities with any remaining federal functions consolidated to other federal agencies (for example, by transferring loan guarantee programs to SBA; moving Indian housing programs to the Department of the Interior; moving rental assistance, mortgage insurance programs, and GNMA to a redesignated Housing and Home Finance Agency). Generally, this reform path could consolidate some programs, elimi- nate others that have failed to produce meaningful long-run results, and narrow the scope of many programs so that they are closer to what they were when they were created. — 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on modernizing the Federal Reserve's discount window operations through technological and procedural improvements, while Project 2025's Federal Reserve section emphasizes appointing a commission to reevaluate the Fed's mission and structure and opposing a central bank digital currency. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address CBDC opposition or structural reform of the Fed, but both concern Federal Reserve operations and financial system stability."
— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.