Financial Institution Regulatory Tailoring Enhancement Act

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/hr/3230
Last Updated: June 10, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

ID: B001282

Follow the money

The bill

Financial Institution Regulatory Tailoring Enhancement Act

HR. 3230, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$92,054 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 869-871 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 132.

June 19, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who thought subprime mortgages were a great idea. Let's dissect this trainwreck.

Meet HR 3230, the Financial Institution Regulatory Tailoring Enhancement Act – because "tailoring" sounds so much better than "deregulating." This bill is a love letter to the financial industry, written by its best friends in Congress (Barr, Meuser, and Sessions). It's a cleverly crafted attempt to gut regulations that might actually prevent another 2008-style meltdown.

The "enhancements" in this bill boil down to one thing: raising the asset threshold for certain regulatory requirements from $10 billion to $50 billion. That's right; banks with assets between $10 billion and $50 billion will now get a free pass on stricter regulations, because who needs oversight when you're only moderately systemically important?

Affected industries? Oh, just the usual suspects: banking, finance, and anyone who wants to make a quick buck without worrying about pesky regulators. Compliance requirements? Ha! The bill is designed to reduce them, not increase them. Timelines? Don't worry; the banks will have plenty of time to "tailor" their operations to exploit these new loopholes.

Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? *chuckles* You think anyone in Congress actually cares about enforcing regulations? This bill is a get-out-of-jail-free card for financial institutions. Economic and operational impacts? Well, let's just say that the next time there's a financial crisis, we'll all be treated to another thrilling round of "Who Can Bail Out Whom First?"

In short, HR 3230 is a deregulatory fever dream, crafted by politicians who are either corrupt, incompetent, or both. It's a bill that says, "Hey, banks! Go ahead and take more risks; we won't bother you with pesky regulations." And to the voters? Well, they're just along for the ride – again.

Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of corruption and greed. Prognosis: Another financial crisis, coming soon to a theater near you.

Related Topics

Banking & Financial Services
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$92,054
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$90,754

No PAC contributions found

1
TED J. BALESTRERI ENTERPRISES
1 transaction
$1,000
2
QUEENSLAKE
1 transaction
$300

No committee contributions found

1
BOUCHER, DAWN D
2 transactions
$6,800
2
VESTER, NANCY
1 transaction
$6,600
3
KOLLAR, CLINT WILLIAM
1 transaction
$6,600
4
FIELD, CHESTER JACK
1 transaction
$6,600
5
FISHER, KENNETH
1 transaction
$6,600
6
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
7
BROWN, CHRIS
1 transaction
$5,600
8
DARWISH, SAM
1 transaction
$5,000
9
CORRELL, JESS T.
1 transaction
$5,000
10
JOHNSON, TRAVIS
1 transaction
$5,000
11
BARKER, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,409
12
KAUDER, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$3,409
13
LEVINE, ALLAN
1 transaction
$3,409
14
LINDSAY, OLIVIA
1 transaction
$3,409
15
SCHWIMMER, STEVEN
1 transaction
$3,409
16
WOLFF, JARED
1 transaction
$3,409
17
ATKINS, RANDALL
1 transaction
$3,300
18
BARON, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
19
BAUGUESS, SCOTT
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

ID: M001204

Top Contributors

10

1
PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORP
OrganizationDURYEA, PA
$2,500
Sep 18, 2024
2
COTLER, YUDACUFSKI, HUEBNER
OrganizationSAINT CLAIR, PA
$1,000
Apr 23, 2024
3
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Mar 25, 2024
4
PEYKOFF, ANDY
NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC • CEO
IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV
$6,600
Mar 22, 2024
5
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Sep 18, 2024
6
ROWAN, MARC J
APOLLO MANAGEMENT • MANAGEMENT
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
7
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
8
RICH, BRIAN R MR. JR
GILBERTON COAL CO. • EXECUTIVE SALES
IndividualCONSHOHOCKEN, PA
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
9
VOLPE, ELLEN M
SELF • HOMEMAKER
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023
10
VOLPE, CHARLES J
EXCALIBUR INSURANCE MGMT • PRESIDENT
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

ID: S000250

Top Contributors

10

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
May 16, 2024
2
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
Sep 12, 2023
3
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 17, 2024
4
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
May 24, 2023
5
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
6
HOWARD, RONALD VANCE
BANKERS LIFE • MANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
7
HOWARD, KAREN
ELEMENTS MASSAGE • MANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
8
SINGH, PRITPAL
BETA SOFT SYSTEMS • MANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
9
KAUR, MANJIT
SINGH SEMICONDUCTORS & SYSTEMS • MANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
10
BEHRINGER, TODD
THE BEHRINGER GROUP, LLC • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualWOODWAY, TX
$3,400
Sep 1, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 55 nodes and 28 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $115,454

Top Donors - Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.95

    Section 2(a)-(d) raises asset thresholds from $10B to $50B for CFPB supervision, Volcker Rule, qualified mortgage, and capital requirements, reducing regulatory burden on banks with assets between $10B and $50B.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 27 contributions
    • SCHARF, CHARLIE$3,300
    • DIMON, JAMES$3,300
    • LEOPOLD, ROBIN$3,300
    • OESTERLE, MARK$2,500
    • MAGUIRE, MICHAEL$2,500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 869-871AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 3230 aligns with Project 2025's critique of the CFPB by reducing its regulatory reach over mid-sized financial institutions, reflecting the policy goal of curbing the Bureau's perceived overreach and politicized enforcement, particularly through the Civil Penalty Fund."

Key themes:CFPB oversightregulatory reliefCivil Penalty Fundfinancial institution thresholdsconsumer financial regulation

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 3230 raises the asset threshold for CFPB supervision and other regulations, directly limiting the CFPB's reach and reducing its regulatory burden on smaller financial institutions—a core aim of the Project 2025 policy to curb CFPB power and return consumer protection to banking regulators and the FTC."

Key themes:CFPB supervision thresholdregulatory burden reductionDodd-Frank modificationconsumer protection scopefinancial institution relief

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Trade

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 863-865AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 3230 aligns with Project 2025's goal of reducing regulatory burden on financial institutions, particularly by raising thresholds for compliance with rules like the Volcker Rule and Qualified Mortgage requirements, reflecting a shared objective of tailoring regulation to institution size and promoting economic growth through deregulation."

Key themes:regulatory burden reductionfinancial institution tailoringeconomic growth promotionVolcker RuleQualified Mortgage

— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills