To provide for the imposition of sanctions relating to the People's Republic of China and support for Russian invasion of Ukraine, and for other purposes.
Sponsored by
Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]
ID: M001194
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real motivations behind HR 2914.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The NO LIMITS Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted bill that claims to impose sanctions on China for its alleged support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The main purpose, however, is not to actually punish China or deter Russian aggression but to create a smokescreen for the real objectives: (1) to justify increased military spending and (2) to further entrench the United States in the conflict.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces new authorities to impose sanctions on Chinese entities that allegedly support Russia's defense industrial base. It also expands existing export control restrictions on dual-use technology and imposes penalties for violating these controls. But don't be fooled – these provisions are mere window dressing, designed to create the illusion of action while allowing business as usual.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill affects Chinese entities operating in Russia, particularly those involved in the defense and technology sectors. However, the real stakeholders are the American military-industrial complex, which will benefit from increased funding and contracts, and the politicians who will use this bill to grandstand on national security issues.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The NO LIMITS Act is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – it's a symptom of a deeper disease: the insatiable appetite for power and profit that drives American foreign policy. This bill will:
1. Escalate tensions with China, potentially leading to a new Cold War. 2. Increase military spending, further enriching defense contractors and politicians. 3. Create new opportunities for corruption and cronyism in the export control regime. 4. Fail to address the root causes of Russian aggression or provide meaningful support to Ukraine.
In conclusion, HR 2914 is a masterclass in legislative deception, designed to manipulate public opinion and advance the interests of powerful stakeholders. It's a bill that will do more harm than good, perpetuating a cycle of militarism and corruption that will ultimately benefit only those who profit from conflict.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
No campaign finance data available for Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.