To provide for the imposition of sanctions relating to the People's Republic of China and support for Russian invasion of Ukraine, and for other purposes.

Bill ID: 119/hr/2914

Last Updated: April 14, 2025

To provide for the imposition of sanctions relating to the People's Republic of China and support for Russian invasion of Ukraine, and for other purposes.

HR. 2914, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$131,950 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

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Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

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Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

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Passed Congress

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Presidential Action

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The NO LIMITS Act of 2025, HR 2914, is a congressional bill that seeks to impose sanctions on the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its alleged support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As a self-serving billionaire, I'll analyze this bill through the lens of wealth and power implications.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to restrict the PRC's ability to provide material support to Russia's defense industrial base. The bill aims to impose sanctions on PRC entities involved in the export of dual-use technology, microelectronics, aerospace, automobiles, and other sectors that may benefit Russia.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces new authorities for the President to:

1. Impose country-wide export control restrictions on dual-use technology exported to the PRC. 2. Sanction PRC entities involved in military modernization activities. 3. Cut off financing avenues for PRC entities providing materiel support to Russia's defense sector.

These provisions expand existing sanctions and export controls, potentially disrupting global supply chains and trade relationships.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill targets:

1. PRC entities operating in the technology, defense, and related sectors. 2. Chinese military companies with business operations in Russia. 3. US persons and companies involved in transactions with sanctioned PRC entities.

These stakeholders will face increased regulatory scrutiny, potential sanctions, and reputational risks.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The NO LIMITS Act may:

1. Disrupt global supply chains, particularly in the tech sector, as companies adapt to new export controls. 2. Increase tensions between the US and China, potentially leading to retaliatory measures from Beijing. 3. Create opportunities for US companies to capture market share in sectors where PRC entities are sanctioned or restricted. 4. Enhance the US government's ability to track and control transactions involving dual-use technology.

As a self-serving billionaire, I see this bill as a potential threat to my business interests, particularly if it disrupts global supply chains or leads to retaliatory measures from China. However, I also recognize opportunities for strategic investments and partnerships that could benefit from the sanctions and export controls imposed by this bill. My think tank, "The Liberty Institute," will closely monitor the developments surrounding this bill and provide guidance on how to navigate its implications.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through the legislative process to become an actual law.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The main purpose of HR 2914, also known as the "NO LIMITS Act of 2025," is to impose sanctions on entities related to the People's Republic of China (PRC) for their support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The bill aims to protect national security by cutting off financing avenues and imposing export control restrictions on dual-use technology.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill has several key provisions:

* Section 2 outlines Congress' findings, which include evidence of PRC entities evading US sanctions to support Russia's defense industrial base. * Section 3 authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons who operate in certain sectors of the Russian economy or engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities, among other things. * The bill also targets Chinese military companies operating in Russia and imposes penalties for violating these sanctions.

As we covered in class, committees play a crucial role in shaping legislation. In this case, the bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Remember when we learned about the importance of committee review? It's essential to ensure that bills are thoroughly vetted before they reach the floor.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The affected parties and stakeholders include:

* The People's Republic of China (PRC) entities, which will face sanctions for their support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. * Russian Federation entities, which will be impacted by the sanctions on PRC entities that operate in certain sectors of their economy. * US companies and individuals who do business with these entities may also be affected.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The potential impact of this bill is significant. If passed, it could:

* Disrupt trade relationships between the US, China, and Russia. * Increase tensions between the US and China. * Potentially harm US businesses that rely on Chinese or Russian suppliers.

As I always emphasized in class, checks and balances are essential to our system of government. In this case, the bill's provisions will be subject to review by various branches of government, including the Executive Branch, which must implement the sanctions.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have to go grade some papers on the Constitution...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

The NO LIMITS Act of 2025 - sounds like a real doozy, folks! On the surface, this bill appears to be about imposing sanctions on China for supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But let me tell you, there's more to it than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose is to prevent Chinese entities from evading US sanctions and providing material support to Russia's defense industrial base. However, I think it's just a smokescreen for something bigger. The real objective might be to create a pretext for further escalating tensions with China and Russia, while also expanding the government's authority to control international trade and commerce.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes the President to impose sanctions on Chinese entities that operate in the technology sector of Russia's economy or provide material support to Russia's defense industrial base. It also allows for country-wide export control restrictions on dual-use technology exported to China, which could be a backdoor way to restrict US companies from doing business with China.

But here's the kicker: Section 3(c) grants the President sweeping powers to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of foreign persons if they're deemed to be supporting Russia or evading US sanctions. This is essentially a blank check for the government to seize assets and control international trade without due process.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Chinese entities, Russian companies, and even US businesses that deal with China could be impacted by these sanctions. But let's not forget about the real stakeholders - the American people. If this bill becomes law, it could lead to higher prices for goods imported from China, reduced economic opportunities, and a further erosion of civil liberties.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has far-reaching implications for global trade, national security, and individual freedoms. By expanding the government's authority to control international commerce, we're essentially creating a new era of economic warfare. The potential consequences include:

* Escalating tensions with China and Russia, potentially leading to a new Cold War or even a hot war. * Increased costs for American consumers due to reduced trade and higher tariffs. * A further erosion of civil liberties as the government gains more power to control international transactions and seize assets without due process.

Wake up, folks! This bill is just another example of how our government is slowly chipping away at our freedoms and manipulating global events to serve their own interests. We need to stay vigilant and demand transparency from our elected officials.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Deep breath, with a hint of smugness) Folks, we've got a real doozy for you tonight! HR 2914, the "NO LIMITS Act of 2025," is a bill that's all about standing up to those pesky Chinese communists and their buddies in Russia. (Wink)

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill aims to impose sanctions on China for its alleged support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The sponsors claim it's time to "more fully cut off financing avenues" for Chinese entities that provide material support to the Russian defense industry. (Sarcastic tone) Oh, because we all know how much those Chinese love their freedom... not.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons who operate in the technology sector of Russia's economy or engage in malicious cyber activities. It also targets Chinese military companies operating in Russia and allows for country-wide export control restrictions on dual-use technology exported to China. (Smirk) Because, you know, those Chinese are just dying to get their hands on our advanced tech.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the Chinese government, Russian defense industry, and any foreign person who dares to do business with them. Oh, and let's not forget about American companies that might be impacted by these sanctions... but we won't worry too much about those poor souls. (Rolls eyes)

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill could lead to a further escalation of tensions between the US and China, potentially harming global trade and economic stability. But hey, who needs stability when you've got freedom? (Sarcastic tone) I mean, it's not like this will lead to any unintended consequences or harm American interests in the long run... nope.

Now, I know what you're thinking: "But wait, isn't this just another example of the deep state trying to undermine our great nation?" (Wink) Well, let me tell you, folks, this bill is all about protecting America's national security and standing up to those evil elites in Beijing. (Smirk) Trust me, it's a brilliant conservative strategy... or at least that's what I'll keep telling you until the next commercial break.

Stay vigilant, patriots!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real motivations behind HR 2914.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The NO LIMITS Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted bill that claims to impose sanctions on China for its alleged support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The main purpose, however, is not to actually punish China or deter Russian aggression but to create a smokescreen for the real objectives: (1) to justify increased military spending and (2) to further entrench the United States in the conflict.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces new authorities to impose sanctions on Chinese entities that allegedly support Russia's defense industrial base. It also expands existing export control restrictions on dual-use technology and imposes penalties for violating these controls. But don't be fooled – these provisions are mere window dressing, designed to create the illusion of action while allowing business as usual.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill affects Chinese entities operating in Russia, particularly those involved in the defense and technology sectors. However, the real stakeholders are the American military-industrial complex, which will benefit from increased funding and contracts, and the politicians who will use this bill to grandstand on national security issues.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The NO LIMITS Act is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – it's a symptom of a deeper disease: the insatiable appetite for power and profit that drives American foreign policy. This bill will:

1. Escalate tensions with China, potentially leading to a new Cold War. 2. Increase military spending, further enriching defense contractors and politicians. 3. Create new opportunities for corruption and cronyism in the export control regime. 4. Fail to address the root causes of Russian aggression or provide meaningful support to Ukraine.

In conclusion, HR 2914 is a masterclass in legislative deception, designed to manipulate public opinion and advance the interests of powerful stakeholders. It's a bill that will do more harm than good, perpetuating a cycle of militarism and corruption that will ultimately benefit only those who profit from conflict.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**HR 2914: NO LIMITS Act of 2025**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The NO LIMITS Act aims to impose sanctions on the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and to protect US national security interests. The bill seeks to restrict PRC entities' ability to provide material support to Russia's defense industrial base, military modernization activities, and evasion of US export controls.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Sanctions on PRC Entities:** The President may impose sanctions on foreign persons (including individuals and companies) located or headquartered in the PRC that operate in the technology sector, defense sector, or other sectors deemed relevant by the Secretary of the Treasury or State. 2. **Country-wide Export Control Restrictions:** The bill authorizes the imposition of country-wide export control restrictions on dual-use technology exported to the PRC due to concerns about diversion to Russia. 3. **Sanctions on Chinese Military Companies:** The President may impose sanctions on known Chinese military companies operating in Russia.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **People's Republic of China (PRC) Entities:** Companies, individuals, and organizations located or headquartered in the PRC that provide material support to Russia's defense industrial base or engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities. 2. **Russian Federation:** The bill aims to restrict Russia's access to technology and resources from the PRC. 3. **US Businesses and Individuals:** May be affected by the imposition of sanctions on PRC entities, potentially disrupting trade relationships.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Escalation of US-China Tensions:** The bill may exacerbate tensions between the US and China, potentially leading to retaliatory measures from Beijing. 2. **Restrictions on Global Trade:** Sanctions on PRC entities could disrupt global supply chains, particularly in the technology sector. 3. **Impact on Russia's Military Capabilities:** The bill aims to restrict Russia's access to resources and technology from the PRC, which may weaken its military capabilities. 4. **National Security Implications:** The bill seeks to protect US national security interests by restricting the flow of sensitive technologies to Russia through the PRC.

Overall, HR 2914 represents a significant escalation in US efforts to counter China's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine and to protect US national security interests.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down this bill, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The NO LIMITS Act of 2025 is all about imposing sanctions on China for supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The main goal is to cut off financing avenues for Chinese entities that are helping the Russian military and defense sector. It's like, if you're gonna support a dude who's being super aggressive, we gotta take away your funding, man.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

This bill has some key provisions, bro:

* The President can impose sanctions on Chinese entities that operate in the tech sector of Russia's economy or provide material support to Russia's defense and military industrial base. * Sanctions can also be imposed on Chinese companies involved in malicious cyber activities, dual-use technology production, or research and development for Russian defense materials. * There are new authorities to protect national security by cutting off financing avenues for Chinese entities that support Russia's military.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

This bill affects a bunch of parties, dude:

* Chinese entities operating in Russia's tech sector or providing material support to Russia's defense and military industrial base * Russian Federation (they're the ones getting supported by China) * United States national security interests (we gotta protect ourselves from these aggressive moves) * Global trade and commerce (sanctions can have a ripple effect, bro)

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The potential impact is huge, man:

* This bill could significantly limit China's ability to support Russia's military aggression in Ukraine. * It might also lead to increased tensions between the US and China, which could affect global trade and commerce. * On the other hand, it could send a strong message that the international community won't tolerate aggressive behavior.

In conclusion, bro, this bill is all about holding China accountable for supporting Russia's aggression in Ukraine. It's like, if you're gonna play with fire, you gotta be ready to get burned, man.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Bill Analysis: HR 2914 - NO LIMITS Act of 2025**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The NO LIMITS Act of 2025 aims to impose sanctions on the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its alleged support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The bill seeks to restrict PRC entities' ability to provide material support to Russia's defense and military industrial base, as well as to limit the export of dual-use technology that could be diverted to Russia.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Sanctions on PRC Entities:** The bill authorizes the President to impose sanctions on PRC entities that operate in the technology sector of Russia's economy or provide material support to Russia's defense and military industrial base. 2. **Country-Wide Export Control Restrictions:** The bill requires the imposition of country-wide export control restrictions on dual-use technology exported to the PRC, citing concerns about diversion to Russia. 3. **Sanctions on Chinese Military Companies:** The bill targets Chinese military companies operating in Russia, allowing the President to impose sanctions on these entities 180 days after enactment.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **People's Republic of China (PRC) Entities:** PRC entities that operate in Russia's technology sector or provide material support to Russia's defense and military industrial base may face sanctions. 2. **Russian Federation:** The bill aims to restrict Russia's access to dual-use technology and limit its ability to receive material support from PRC entities. 3. **U.S. Companies:** U.S. companies that export dual-use technology to the PRC may be affected by the country-wide export control restrictions.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Escalation of U.S.-China Tensions:** The bill's sanctions on PRC entities could exacerbate tensions between the United States and China, potentially leading to retaliatory measures from Beijing. 2. **Impact on Global Supply Chains:** The country-wide export control restrictions on dual-use technology could disrupt global supply chains, particularly in industries that rely heavily on Chinese manufacturing. 3. **Effectiveness of Sanctions:** The bill's sanctions may not be effective in achieving their intended goals, as PRC entities may find ways to circumvent or evade the restrictions.

**Monied Interest Analysis:**

1. **Defense Industry Lobbying:** The defense industry has been a strong supporter of sanctions on Russia and China. Companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon Technologies have lobbied extensively on issues related to national security and export controls. 2. **U.S.-China Business Council:** The U.S.-China Business Council, which represents American companies operating in China, may oppose the bill's country-wide export control restrictions, citing concerns about their impact on U.S. businesses.

**Committee Capture:** The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which this bill was referred, has a history of being influenced by defense industry lobbyists and

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$131,950

26 donors

PACs

Organizations

$39,550

Committees

Individuals

$92,400

No PAC contributions found

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

3 transactions

$6,600

SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS

2 transactions

$5,800

MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND POTTAWATOMI INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE TRIBAL OPERATIONS

1 transaction

$3,300

NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI

1 transaction

$3,300

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$3,000

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE CHIPPEWA INDIANS

1 transaction

$2,900

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

1 transaction

$2,500

THE CHICKASAW NATION

1 transaction

$2,000

GRANT CONSULTING GROUP LLC

1 transaction

$250

No committee contributions found

HIBMA, DANIEL T.

1 transaction

$6,600

CAMERON, RONALD M.

1 transaction

$6,600

KENNEDY III, JOHN C.

1 transaction

$6,600

LYNCH, JON J.

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, DANIEL G.

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, DOUGLAS L.

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, ELISABETH

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, MARIA P.

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, PAMELLA G.

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, RICHARD M. JR.

1 transaction

$6,600

DEVOS, SUZANNE C.

1 transaction

$6,600

EHMANN, STEPHEN L.

1 transaction

$6,600

MYLER, PAMELA H.

1 transaction

$6,600

KEPLER, DAVID E. II

1 transaction

$6,600

Donor Network - Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 56 nodes and 30 connections (59 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $131,950

Top Donors - Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

12 Orgs14 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 6 harmed.

−Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Section 3(a)(1)(B) authorizes sanctions on foreign persons operating in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation's economy, which would harm defense contractors that do business with Russian entities.
−Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.90
Section 3(a)(1)(B) and (e)(6) list semiconductor firms like SMIC, YMTC, CXMT, AMEC as known Chinese military companies; sanctions on their operations in Russia would harm semiconductor hardware industry.
−Aerospace (Commercial)confidence 0.85
Section 3(b) targets known Chinese military companies with business operations in Russia, including aerospace firms like AVIC and its subsidiaries listed in (e)(6)(JJ)-(NN), which would harm commercial aerospace contractors linked to these entities.
−Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.85
Section 3(e)(6) lists Huawei, ZTE (implied via China Telecom/Unicom), and other telecom equipment makers as known Chinese military companies; sanctions on their Russia operations would harm telecom industry.
−Cybersecurityconfidence 0.85
Section 3(a)(2)(A) authorizes sanctions for malicious cyber-enabled activities; firms like Qihoo 360 (e)(6)(B)) and other cybersecurity firms could be targeted if linked to Russian operations.
−AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.80
Section 3(a)(1)(B) covers dual-use technology and AI-related sectors; firms like SenseTime, Megvii (listed in e)(6)(E)) and cloud/AI providers could be sanctioned if operating in Russia, harming AI/cloud sector.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Aerospace (Commercial)$1,500
from 3 contributions
- WACLAWSKI, MICHAEL L.$1,500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2914 directly enacts the export‑control tightening measures advocated in Project 2025—imposing country‑wide restrictions on dual‑use tech to China, sanctioning PRC entities that support Russia’s military, and expanding the Entity List/denial policy—thereby implementing the policy’s core objectives."

Key themes:export controlsChina/Russia restrictionsEntity List sanctionsdual‑use technologylicensing tightening

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Very Strong

Vector: 64%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2914 directly implements Project 2025's call to tighten export controls on China and Russia by imposing sanctions on PRC entities supporting Russia's military, authorizing country-wide export restrictions on dual-use tech, and targeting Chinese military firms—aligning with EAR modernization goals like eliminating loopholes, broadening foreign direct product rules, and treating China/Russia as high-risk countries of concern."

Key themes:export controls on Chinanational security technology protectioncountering civil-military fusionstrengthening EAR enforcementrestricting dual-use tech transfers

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of State

Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 214-216AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2914 aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on countering Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. interests, particularly through sanctions targeting PRC support for Russia's war in Ukraine and efforts to protect national security by restricting technology transfers. The bill reflects the Project 2025 view that U.S. foreign policy must prioritize American interests, fiscal responsibility, and sovereignty while confronting China's enabling role in global instability."

Key themes:China as primary threatNational security strategyCountering PRC-Russia cooperationTechnology export controlsSanctions on foreign entities

— 182 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l One school of conservative thought holds that as Moscow’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine drags on, Russia presents major challenges to U.S. interests, as well as to peace, stability, and the post-Cold War security order in Europe. This viewpoint argues for continued U.S. involvement including military aid, economic aid, and the presence of NATO and U.S. troops if necessary. The end goal of the conflict must be the defeat of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a return to pre-invasion border lines. l Another school of conservative thought denies that U.S. Ukrainian support is in the national security interest of America at all. Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance and is one of the most corrupt nations in the region. European nations directly affected by the conflict should aid in the defense of Ukraine, but the U.S. should not continue its involvement. This viewpoint desires a swift end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia. l The tension between these competing positions has given rise to a third approach. This conservative viewpoint eschews both isolationism and interventionism. Rather, each foreign policy decision must first ask the question: What is in the interest of the American people? U.S. military engagement must clearly fall within U.S. interests; be fiscally responsible; and protect American freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, all while recognizing Communist China as the greatest threat to U.S. interests. Thus, with respect to Ukraine, continued U.S. involvement must be fully paid for; limited to military aid (while European allies address Ukraine’s economic needs); and have a clearly defined national security strategy that does not risk American lives. Regardless of viewpoints, all sides agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is unjust and that the Ukrainian people have a right to defend their homeland. Furthermore, the conflict has severely weakened Putin’s military strength and provided a boost to NATO unity and its importance to European nations. The next conservative President has a generational opportunity to bring res- olution to the foreign policy tensions within the movement and chart a new path forward that recognizes Communist China as the defining threat to U.S. interests in the 21st century. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Peace and stability in Northeast Asia are vital interests of the United States. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan are critical allies for ensuring a free and open Indo–Pacific. They are indispensable military, economic, diplomatic, and technology partners. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North — 183 — Department of State Korea) must be deterred from military conflict. The United States cannot permit the DPRK to remain a de facto nuclear power with the capacity to threaten the United States or its allies. This interest is both critical to the defense of the Amer- ican homeland and the future of global nonproliferation. The DPRK must not be permitted to profit from its blatant violations of international commitments or to threaten other nations with nuclear blackmail. Both interests can only be served if the U.S. disallows the DPRK’s rogue regime behavior. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS Western Hemisphere The United States has a vested interest in a relatively united and economically prosperous Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the region now has an overwhelm- ing number of socialist or progressive regimes, which are at odds with the freedom and growth-oriented policies of the U.S. and other neighbors and who increasingly pose hemispheric security threats. A new approach is therefore needed, one that simultaneously allows the U.S. to re-posture in its best interests and helps regional partners enter a new century of growth and opportunity. The following core policies must be part of this new direction: l A “sovereign Mexico” policy. Mexico is currently a national security disaster. Bluntly stated, Mexico can no longer qualify as a first-world nation; it has functionally lost its sovereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country. The current dynamic is not good for either U.S. citizens or Mexicans, and the perfect storm created by this cartel state has negative effects that are damaging the entire hemisphere. The next Administration must both adopt a posture that calls for a fully sovereign Mexico and take all steps at its disposal to support that result in as rapid a fashion as possible. l A fentanyl-free frontier. The same cartels that parasitically run Mexico are also working with the PRC to fuel the largest drug crisis in the history of North America. These Mexican cartels are working closely with Chinese fentanyl precursor chemical manufacturers, importing those precursor chemicals into Mexico, manufacturing fentanyl on Mexican soil, and shipping it into the United States and elsewhere. The highly potent narcotic is having an unprecedented lethal impact on the American citizenry. The next Administration must leverage its new insistence on a sovereign Mexico and work with other Western Hemisphere partners to halt the fentanyl crisis and put a decisive end to this unprecedented public health threat.

Trade

Moderate

Vector: 62%

Pages: 846-848AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2914 aligns with Project 2025's broader China strategy by targeting PRC support for Russia and seeking to restrict technology transfers that bolster adversarial capabilities, reflecting shared concerns about China's authoritarian practices and national security threats. However, the bill focuses on sanctions and export controls rather than the specific Project 2025 proposal to close EXIM, resulting in moderate rather than strong alignment."

Key themes:China policynational securitytechnology transfer restrictionsauthoritarian regimeseconomic statecraft

— 813 — Trade Unlike most other agencies, EXIM has a charter that expires. Congress must renew it periodically, or else the agency will permanently close. Its current charter expires at the end of 2026. Closing this New Deal–era legacy agency would be a conservative victory on a number of fronts. It is also a winnable battle: Congress just needs to do nothing. Conservatives have both foreign policy and economic reasons to oppose EXIM. EXIM has a long history of providing financing for authoritarian govern- ments in China, Russia, and the Middle East that often oppose U.S. foreign policy interests, and its deals often oppose U.S. economic interests. EXIM financing also harms domestic airlines. Many EXIM financing deals enable foreign state- run airlines to buy Boeing jets at a discount. These foreign airlines, subsidized by the U.S. government, then compete directly with U.S. airlines on interna- tional routes. More recently, the Biden Administration has expanded EXIM’s mission to advance progressive policy goals, including limits on financing for projects that involve fossil fuels or contribute to climate change, preferential treatment for renewable energy projects, and quotas for projects that benefit women-owned and minority-owned businesses. All of these could raise EXIM’s default rates, putting taxpayer dollars at risk. The strongest argument in EXIM’s favor is that it boosts U.S. exports by financ- ing projects that would otherwise never receive financing. We now have evidence that this argument is false: EXIM does not finance additional exports; instead, it largely substitutes for other forms of export financing that would occur anyway. EXIM’s authorization lapsed in 2014–2015 because of conservative opposition to renewing its charter. During this lapse, EXIM maintained its existing portfo- lio but was unable to take on new business. Boeing reported no trouble finding alternative financing and even reported record profits during EXIM’s lapse while working to fulfill a seven-year backlog of orders.76 EXIM boasts an extremely low default rate, but that is because of selection bias. EXIM overwhelmingly takes on low-risk projects that private banks would be happy to finance, although this admittedly could change somewhat with EXIM’s Biden-era mandates to finance climate and other policy-focused projects. EXIM is also a textbook example of regulatory capture. l It has a long record of deals with authoritarian governments. l It subsidizes direct foreign competitors of domestic businesses. l It has been hijacked by progressives to advance their climate and other preferred policies. — 814 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Its beneficiaries have proven they can get adequate financing from private banks. EXIM’s charter expires at the end of 2026. The agency will close automatically unless Congress and the President decide to extend it. Closing EXIM should be one of the next Administration’s easiest decisions. Adopting a Multi-Pronged China Strategy. An effective American policy toward China needs to take a realistic view of the country, its leaders, their strengths, and the serious challenges they face. It should be comprehensive and flexible. A threatened CCP is dangerous, perhaps now more than at any time since Mao Tse-Tung, as Xi Jinping continues to use strong-arm tactics to consolidate his power and saber-rattling to challenge the international order. At the same time, recent revelations about China’s official statistics overstating its GDP by 30 percent track well with other problems that were already known.77 These include one of the world’s worst demographic aging curves thanks to China’s one-child policy; a population that may already be declining; an unsustainable debt load that is already causing problems; countless failed boondoggles, from empty cities to its underwhelming Belt-and-Road Initiative, that are wasting significant resources; Xi Jinping’s authoritarian turn; increasing state control of the economy; and a zero-COVID policy that has sabotaged the economy and driven away foreign investment.78 America has its problems, but it is in better shape than China on nearly every measure, especially in the long run. While the facts on the ground should inoculate the next Administration against the most strident China fearmongering circulating in the media and in Washington, that does not mean that the government in Beijing is no threat to American interests. The question is: What should we do about it? A serious China policy will require American policymakers to integrate doc- trines, institutional prerogatives, expertise, and realistic objectives. Traditional Cabinet-level bureaucracies like those at the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce will need to work together to pursue a comprehensive American strat- egy. Scores of incremental, narrowly targeted policies are necessary. They will not make for good soundbites on cable news, and many will operate slowly and out of sight from most news cycles even as progress is made. An effective China policy must also allow for adaptation because the CCP will not sit idly by. As people react to developments, America needs flexible options. Trade isolationism is inherently inflexible because it reduces the number of con- tact points with China. This is a tougher political sell than loud, simplistic jeremiads, but going the extra mile to solve these difficult coordination problems is vital to America’s interests. Trade and engagement with China are necessary if we are to contain the threats that China poses to its neighbors and to the U.S. The next Administration should:

Trade

Moderate

Vector: 62%

Pages: 846-848AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2914 aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on a targeted, comprehensive China strategy that uses economic tools to counter specific malign behavior, but it focuses on sanctions and export controls for geopolitical support rather than the trade‑policy reforms (e.g., WTO status, TPP reentry) highlighted in the Project 2025 text."

Key themes:targeted actions against Chinese firmsexport controls/restrictionscountering China's threatscomprehensive China strategy

— 814 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Its beneficiaries have proven they can get adequate financing from private banks. EXIM’s charter expires at the end of 2026. The agency will close automatically unless Congress and the President decide to extend it. Closing EXIM should be one of the next Administration’s easiest decisions. Adopting a Multi-Pronged China Strategy. An effective American policy toward China needs to take a realistic view of the country, its leaders, their strengths, and the serious challenges they face. It should be comprehensive and flexible. A threatened CCP is dangerous, perhaps now more than at any time since Mao Tse-Tung, as Xi Jinping continues to use strong-arm tactics to consolidate his power and saber-rattling to challenge the international order. At the same time, recent revelations about China’s official statistics overstating its GDP by 30 percent track well with other problems that were already known.77 These include one of the world’s worst demographic aging curves thanks to China’s one-child policy; a population that may already be declining; an unsustainable debt load that is already causing problems; countless failed boondoggles, from empty cities to its underwhelming Belt-and-Road Initiative, that are wasting significant resources; Xi Jinping’s authoritarian turn; increasing state control of the economy; and a zero-COVID policy that has sabotaged the economy and driven away foreign investment.78 America has its problems, but it is in better shape than China on nearly every measure, especially in the long run. While the facts on the ground should inoculate the next Administration against the most strident China fearmongering circulating in the media and in Washington, that does not mean that the government in Beijing is no threat to American interests. The question is: What should we do about it? A serious China policy will require American policymakers to integrate doc- trines, institutional prerogatives, expertise, and realistic objectives. Traditional Cabinet-level bureaucracies like those at the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce will need to work together to pursue a comprehensive American strat- egy. Scores of incremental, narrowly targeted policies are necessary. They will not make for good soundbites on cable news, and many will operate slowly and out of sight from most news cycles even as progress is made. An effective China policy must also allow for adaptation because the CCP will not sit idly by. As people react to developments, America needs flexible options. Trade isolationism is inherently inflexible because it reduces the number of con- tact points with China. This is a tougher political sell than loud, simplistic jeremiads, but going the extra mile to solve these difficult coordination problems is vital to America’s interests. Trade and engagement with China are necessary if we are to contain the threats that China poses to its neighbors and to the U.S. The next Administration should: — 815 — Trade l End China’s developing-nation status in the WTO and other international organizations. China is an advanced manufacturing economy and should be treated as such, even if its political and legal institutions remain those of a developing nation, to prevent it from exploiting its status to gain special privileges. l Use a target, not a blanket. There should be actions against Chinese firms that are known to have engaged in unfair trade practices such as intellectual property theft. Rather than blanket tariffs or non-tariff barriers aimed at entire Chinese industry sectors, firms that act in bad faith should be targeted individually. This policy was employed to good effect early in the Trump Administration but was abandoned in favor of a less effective blanket tariff policy. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement might have been the Trump Administration’s biggest trade policy mistake. The TPP was already negotiated and would have strengthened an alliance against China, including most of its biggest trading partners in East Asia and the Americas. America’s departure created tensions and infighting, distracting the U.S. and its allies from the goal at hand: countering China. The other 11 TPP countries continue, without American input or influence, under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP) to develop a modern institutional framework to contain Chinese commercial imperialism. Rejoining this alliance should be a top priority in the next conservative Administration’s China policy. Accession negotiations are likely to be difficult, given that the CPATPP suspended several clauses that were important to the United States (such as provisions relating to patents and aspects of investor-state dispute resolution) when the U.S. pulled out of the TPP agreement in 2017. Diplomatic and economic pressure against Beijing will be more effective when its largest trading partners work in concert. Beijing’s diplomats will have a hard time employing a divide-and-conquer policy against a united front of the sort that the TPP offers. l Refocus the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity on trade. President Biden began the process to create IPEF in 2022, but any agreement will likely still be under negotiation when the next Administration takes office. IPEF is similar to the TPP, but its member

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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