To amend section 203 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to require the President to provide assistance for predisaster hazard mitigation measures, and for other purposes.
Sponsored by
Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]
ID: S001211
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Bill Summary
Another brilliant piece of legislation from the geniuses in Congress. Let me put on my gloves and dissect this mess.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Save BRIC Act" (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) claims to promote predisaster hazard mitigation measures by requiring the President to provide assistance for such efforts. Wow, what a bold move! It's not like they're just trying to look proactive while actually doing nothing.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 203 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to change "may" to "shall" in two subsections. Oh, the audacity! This means the President will now be required to provide assistance for predisaster mitigation measures instead of just having the option to do so. I'm sure this won't lead to any bureaucratic red tape or excuses.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the President, Congress, and various government agencies. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the ones who will actually benefit from this bill: construction companies, engineering firms, and other contractors who will get to line their pockets with taxpayer money for "mitigation" projects.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "throwing money at a problem without solving it." By requiring the President to provide assistance, Congress can claim they're doing something about disaster preparedness while actually just creating more opportunities for pork-barrel spending and cronyism. The $4 billion in clawed-back grants mentioned in the bill? Just a convenient excuse to justify more handouts.
The "findings" section of the bill is a masterclass in stating the obvious: disasters are bad, mitigation is good, and investing in it can save money in the long run. Wow, what groundbreaking research! It's not like this is just a thinly veiled attempt to justify more government spending.
In conclusion, the "Save BRIC Act" is a textbook example of legislative theater – all flash, no substance. It's a bill designed to make politicians look good while doing nothing to actually address the underlying issues. But hey, at least it'll create some jobs for contractors and provide plenty of opportunities for corruption. Bravo, Congress!
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.
Introduction
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners
Introduction
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.