To terminate certain tariffs imposed pursuant to emergency authorities and require congressional approval for the imposition of similar tariffs, and for other purposes.

Bill ID: 119/hr/2888

Last Updated: April 10, 2025

To terminate certain tariffs imposed pursuant to emergency authorities and require congressional approval for the imposition of similar tariffs, and for other purposes.

HR. 2888, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.

The sponsor

Rep. Sánchez, Linda T. [D-CA-38]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 834-836 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Invalid Date

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: HR 2888 - A Threat to Executive Discretion and Free Trade**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect the implications of HR 2888 on my business empire and the global economy.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill aims to terminate certain tariffs imposed under emergency authorities and require congressional approval for future tariff impositions. The primary objective is to limit executive discretion in trade policy and subject it to congressional oversight.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Termination of Executive Orders:** HR 2888 nullifies specific executive orders imposing tariffs, effectively reversing existing trade policies. 2. **Congressional Approval Required:** The bill mandates joint resolutions of approval for future tariff impositions, quotas, or suspension of trade agreement concessions. 3. **Exclusions and Exceptions:** Certain duties, such as antidumping and countervailing duties, are exempt from the congressional approval requirement.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Executive Branch:** The bill limits the President's authority to unilaterally impose tariffs, potentially hindering their ability to respond quickly to changing market conditions. 2. **Congress:** HR 2888 empowers Congress to scrutinize and approve trade policies, increasing their influence over international trade decisions. 3. **Businesses and Industries:** Companies relying on imports or exports may face increased uncertainty and costs due to the potential for delayed or blocked tariff impositions.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Reduced Executive Flexibility:** By requiring congressional approval, HR 2888 restricts the executive branch's ability to respond swiftly to trade disputes or emerging market trends. 2. **Increased Regulatory Burden:** The bill may lead to a more complex and time-consuming process for implementing trade policies, potentially hindering innovation and competitiveness. 3. **Potential Trade Disruptions:** The termination of existing tariffs and quotas could disrupt global supply chains, leading to increased costs and reduced economic efficiency.

In conclusion, HR 2888 poses a significant threat to executive discretion in trade policy and may lead to increased regulatory burdens, trade disruptions, and reduced competitiveness. As a visionary entrepreneur, I will closely monitor the bill's progress and advocate for policies that promote free trade, innovation, and economic growth.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

No campaign finance data available for Rep. Sánchez, Linda T. [D-CA-38]

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 14 helped.

+Oil & Gasconfidence 0.90
Section 2 terminates tariffs imposed by Executive Orders 14257, 14193, 14194, which include tariffs on steel, aluminum, and other goods; removal of such tariffs reduces input costs for oil and gas extraction and refining operations that rely on imported steel and equipment.
+Construction & Engineeringconfidence 0.90
Section 2 terminates tariffs on steel and aluminum, directly reducing material costs for construction firms and engineering contractors that rely on imported metals for building materials and infrastructure projects.
+Coal Miningconfidence 0.85
Section 2 terminates tariffs on steel and aluminum under the cited Executive Orders, which lowers costs for coal mining operations that use imported steel for machinery, conveyors, and infrastructure.
+Pipelines & Energy Infrastructureconfidence 0.85
Section 2 terminates tariffs on steel and aluminum, which are critical inputs for pipelines, LNG terminals, and storage facilities; removal lowers capital costs for midstream operators.
+Automotive (Legacy)confidence 0.85
Section 2 terminates tariffs on steel and aluminum, key inputs for vehicle manufacturing; removal lowers production costs for traditional automakers.
+Renewable Energyconfidence 0.80
Section 2 terminates tariffs on steel and aluminum, reducing costs for wind turbine and solar panel manufacturing that depend on imported metals; Section 3 requires congressional approval for new tariffs, preventing future cost increases.

+ 8 more industries not shown.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Strong

Vector: 68%

Pages: 834-836AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2888 aligns strongly with Project 2025's trade policy by seeking to repeal harmful tariffs and restore congressional authority over trade measures, directly supporting the goal of eliminating destructive Trump-Biden tariffs and addressing constitutional concerns about executive overreach in tariff imposition."

Key themes:tariff reformcongressional authoritytrade policy stabilityexecutive power checksSection 232/301 repeal

— 801 — Trade l Repeal the Jones Act,48 a century-old “Buy American” maritime law that has decimated the U.S. shipbuilding industry. l Work with Congress to restore the President’s Trade Promotion Authority, which would expedite the negotiation of trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Taiwan, the European Union, and other allies, and keep trade-unrelated provisions out of trade agreements. l Restore the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution process to full strength. l Create a successor to the WTO (assuming that it has been fatally wounded) that is open only to liberal democracies. This would prevent authoritarian countries like China from abusing the organization for their own ends. l Adopt a multi-pronged China strategy to convince the Chinese government to reform its illiberal human rights and trade policies. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whose 11 members are developing institutional trade norms in an important geopolitical region without U.S. input or involvement. l Reorient the proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to focus only on trade issues, which it currently ignores in favor of progressive wish-list policies. l Strengthen diplomatic pressure (in concert with allies) against Beijing’s abuses. Encourage cultural and intellectual engagement with the Chinese people, remembering that blue jeans and rock ’n’ roll helped to win the Cold War. Tariff Relief. When people try something repeatedly and it still doesn’t work, they should stop doing it—especially when the consequences turn out to be just what conservative economists have long predicted they would be.49 With tariffs, the proper reform is not only to get rid of the individual tariffs that have backfired, but also to build institutional safeguards against future abuse. We are five years into the biggest experiment with tariffs since the Great Depres- sion, and the results are in: The new tariffs raise consumer prices for ordinary Americans by about $1,200 per household every year50 and benefit only a small number of special interests. Steel and aluminum tariffs, enacted on national security grounds, angered allies. Beijing made not a single substantive reform in — 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that

Trade

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 843-845AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2888 aligns strongly with Project 2025's trade policy by seeking to restore congressional authority over trade actions, particularly regarding tariff imposition, which reflects the document's emphasis on renewing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and increasing congressional oversight to ensure trade agreements remain focused on trade issues and prevent executive overreach."

Key themes:congressional oversighttrade promotion authoritytariff imposition limitsexecutive-legislative balancetrade policy stability

— 811 — Trade contains the Sections 201 and 301 tariff delegations. TPA, then called fast-track, has aided several trade agreements, including NAFTA and the USMCA, which took effect in 2020. TPA has lapsed before during slow periods in trade policy, most recently in July 2021, and remains lapsed today. The President should work with Congress to renew TPA to rationalize negoti- ations for upcoming trade agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. Both supporters and critics have questions regarding TPA’s implications for the constitutional separation of powers, and policymakers should take those questions seriously. As things currently stand, Congress has some oversight powers over the President’s negotiations under TPA, but they are limited. Congress can increase its oversight by passing new legislation superseding relevant provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. However, that is a double-edged sword. A Congress that largely favors free trade could exercise oversight to keep the President on the straight and narrow in trade negotiations. A progressive Congress would instead insist that the President negotiate for as many trade-unrelated provisions as possible to benefit labor and green constituencies while pushing progressive policies on the U.S. and its trading partners. On balance, a single voice at the negotiating table that is subject to congressional oversight is the best posture for American workers and consumers. A fractious Congress has yet to demonstrate the capacity to negotiate with other nations, but it can help to hold the Administration accountable. Trade Agreements with the United Kingdom, European Union, and Others. Even with a renewed TPA, trade agreement negotiations will likely take years. The Trump and Biden Administrations were not inclined to start the process, so that job may well fall to the next Administration. In that sense, the delays may end up being worth it. If there is one lodestar to follow, it is to restrict these agreements to trade issues only. Ever since NAFTA, trade-unrelated provisions have taken on a greater role in trade agreements. These create sticking points and are routinely hijacked by rent-seeking special interests and progressive ideologues who demand subsidies, carve-outs, and economically distorting labor and environmental standards that have nothing to do with trade. If governments are to negotiate these issues, they should do so in separate agreements so they do not torpedo efforts to liberalize and engage with allies. Trade agreements should lighten burdens, not create new ones by attempting to address non-trade issues. Policy leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, including experts from The Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Enterprise Insti- tute, have prepared a model trade agreement along these lines.73 Along with TPA renewal, this would greatly reduce negotiating costs. This template is also readily adaptable for agreements with Europe and any other allies that are willing to — 812 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liberalize their economies and build a stronger alliance with America. The draft U.S.–U.K. agreement includes an accession chapter to allow others to join on the same terms. Restoring or Replacing the WTO Dispute Resolution Process. The World Trade Organization as we know it may be mortally wounded. This deprives the U.S. of the WTO’s dispute resolution process, under which the U.S. it won 85 percent of the cases it brought. The WTO’s slow death began under the Obama Administra- tion, which refused to allow appointees to the WTO’s appellate board, which as a consequence is now nonfunctional. Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have continued the Obama Administration’s approach. That means that every case in the dispute resolution process will sputter to a halt as parties file appeals that cannot be heard. If the WTO is no longer fit for that purpose, it may be better to look in a different direction. More than 20 years ago, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow proposed that America and other free economies should form a Global Free Trade Alliance that is open to all countries that adhere to a truly free market system with appropriate safeguards such as property rights, lack of corruption, and enforcement of contracts.74 Alongside a general agreement on low to zero tariffs, the alliance would move to reduce the effect of nontariff barriers (such as the previously noted baby formula ingredient and labeling barriers) by basing trade around the principle of mutual recognition. Such an alliance could be started by a trade agreement between the United States and, for example, the United Kingdom with an accession chapter allowing others to join if they meet the criteria. It would be essential for a Global Free Trade Alliance to avoid the WTO’s most serious problem: the exemptions from its rules that are granted to developing countries. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was granted developing-na- tion status, which it continues to use to dodge rules that should apply to it. Other countries have used that status to delay needed reforms. Rule exemptions give some countries a perverse incentive to remain poor and autocratic. A Global Free Trade Alliance would allow the U.S. to enjoy the benefits of a rules- based international trading system without the WTO’s shortcomings. Negotiation costs would be lower because the countries would already be allied on many issues. In addition, there would be no separate tiers with different rules, and this would give developing countries an incentive to liberalize. In addition to being good for its own sake, liberalization would give them entry into a prestigious club that tilted toward America’s orbit and away from China’s. Closing the Export–Import Bank. The Export–Import Bank (EXIM) is an unusually clear example of how vulnerable trade protectionism is to being hijacked by special interests.75 In most years, about half of EXIM’s business benefits a single company, Boeing. Their relationship is so cozy that EXIM’s nickname around Washington is “the Bank of Boeing.”

Trade

Strong

Vector: 66%

Pages: 834-836AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2888 aligns strongly with Project 2025's trade policy by seeking to repeal or limit executive-imposed tariffs under Sections 232, 201, and 301, and restoring congressional authority over trade measures—core objectives outlined in the policy. Both emphasize correcting the misuse of delegated tariff authority and promoting stable, accountable trade policy that benefits American workers and consumers."

Key themes:tariff repealcongressional authoritySection 232/301trade policy accountabilityexecutive power checks

— 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that — 803 — Trade American manufacturing output is currently at an all-time high. The record was not set during World War II and not during the 1950s boom. Output did not peak when manufacturing employment peaked in 1979 or during the Reagan economic revival in the 1980s. It is actually higher now than it has ever been. American manufacturing is buoyant because each manufacturing worker’s pro- ductivity is also at an all-time high. The key to prosperity is doing more with less. The next President should ignore special interests and populist ideologues who want government to do the opposite through industrial policy, trade protectionism, and other failed progressive policies. It takes surprisingly few people to achieve America’s record-high manufac- turing output—currently about 13 million people out of a workforce of more than 160 million, compared to the 1979 peak of 19.5 million people out of a workforce of 104 million.56 Productivity growth has freed the time and talents of millions of people for other, additional uses. The belief that manufacturing has to shrink for services to grow is the zero- sum fallacy against which sensible economists often warn. It is anathema to the optimism, hope, and confidence that are the natural birthright of conservatives. Growing productivity enables more output of both manufacturing and services. That is why America continues to have sustained booms and record-setting real GDP despite the long-run decline in manufacturing employment. Economists distinguish between two types of growth: extensive and intensive. Extensive growth is the Soviet and Chinese model for manufacturing: If you have more people use more resources, they will create more output. Extensive growth is doing more with more; intensive growth is doing more with less. That is where America’s superpower lies. The story of American manufacturing is one of intensive growth dating back to our agricultural origins. Conservative leaders should draw on this history to position America for continued success. With intensive growth, it is not manufacturing or services; it is manufacturing and services. Retaliatory Tariffs. Raising tariffs on another country almost always invites retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. The latter tend to be directed at politically sen- sitive American exports. Retaliatory tariffs by both China and American allies in response to the 2018 steel tariffs were targeted primarily at American agriculture. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, those tariffs cost farmers $27 billion with losses concentrated particularly in heartland states.57 Retaliatory tariffs also targeted U.S. industries that were not protected by tar- iffs. Many imports become inputs into U.S. manufacturing. The motorcycle maker Harley-Davidson was already facing higher production costs as domestic steel producers raised their prices to accommodate the new steel tariff. A retaliatory tariff on its motorcycles imposed by the European Union further raised its prices and hurt its export business. Harm to such innocent bystanders was another unin- tended (though foreseen) consequence.

Trade

Weak

Vector: 65%

Pages: 843-845AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2888 focuses on limiting executive power in imposing tariffs by requiring congressional approval, which contrasts with Project 2025's emphasis on renewing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to strengthen presidential negotiating power in trade agreements, albeit with congressional oversight. While both address congressional-executive dynamics in trade policy, the bill seeks to constrain presidential authority, whereas Project 2025 aims to enhance it under TPA, resulting in only weak thematic ali"

Key themes:congressional oversighttrade policyexecutive-legislative balanceTrade Promotion Authority

— 810 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is important not to oversell trade’s inflation benefits as a cure-all, but at the margin, it can help. The next Administration should keep this in mind as it tries to cope with this politically volatile issue. Trade and Foreign Policy. We have seen how trade liberalization would boost the domestic economy and make American businesses more competitive, but conservative trade policies also benefit America’s foreign policy interests. Policy- makers should therefore: l Negotiate multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. l Reform the World Trade Organization or build a successor organization with membership limited to liberal democracies. l Repeal the Jones Act to replace Russian energy imports with domestic production. l Develop a multifaceted, long-term China policy that takes seriously America’s biggest foreign policy threat and deals with it on several fronts. National Security. The most persuasive arguments against a market-oriented trade policy come from another national objective: national security. Protection- ism and similar progressive policies tend to weaken American security, but trade creates peace. The more countries trade, the less likely they are to fight one another and the more robust their supply networks will be. Going to war with customers is bad for business. Without a strong economic interest in continued U.S. investment and exports, for example, China’s behavior would likely become increasingly less predictable and more dangerous. Anyone who thinks Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and the government in Beijing are bad actors now—which they are—should consider what would happen if the Chinese convinced liberal countries like the United States to decouple from them, leaving them free to pursue whatever policies they wish without the significant counterweight that America can provide. That is one reason for Xi Jinping’s emphasis on centralization and self-suffi- ciency. He does not like international pressure about his government’s human rights violations and bad-faith trading policies, and decoupling from trading part- ners like America is one way to avoid that pressure. A less constrained China would be poorer but much more unstable and dangerous to its neighbors and to America than it would be if it still had to engage regularly with the rest of the world. Trade Promotion Authority. Trade agreements can take years to negotiate. One way to accelerate the process is for Congress to grant the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). It was first granted under the 1974 Trade Act, which — 811 — Trade contains the Sections 201 and 301 tariff delegations. TPA, then called fast-track, has aided several trade agreements, including NAFTA and the USMCA, which took effect in 2020. TPA has lapsed before during slow periods in trade policy, most recently in July 2021, and remains lapsed today. The President should work with Congress to renew TPA to rationalize negoti- ations for upcoming trade agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. Both supporters and critics have questions regarding TPA’s implications for the constitutional separation of powers, and policymakers should take those questions seriously. As things currently stand, Congress has some oversight powers over the President’s negotiations under TPA, but they are limited. Congress can increase its oversight by passing new legislation superseding relevant provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. However, that is a double-edged sword. A Congress that largely favors free trade could exercise oversight to keep the President on the straight and narrow in trade negotiations. A progressive Congress would instead insist that the President negotiate for as many trade-unrelated provisions as possible to benefit labor and green constituencies while pushing progressive policies on the U.S. and its trading partners. On balance, a single voice at the negotiating table that is subject to congressional oversight is the best posture for American workers and consumers. A fractious Congress has yet to demonstrate the capacity to negotiate with other nations, but it can help to hold the Administration accountable. Trade Agreements with the United Kingdom, European Union, and Others. Even with a renewed TPA, trade agreement negotiations will likely take years. The Trump and Biden Administrations were not inclined to start the process, so that job may well fall to the next Administration. In that sense, the delays may end up being worth it. If there is one lodestar to follow, it is to restrict these agreements to trade issues only. Ever since NAFTA, trade-unrelated provisions have taken on a greater role in trade agreements. These create sticking points and are routinely hijacked by rent-seeking special interests and progressive ideologues who demand subsidies, carve-outs, and economically distorting labor and environmental standards that have nothing to do with trade. If governments are to negotiate these issues, they should do so in separate agreements so they do not torpedo efforts to liberalize and engage with allies. Trade agreements should lighten burdens, not create new ones by attempting to address non-trade issues. Policy leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, including experts from The Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Enterprise Insti- tute, have prepared a model trade agreement along these lines.73 Along with TPA renewal, this would greatly reduce negotiating costs. This template is also readily adaptable for agreements with Europe and any other allies that are willing to

Environmental Protection Agency

Minimal

Vector: 65%

Pages: 458-460AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2888 focuses on limiting executive authority over tariffs and trade policy, while the Project 2025 EPA section addresses environmental regulation, emissions standards, permitting reforms, and climate policy. There is no substantive overlap in subject matter, goals, or mechanisms between the bill and the cited policy section."

— 425 — Environmental Protection Agency are statutorily required, and remove any regulatory differences between attainment and maintenance that are not explicitly required by law. l Streamline the process for state and local governments to demonstrate that their federally funded highway projects will not interfere with NAAQS attainment. l Adopt policies to prevent abuse of EPA’s CAA “error correction” authority.20 EPA historically has used this to coerce states into adopting its favored policies on pain of imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). l Limit EPA’s reliance on CAA § 30121 general rulemaking authority to ensure that it is not abused to issue regulations for which EPA lacks substantive authority elsewhere in the statute. l If possible, return the standard-setting role to Congress. Climate Change l Remove the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) for any source category that is not currently being regulated. The overall reporting program imposes significant burdens on small businesses and companies that are not being regulated. This is either a pointless burden or a sword-of- Damocles threat of future regulation, neither of which is appropriate. l Establish a system, with an appropriate deadline, to update the 2009 endangerment finding. l Establish a significant emissions rate (SER) for greenhouse gasses (GHGs). Regulating Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Under the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act22 l Repeal Biden Administration implementing regulations for the AIM Act that are unnecessarily stringent and costly. l Refrain from granting petitions from opportunistic manufacturers to add new restrictions that further skew the market toward costlier refrigerants and equipment. — 426 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Conduct realistic cost assessments that reflect actual consumer experiences instead of the current unrealistic ones claiming that the program is virtually cost-free. Mobile Source Regulation by the Office of Transportation and Air Quality l Establish GHG car standards under Department of Transportation (DOT) leadership that properly consider cost, choice, safety, and national security. l Review the existing “ramp rate” for car standards to ensure that it is actually achievable. l Include life cycle emissions of electric vehicles and consider all of their environmental impacts. l Restore the position that California’s waiver applies only to California- specific issues like ground-level ozone, not global climate issues. l Ensure that other states can adopt California’s standards only for traditional/criteria pollutants, not greenhouse gases. l Stop the use of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to increase standards on airplanes. l Reconsider the Cleaner Trucks Initiative to balance the goal of driving down emissions without creating significant costs or complex burdens on the industry. Air Permitting Reforms for New Source Review (Pre-Construction Per- mits) and Title V (Operating Permits) l Develop reforms to ensure that when a facility improves efficiency within its production process, new permitting requirements are not triggered. l Restore the Trump EPA position on Once-In, Always-In (that major sources can convert to area sources when affiliated emissions standards are met). l Revisit permitting and enforcement assumptions that sources will operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; this artificially inflates a source’s potential to emit (PTE), which can result in more stringent permit terms.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

To terminate certain tariffs imposed pursuant to emergency authorities and require congressional approval for the imposition of similar tariffs, and for other purposes.