To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit machinegun conversion devices and illegal modifications of semiautomatic firearms, and for other purposes.

Bill ID: 119/hr/2799
Last Updated: April 15, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

ID: T000468

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Invalid Date

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

âś…

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Closing the Bump Stock Loophole Act of 2025" is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. The bill's primary objective is to prohibit machinegun conversion devices and modifications that increase the rate of fire of semiautomatic firearms. Or, in simpler terms, it's an attempt to ban bump stocks and other gadgets that make guns go " pew-pew-pew" faster.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Title 18 of the United States Code by adding a new definition for semiautomatic firearms and prohibiting the importation, sale, manufacture, transfer, receipt, or possession of devices that increase the rate of fire. It also requires registration of modified semiautomatic firearms within 120 days of enactment.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this legislative circus:

* Gun manufacturers and lobbyists, who will no doubt find creative ways to circumvent these new regulations. * Gun owners and enthusiasts, who will be forced to register their modified firearms or risk facing the wrath of the law. * Law enforcement agencies, which will have to deal with the bureaucratic nightmare of enforcing these new provisions.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of treating the symptoms rather than the disease. By focusing on bump stocks and other gadgets, Congress is ignoring the root causes of gun violence in America. The real issue is not the devices themselves, but rather the lax regulations surrounding firearms sales, ownership, and use.

In reality, this bill will have little to no impact on reducing gun violence. It's a feel-good measure designed to appease the masses while allowing politicians to claim they're "doing something" about the problem. Meanwhile, the gun lobby will continue to pull the strings from behind the scenes, ensuring that meaningful reform remains elusive.

In medical terms, this bill is akin to treating a patient with a severe case of gangrene by applying a Band-Aid. It's a superficial solution that ignores the underlying rot and corruption that plagues our system.

And so, we're left with another example of legislative malpractice, where politicians prioritize grandstanding over genuine problem-solving. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create a bill that is both ineffective and infuriating.

Related Topics

Civil Rights & Liberties State & Local Government Affairs Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Government Operations & Accountability National Security & Intelligence Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Federal Budget & Appropriations Congressional Rules & Procedures
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$78,850
24 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$12,850
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

1
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$5,800
2
LAS VEGAS PAIUTE TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,300
3
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,500
4
RENO-SPARKS INDIAN COLONY
1 transaction
$1,000
5
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000
6
NET2LINK, LLC
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
ALSOP, JOSEPH W
2 transactions
$6,600
2
BROWN, JAY H.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
CHANG, RONIE
1 transaction
$3,300
4
PRITZKER, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300
5
SCHMIDT, ERIC
1 transaction
$3,300
6
CASHMAN, MARYKAYE
1 transaction
$3,300
7
GREENSPUN, MYRA S
1 transaction
$3,300
8
HAAS, GENE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
KELLNER, PETER
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SANDBERG, SHERYL
1 transaction
$3,300
11
SCOTT, MARIE RAY
1 transaction
$3,300
12
SUSSMAN, S. DONALD S
1 transaction
$3,300
13
TRONE, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
14
JURVETSON, KARLA
1 transaction
$3,300
15
SAMUELSON, MARTHA S
1 transaction
$3,300
16
SAMUELSON, PAUL
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BEKENSTEIN, ANITA
1 transaction
$3,300
18
BEKENSTEIN, JOSHUA
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 25 nodes and 27 connections

Total contributions: $78,850

Top Donors - Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]

Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount

6 Orgs18 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 45.6%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Low 45.6%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Introduction

Low 43.3%
Pages: 587-589

— 554 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise attorneys are consistently using the tools at their disposal in cases with violent offenders, including pursuing mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).43 The department should also support legislative efforts to provide further tools, such as the Restoring the Armed Career Criminal Act, which Senators Tom Cotton (R–AR), Marsha Blackburn (R–TN), and Cindy Hyde-Smith (R–MS) introduced in 2021 in response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions neutering the ACCA.44 l Enforce the death penalty where appropriate and applicable. Capital punishment is a sensitive matter, as it should be, but the current crime wave makes deterrence vital at the federal, state, and local levels. However, providing this punishment without ever enforcing it provides justice neither for the victims’ families nor for the defendant. The next conservative Administration should therefore do everything possible to obtain finality for the 44 prisoners currently on federal death row. It should also pursue the death penalty for applicable crimes—particularly heinous crimes involving violence and sexual abuse of children—until Congress says otherwise through legislation.45 DISMANTLING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES Criminal organizations are as old as crime itself, but are more extensive, sophisticated, and dangerous today than at any other point in history. The Department of Justice has a key role in tackling transnational criminal orga- nizations like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Mexican drug cartels as well as purely domestic criminal organizations like those built on the more traditional mafia crime model as part of its obligation to ensure the safety and security of the American people. The department’s primary directive under the next Administration should be to return to an unapologetic focus on dismantling these criminal organizations and incarcerating their membership. Once this reprioritization occurs, the depart- ment’s political leadership should take concrete steps to use agency reach and resources to prevent these criminal organizations from operating and surviving. Assaulting the business model of these criminal organizations—which are massive, diversified enterprises with nationwide or international operations—is essential for success. The next Administration will therefore need to: l Revitalize the DOJ’s use of the array of statutory tools that exist for dealing with the threat of criminal organizations. The most potent ones are the simplest. For example, the department should:

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.