No Tax Breaks for Union Busting (NTBUB) Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2692
Last Updated: April 16, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Norcross, Donald [D-NJ-1]

ID: N000188

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Bill Summary

The No Tax Breaks for Union Busting (NTBUB) Act - because who needs a clever acronym when you can just spell out the obvious? This bill is a masterclass in legislative theater, designed to make it seem like Congress actually cares about workers' rights. Let's dissect this farce.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The NTBUB Act claims to end tax subsidies for employers who try to influence their employees' decisions regarding labor organizations and collective action. In reality, its purpose is to score cheap political points with unions and liberal voters while doing little to address the actual issues.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to deny tax deductions for employer spending aimed at influencing employees' opinions on labor organizations. It also defines "labor organization" and "labor organization activity" to ensure everyone knows what they're pretending to care about.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Employers, unions, and workers are the obvious stakeholders. However, let's be real - this bill is more about posturing than actual change. Employers will find ways to circumvent these rules, unions will claim a hollow victory, and workers will continue to get screwed.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The NTBUB Act might lead to some minor changes in employer behavior, but it won't address the systemic issues that allow union busting to thrive. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. Employers will still find ways to intimidate and manipulate workers, and unions will continue to struggle for relevance.

In conclusion, this bill is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to appear pro-worker while doing nothing to address the underlying problems. The sponsors of this bill should be ashamed - but they won't be, because they're too busy patting themselves on the back for pretending to care about workers' rights.

Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of " Politician-itis" - a disease characterized by an excessive desire for self-aggrandizement and a complete lack of actual policy substance. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for hypocrisy, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies.

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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Norcross, Donald [D-NJ-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$67,300
16 donors
PACs
$0
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$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$67,300

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
MAZZARELLI, ANTHONY
2 transactions
$6,600
2
O'DOWD, KEVIN
2 transactions
$6,600
3
ROWAN, CAROLYN
2 transactions
$6,600
4
ROWAN, MARC J
2 transactions
$6,600
5
DAVIS, MITCHELL
1 transaction
$4,600
6
BELLIA, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
7
BERNARDES, JULIENE
1 transaction
$3,300
8
BIBBS, K. WENDELL
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BIRD, ALLEN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
CAPOFERRI, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
11
CULNAN, DENNIS JR
1 transaction
$3,300
12
FORMAN, DONNA R
1 transaction
$3,300
13
LEONARD, THOMAS A ESQ.
1 transaction
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14
KRONE, DAVID BRETT
1 transaction
$3,300
15
LAZARUS, MEG
1 transaction
$3,300
16
MCEVOY, CAROL WOOLLLEY
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Norcross, Donald [D-NJ-1]

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Total contributions: $67,300

Top Donors - Rep. Norcross, Donald [D-NJ-1]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 50.9%
Pages: 636-638

— 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by — 605 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies government agencies, but other Western market democracies feature effective and popular benefits administered by non-public worker organizations. The next conservative Administration should encourage UI innovation by capi- talizing on a key feature of the system and principle of conservative policymaking: federalism. State governments already administer unemployment benefits and have broad discretion over their programs. Existing statutory language in the Social Security Act24 does not prohibit non-public organizations from administering the program, nor does it specifically authorize states to do so. Further, the Adminis- tration can replicate state-level experiments in welfare programs and empower state officials to adapt UI to local conditions and needs. l Approve non-public worker organizations as UI administrators. DOL should approve, pursuant to § 303(a)(2) of the Social Security Act, non- public worker organizations as administrators. l Offer waivers for suitable alternatives. DOL should offer waivers from the standard requirements imposed on unemployment compensation by § 303(a) and § 303(d) of the Social Security Act to states that propose suitable alternatives. l Require organizations to comply with restrictions on political spending. DOL should establish as a precondition for receiving any public funds a requirement that an organization comply with restrictions on political spending as applied to 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. Labor Law. The federal laws governing labor-management relations have barely changed in generations, and reforms on the federal level have been almost impossible to get through Congress. To modernize labor law, the Congress should: l Pass legislation allowing waivers for states and local governments. To encourage experimentation and reform efforts at the state and local levels, Congress should pass legislation allowing waivers from federal labor laws like the NLRA and FLSA under certain conditions. State and local governments seeking waivers would be required to demonstrate that their reforms would accomplish the purpose of the underlying law, and not take away any current rights held by workers or employers. In addition, waivers would be limited to a five-year period, after which time they could be modified, canceled, or renewed. Excessive Occupational Regulation. Excessive occupational regulation— most typically encountered as occupational licensing—creates underemployment

Introduction

Low 48.9%
Pages: 636-638

— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others

Introduction

Low 48.9%
Pages: 636-638

— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others — 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.