Cool Roof Rebate Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
ID: F000477
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed representatives in Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Cool Roof Rebate Act of 2025 is a masterclass in greenwashing, masquerading as an effort to promote energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The bill's primary objective is to provide rebates for households that install "cool roof" products, which allegedly reflect solar radiation and reduce heat gain.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a rebate program, administered by the Secretary of Energy, to incentivize households to purchase and install eligible cool roof products. The rebates range from $0.25 to $0.75 per square foot, depending on the type of roof and product used. The program is set to terminate in 2030, with a reporting requirement to assess its effectiveness.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this charade:
* Homeowners, who will receive rebates for installing cool roof products (but only if they meet the arbitrary criteria set by the bill). * The roofing industry, which will likely see an increase in demand for their products. * Environmental groups, who will tout this bill as a victory for climate action (despite its negligible impact). * Taxpayers, who will foot the bill for this program through appropriations.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's not be naive; this bill is a token gesture, designed to appease environmentalists and provide a PR boost for politicians. The actual impact on energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions will be minimal, as the rebates are limited in scope and duration.
The real beneficiaries of this bill are the roofing industry and their lobbyists, who have successfully manipulated the system to secure government subsidies for their products. This is a classic example of regulatory capture, where special interests hijack policy to serve their own agendas.
In conclusion, the Cool Roof Rebate Act of 2025 is a farcical exercise in legislative theater, designed to create the illusion of action on climate change while serving the interests of industry lobbyists. As with most government programs, this bill will likely achieve little more than lining the pockets of special interest groups and perpetuating the cycle of corruption and incompetence that plagues our political system.
Diagnosis: Terminal Stupidity Syndrome (TSS), characterized by a severe lack of critical thinking, an overreliance on feel-good policies, and a complete disregard for the underlying motivations driving legislative decisions. Prognosis: Poor.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
Donor Network - Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 19 nodes and 20 connections
Total contributions: $52,350
Top Donors - Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 395 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research.”85 Its cleanup program is the world’s largest, and EM reports that 92 (of 107) sites have been completed.86 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE is responsible for the largest share of the federal government’s environmental liability—about 85 percent in fiscal year 2020.”87 Since 2011, EM has spent a cumulative total of $63.2 billion, and its liability has grown by $243 billion.88 It is currently projected that cleanup will take another 70 years (FY 2022 to FY 2091).89 Projected “Low Range” and “High Range” lifecycle costs total slightly less than $652.4 billion and slightly more than $887.2 billion, respectively.90 Needed Reforms Some states (and contractors), see EM as a jobs program and have little interest in accelerating the cleanup. EM needs to move to an expeditious program with targets for cleanup of sites. The Hanford site in Washington State is a particular challenge. The Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) among DOE, the Environmental Pro- tection Agency, and Washington State’s Department of Ecology has hampered attempts to accelerate and innovate the cleanup. A central challenge at Hanford is the classification of radioactive waste. High-Level Waste (HLW) and Low-Level Waste (LLW) classifications drive the remediation and disposal process. Under President Trump, significant changes in waste classification from HLW to LLW enabled significant progress on remediation. Implementation needs to continue across the complex, particularly at Hanford. New Policies The next Administration should: l Accelerate the cleanup. This means that a comprehensive cost projection and schedule reflecting the entire scope of the job should be developed and appropriate reforms should be instituted. To save taxpayers a potential $500 billion over the long run and reduce current risk, a 10-year program to complete all sites by 2035 (except Hanford with a target date of 2060) should be considered. Such a commitment will require increased funding for EM during those accelerated periods. To the extent that funding from the IIJA and IRA cannot be repealed, requests to divert those funds to EM’s cleanup obligations should be considered. l Fully implement High-Level Waste determination. Fully adopting the High-Level Waste (HLW) determination across the DOE complex, particularly at Hanford, would allow LLW to be grouted rather than vitrified. — 396 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Increase the use of commercial waste disposal. Using commercial disposal would reduce capital costs (~ $2 billion) for new disposal sites to accelerate cleanup and reduce local post-cleanup environmental liability at multiple sites. l Revisit the Hanford cleanup’s regulatory framework. Hanford poses significant political and legal challenges with the State of Washington, and DOE will have to work with Congress to make progress in accelerating cleanup at that site. DOE and EPA need to work more closely to coordinate their responses to claims made under the TPA and work more aggressively for changes, including congressional action if necessary, to achieve workable cleanup goals. l Establish more direct leadership and accountability to the Deputy Secretary consistent with Government Accountability Office recommendations.91 l Change Environmental Management’s culture to promote innovation and completion. Budget Environmental Management received slightly less than $7.6 billion in FY 2021, and its budget request for FY 2023 is approximately $8.06 billion.92 The additional funding necessary to accelerate closure of the program will need to be considered as part of a broader government-wide discussion about yearly appropriations. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCRWM) (CURRENTLY OFFICE OF SPENT FUEL AND WASTE DISPOSITION) Mission/Overview The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 conferred the responsibility for commercial nuclear waste disposal on the federal government,93 and in 2002, Congress designated a single repository located at Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the national repository site. The act also established the Office of Civilian Radio- active Waste Management (OCRWM).94 The Obama Administration shut down OCRWM in 2010. The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, which is headed by a non-confirmed Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of Nuclear Energy, is currently responsible for the management of nuclear waste, and interim disposal is taking place on various sites. Providing a plan for the proper disposal of civilian nuclear waste is essential to the promotion of nuclear power in the United States.
Introduction
— 395 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research.”85 Its cleanup program is the world’s largest, and EM reports that 92 (of 107) sites have been completed.86 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE is responsible for the largest share of the federal government’s environmental liability—about 85 percent in fiscal year 2020.”87 Since 2011, EM has spent a cumulative total of $63.2 billion, and its liability has grown by $243 billion.88 It is currently projected that cleanup will take another 70 years (FY 2022 to FY 2091).89 Projected “Low Range” and “High Range” lifecycle costs total slightly less than $652.4 billion and slightly more than $887.2 billion, respectively.90 Needed Reforms Some states (and contractors), see EM as a jobs program and have little interest in accelerating the cleanup. EM needs to move to an expeditious program with targets for cleanup of sites. The Hanford site in Washington State is a particular challenge. The Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) among DOE, the Environmental Pro- tection Agency, and Washington State’s Department of Ecology has hampered attempts to accelerate and innovate the cleanup. A central challenge at Hanford is the classification of radioactive waste. High-Level Waste (HLW) and Low-Level Waste (LLW) classifications drive the remediation and disposal process. Under President Trump, significant changes in waste classification from HLW to LLW enabled significant progress on remediation. Implementation needs to continue across the complex, particularly at Hanford. New Policies The next Administration should: l Accelerate the cleanup. This means that a comprehensive cost projection and schedule reflecting the entire scope of the job should be developed and appropriate reforms should be instituted. To save taxpayers a potential $500 billion over the long run and reduce current risk, a 10-year program to complete all sites by 2035 (except Hanford with a target date of 2060) should be considered. Such a commitment will require increased funding for EM during those accelerated periods. To the extent that funding from the IIJA and IRA cannot be repealed, requests to divert those funds to EM’s cleanup obligations should be considered. l Fully implement High-Level Waste determination. Fully adopting the High-Level Waste (HLW) determination across the DOE complex, particularly at Hanford, would allow LLW to be grouted rather than vitrified.
Introduction
— 413 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 62. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, “About the Federal Energy Management Program: Mission and Stakeholders,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/about-federal-energy- management-program (accessed February 13, 2023). 63. See, for example, 42 U.S. Code § 8252, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8252 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8253, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8253 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8254, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8254 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8255, https://www.law. cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8255 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8256, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ text/42/8256 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8257, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8257 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8258, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8259b, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258b (accessed February 13, 2023); § 15852, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/15852 (accessed February 13, 2023); and § 17143, https://www. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/17143 (accessed February 13, 2023). 64. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations,” May 17, 2018, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 99 (May 22, 2018), pp. 23771–23774, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05- 22/pdf/2018-11101.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 65. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “FY 2022 Request Overview Briefing,” June 2021, p. 11, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/FY2022-EERE-budget-request- energy-efficiency.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 66. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 21. 67. U.S. Department of Energy, Clean Energy Corps, “Careers,” https://www.energy.gov/CleanEnergyCorps (accessed March 13, 2023). 68. Ibid. 69. U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE Kicks Off Recruitment to Support Implementation of Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,” January 13, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-kicks-recruitment-support- implementation-bipartisan-infrastructure-law (accessed March 13, 2023). 70. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “About EIA,” https://www.eia.gov/about/ (accessed February 13, 2023). 71. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022,” March 2022, p. 1, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_ generation.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 72. U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016, April 2018, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy. pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 73. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 24, and 105. 74. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Mission: Our Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ia/ our-mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 75. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Priorities: Our Objectives,” https://www.energy. gov/ia/priorities (accessed February 13, 2023). 76. Editorial Board, “Biden Signs Up for Climate Reparations,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-signs-up-for-climate-change-reparations-europe-fund-un-john-kerry- poor-countries-bank-capitalism-11668974219 (accessed February 13, 2023). 77. U.S. Department of Energy, Arctic Energy Office, “About the Arctic Energy Office,” https://www.energy.gov/ arctic/about-arctic-energy-office (accessed March 1, 2023). 78. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, The White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 79. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence website, https://www.energy.gov/ intelligence/office-intelligence-and-counterintelligence (accessed February 13, 2023). 80. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy, “Publications,” https://www.energy.gov/policy/office-policy (accessed February 13, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.